Investigating the Paradoxical Development of Southeast Asia: Economies Boom, Human Rights Collapse
Christian Montanez
Staff Writer
Southeast Asia is undoubtedly a starlet of economic development in today’s modern world. According to the International Monetary Fund, Southeast Asia is the second fastest developing economic region since 1980, as its GDP has grown over two hundred percent and its share of world GDP has doubled. The population increase of the region tells a similar tale, as it has increased more than twofold, post-1980. As a result, Southeast Asia has become a basin full of budding trade markets, manufacturing centers, and foreign investment. When presented with such strong indications of positive change, one would expect Southeast Asia (SEA) to be at the precipice of becoming a major powerhouse on the international stage and the posterchild for successful development; however, human rights protection, a key aspect of development, have been left in the dust. While it is unfair to claim that Southeast Asia has not improved its human rights situation, progress has not been nearly as rapid as economic growth, leaving much to be desired. To understand why individual rights have failed to develop throughout Southeast Asia, there are two fundamental roadblocks that impede meaningful change: the return of oppressive, politically violent regimes and a lack of strong international institutions which could hold regimes accountable.
In the early 2000s, democracy had appeared to be on the rise within SEA, as nations that had historically been ruled by military regimes such as Myanmar, Indonesia, and Thailand cast out and replaced them with civilian-led governments. Furthermore, previously established democracies such as the Philippines, Timor-Leste, and Malaysia reinforced the foundations of their systems. However, these widescale reforms that increased civil liberties, and political freedoms were not designed to last. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, militaries saw little reductions in their size and funding, received impunity from punishment for committing political violence, and constitutional reforms fell short or failed to materialize at all. By failing to admonish and separate the military from political power, young Southeast Asian democracies were destined to fail, as those that utilized political violence escaped without permanent, long-lasting consequences.
As reported by Freedom House in their 2024 Freedom Report, out of the eleven countries in Southeast Asia, only Timor-Leste is considered to still be a free country while all other nations have suffered partial or complete losses of political freedom due to military coups. The most visible example of this regression can be seen in Myanmar. As stated by Human Rights Watch, since 2017, the Rohingya ethnic minority has been suffering from a military-led genocide that has seen over 750,000 civilians killed or forced to flee from their homes due to mass destruction. With the onset of the 2021 coup, military violence has spread to the entire nation, as punitive bombings on villages accused of helping rebels has resulted in the deaths of over 4,000 civilians . These actions are in blatant violation of articles three and five of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or UDHR, which all 193 UN member states, including Myanmar, has signed. Although the Rohingya genocide existed before military rule, the junta has undoubtedly exacerbated an already horrid human rights situation. While there is no guarantee that an elected government will abide by the UDHR, they can be held accountable by its constituents while a military junta has no impetus to relinquish power or change its behavior short of a stronger military force. If more countries in Southeast Asia fall to military coups such as Cambodia or Thailand, their populations could face the same fate seen in Myanmar, resulting in a human rights catastrophe.
A similar human rights situation can be seen even in the stronger, established democracies of Southeast Asia. In the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, democratically elected leaders have enacted authoritarian policies or returned power to military leadership as told by the Council on Foreign Relations. The Philippines is a particularly interesting situation given its previous history with authoritarian regimes, as it overthrew the Ferdinand Marcos dictatorship and created a new constitution built to prevent such abuses of power from occurring again. Nevertheless, the populist election of former president Rodrigo Duterte in 2016 sparked a campaign dubbed the “war on drugs,” which began a cycle of extrajudicial violence that continues to this very day. Through the “war on drugs,” Duterte abused the office of the President by ordering the national police force as a weapon of political violence, which violated human rights defined in the UDHR. As reported by Rappler, over 30,000 citizens were murdered by both national police forces and vigilantes under the accusation of being drug users or dealers without ever seeing a day in court. The same fate awaited nearly 700 human rights lawyers, activists, and journalists, as in their attempts to stop the bloodshed and hold Duterte’s death squads accountable through civil institutions, became targets for imprisonment and assassinations.
As seen in the two previous examples, when civilian or military governments use political violence and repressive policies to oppress its people and silence critics, national systems simply are not enough to protect human rights. As a result, populations look to the international community for assistance in their fights for human rights, yet problems lie there as well. In theory, international institutions such as the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) were created with the purpose of holding governments accountable for violations of international law, including human rights violations; however, due to a lack of enforcement mechanisms, these organizations have had great difficulty in completing their goals. Instead of being able to unilaterally investigate potential abuses, the ICC and UNHRC rely on the cooperation, presenting a great vulnerability when nations refuse to allow access as seen in the Philippines. Furthermore, even if an institution is granted access, it lacks the power to force a regime to make meaningful changes outside shaming through exposing rights violations. With the combination of a rise in authoritarian regimes and weak international protections, it is no wonder that regional declines in human rights have arisen across the region.
Nonetheless, Southeast Asia still has a chance for reversing its troubling future, as an underutilized intergovernmental organization provides hope if it can properly adapt its behavior. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, otherwise known as ASEAN, is a regional political-economic union that consists of each state in the region except Timor-Leste, who is in the process of joining. According to ASEAN, its focuses are economic growth, social progress, and security through its principles of peace and non-intervention collaboration. ASEAN has undoubtedly benefitted the region as, according to World Economics, it accounts for 7 percent of the world GDP and 8.5 percent of world growth of the last decade, a stark contrast from the 3 percent in 1980. Unfortunately, when it comes to human rights ASEAN has had nowhere near the same level of success. Despite publicly stating a commitment to uphold human rights in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration of 2012, ASEAN has been disappointingly silent and weak in its responses to human rights violations. Instead of taking definitive action, oftentimes ASEAN would simply release a statement that calls for peace but refused to condemn the actions of any government or party. After seeing such timid action, autocratic regimes recognized that international repercussions for their actions are heavily limited, perpetuating the cycle of repression that has seen
Although ASEAN’s current ability to protect human rights is extremely weak, it has great promise to transform into a stalwart defender of marginalized people. Given ASEAN’s history as successful and widely respected regional organization, established governmental infrastructure, and economic integration, it has all the tools to elevate itself to the next level. However, for this potential to be fully reached, ASEAN must change one its core tenets and mechanisms. The principle of non-interference severely hinders the effectiveness of any attempt at human rights protections, as it prevents ASEAN from ever intervening in a country’s affairs, whether that be in the form economic or security measures. By not being able to interfere with the internal affairs of a state, ASEAN cannot make any meaningful threats to force a government to stop its human rights violations, as seen today. Similarly, the consensus vote at the ASEAN Summit restricts the action the organization can take, as one country can uphold the entire process. If this form of voting is transformed to a simple majority where each country has one vote, all members will still have an equal say while being able to pass legislation at a much more effective rate. With these barriers removed, ASEAN would have an entire arsenal of measures available at its disposal. The bulk of ASEAN’s leverage exists within its trade agreements such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), as they allow for the reduction or elimination of tariffs and provide access to markets across Asia that would be initially hard to reach. If participation in these agreements could be threatened by a majority vote instead of consensus at the ASEAN Summit, countries that commit human rights violations would have to seriously consider how to move forward rather than just ignore ASEAN. The economic integration of Southeast Asia through trade is one of the main drivers behind why countries were able to develop in the first place, so if these trade agreements were revoked then significant economic damage would ensure in the aftermath. Countries such as Myanmar and the Philippines would be forced to stop their human rights abuses or risk losing the immense progress they have enjoyed for the preceding decades, a choice that could certainly result in the reduction of human rights violations.
ASEAN certainly provides a potential remedy, but there are also caveats that must be acknowledged. Firstly, there is the question of whether or not human rights even fall within the scope of ASEAN’s duties. Even though ASEAN has primarily functioned as a regional forum for economic cooperation, as outlined within the Bangkok Declaration, one of the purposes of ASEAN is to promote the principles of the UN Charter and social progress with Southeast Asia. With such aims described within the organization’s founding document, it becomes evident that human rights fall within the scope of ASEAN. Secondly, even with the creation of stronger enforcement methods and institutions, would ASEAN human rights intervention be effective? While stronger institutions such as the majority vote can help organize and direct support, ASEAN cannot act unilaterally and must depend upon the cooperation of its member states to function, limiting its ability to act outside of the interests and dedication of the Southeast Asian community of nations. After all, policies are nothing more than words if each state does not commit themselves to action to make them a reality. More specifically, the support of the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand, known as the ASEAN-5, could make or break the effectiveness of ASEAN intervention. The ASEAN-5 are the largest economies within Southeast Asia, containing much of the industry and trade within the region, making these powerhouses very influential. If ASEAN could gain the collective backing of these five, then its enforcement of human rights reforms could be much more potent, as if it requests for collective action such as the enactment of trade barriers, the loss of access to ASEAN-5 markets could hinder the economies of non-cooperative nations enough to lead to their compliance. On the other hand, if ASEAN does not receive this key support, then its primary mechanism of compliance is significantly weakened as the strongest countries could then cooperate with each other to reduce the effect of any ASEAN mandate to virtually nothing. Ultimately, there is no one solution for the human rights dilemma within Southeast Asia; however, a reformed and further involved ASEAN can become a force for human rights throughout the entire region as long as interstate dynamics do not lead to cooperation against ASEAN.
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