State-Building and Its Discontents: Why the U.S. Should Step Back in Gaza
Neve Walker
Staff Writer
There have been many calls for the United States to take the lead in rebuilding Gaza. Yet, this assumption is based on the rhetoric that Washington possesses both legitimacy and the responsibility to reshape political landscapes far beyond its borders. This assumption is false and deserves far greater scrutiny .
In the post-Cold War era, the United States became a global hegemon, its power far outpacing formerly communist states. Now,in the over thirty years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. took it upon themselves to work in state building, especially in the Middle East. This attitude of American exceptionalism, that the U.S. had greater authority to create a state then the people comprising the state did not have the intended benefits that was hoped. Instead of stronger allies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and other areas, the United States funded terrorist organizations, led coups, and destabilized the area, creating further distrust \Americans and led to attacks on American soil. History suggests that when the United States moves beyond humanitarian relief into state-building in the Middle East, the results are rarely stable and often provoke backlash that undermines both regional order and American credibility. Gaza is not a U.S. territory, nor an ally. A country that is spending billions of dollars to destroy an entire region and its people should not have the authority to work in the state-building process, especially when the President of our country is creating AI videos of Gaza being rebuilt in his image, with golden statues of Donald Trump and dancing women.
Looking back on our historical intervention in the region can help us contextualize the situation at hand. During the Cold War, the United States was the central actor in a multitude of proxy wars in the area, destabilizing the region and giving rise to political fundamentalism, which paved the way to further destabilization in the War of Terror. The U.S.’s involvement in the landscape blended security imperatives with ambitious political engineering, which typically were failed experiments. Iraq’s reconstruction after 2003 can be used as an example on such failed experiments. After billions of dollars in aid and institutional reform efforts, there was still a failure to produce a working government. Perceptions of occupation by the United States fueled insurgency groups in the area. Rather than stabilization, this American led state-building practice became entwined with local power struggles and nationalist resentment.
There is also a broader global context the United States cannot ignore. Actress regions, the erosion of trust in liberal internationalism and the rise of authoritarian and far-right movements thrive on narratives of foreign meddling and imperial overreach. American-directed rebuilding campaigns can inadvertently strengthen these narratives, both abroad and at home, by portraying U.S. power as unaccountable and expansive. In the Middle East, memories of colonial mandates and Cold War interventions remain potent, Washington’s visible hand in shaping Gaza’s future could reinforce claims that Western powers continue to dictate regional outcomes, deepening political polarization and resistance.
While this all may be true, this does not mean there should be a complete withdrawal of U.S. intervention. Instead, the United States needs to pivot, withdrawing aid from the aggressors, instead using it for humanitarian aid. These efforts need to be made multilaterally to avoid direct influence. The political destiny of the Palestinian area should not be in the hands of the United States, nor any outside country for that matter, it needs to be decided by Palestinians.
The distinction between providing humanitarian assistance and being a key player in state-building is crucial. When aid is conditional, when preventing the suffering and starvation of a group of people is contingent on political redesign overseen by an external power, the aid blurs into coercion. When aid prioritizes civilian survival as well as delivered transparently through international frameworks, like IGOs and NGOs, there is a preservation of a degree of neutrality that is essential in protracted conflicts of this nature. The Palestinians themselves need to be at the forefront of Gazan reconstruction. There is a need for international support, yes, but it should not translate into foreign authority. The United States should not have the jurisdiction to redesign the Gazan area just like China and Russia should not, it is the duty of the Palestinians and regional actors. The United States influence in the MENA region has historically oscillated between engagement and overreach. While at moment, it has brokered peace and mobilized relief, other times, it has become the central actor in conflicts the U.S. had no control over. The devastation in Gaza is not an area for state-building experiments, with golden statues and AI Elon Musk. This conflict has killed thousands and has left hundreds of thousands displaced. According to the United Nations, 20,000 children are at risk of dying from starvation in the area. We need to reimagine a more restrained conception of American power, one that prioritizes humanitarian responsibility over political engineering, right over might, and assistance over authority.
The question is not whether the United States can help rebuild Gaza, it is the United States’ responsibility to shape its political future. In an era marked with rising authoritarianism, Washington may create stability best not by governing from afar, but on focusing on how to alleviate the most suffering for the most people in the area.
Image courtesy of Getty Images.
