The Usage of Drones for Terrorism in Africa

Envoy Staff Writer

On Africa’s evolving battlefields, the skies are a new front in the fight against terror. Over the past two years, both Islamist militants and state-actor rivals have increasingly relied on drones, not only for reconnaissance, but for lethal strike missions. The result is a fundamental transformation in the projection of violence across the continent, especially in Sudan and the Sahel, where comparatively low-cost unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are rebalancing the dynamics of asymmetric conflict.

In Sudan’s civil war, the battle for air supremacy has come to the fore. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) operationalized the Baykar Akinci UCAV, a highly effective Turkish-manufactured platform, in late 2024 as a remedy to regain control over disputed airspace in Darfur and Kordofan. Military Africa reports that the Akinci, endowed with endurance and payload, was meant to be a game changer. Its deployment was a step towards high-end drones in a conflict that had earlier been fought with older, smaller UAVs and manned aircraft.

Yet Sudan’s paramilitary foe, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), have been undeterred. RSF air defenses shot down the third Akinci drone in September 2025 over West Kordofan, chipping away at SAF air superiority. Military Africa further confirms the debris matched significant Akinci components—fuselage, wings, nosecone—showing that the RSF’s countermeasures are taking hold. Earlier in the year, the RSF had already shot down another Akinci model, a sign of a trend. Military Africa also reports that in early May 2025, RSF drones bombed Port Sudan, where Turkish specialists were training SAF on the operation of Akinci.

In the meantime, Sudan is trying to enhance its own drone potential as well. In July 2025, at the International Defence Industry Fair, the Safaroog OWA UAV was revealed, an attempt to localize UAV production and reduce reliance on external vendors. Military Africa comments that this ambition is part of a broader plan: combining UAVs with electronic warfare to disable adversarial drones.

The transformation is not limited to Sudan. Across the Sahel, jihadist groups have adopted drone warfare as an increasingly significant tool. Le Monde reports that JNIM — the local al-Qaeda affiliate — has carried out more than 30 confirmed drone attacks since 2023, including a flurry of 24 between March and June 2025 alone. JNIM and other such outfits are using commercially available drones, such as DJI models, modified to carry improvised explosives and controlled using mobile networks. These tactics reflect a transition from pure surveillance to offensive strike usage.

The spread of drone-enabled insurgency is not just a technological challenge—it changes the strategic math of violence. In May 2025, the Nigerien base at Eknewane was attacked by jihadist militants who utilized drone reconnaissance to spearhead their assault. The attack killed over 60 troops. Drone intelligence helped militants synchronize the direction and timing of their ground assault, according to Defense Archives. In these contexts, drones are force multipliers, enabling dispersed fighters to punch above their weight. 

More broadly, the adoption of drones lowers the barrier to entry for militant groups. In contrast to missiles or jet fighters, small UAVs are comparatively low-cost, easier to maintain, and can be operated covertly. They allow jihadists to strike previously unreachable targets and project terror outside of their immediate zone of control.

Yet, there are constraints and opposing pressures. In Sudan, RSF high-level air defenses, anti-aircraft gun deployment, MANPADS, and electronic jamming have increasingly eroded UAV survivability. Military Africa warns that air dominance alone does not guarantee ground gains—control of territory still matters. In the Sahel, signal jamming sophistication, drone detection, and counter-measures pose a tall technological challenge to governments and jihadists alike.

The spread of drones across conflicts in Africa portends a new era of militarized instability. As insurgents gain airpower, states must quickly adapt by developing detection systems, layered air defenses, electronic warfare, and doctrinal innovation. In the meantime, however, the drone is a disruptive equalizer.

The balance of power is shifting. Over Sudan, the skies are contested anew, and the RSF has shown that it can bring down even advanced opponents. In the Sahel, extremist groups are using cheap UAVs to rewrite the math of war from insurgency to devastation. Drone-enabled insurgency is not a future threat to Africa—it is occurring now, and its impact will be felt for years to come.

Image courtesy of Getty Images.