Nationalism’s ‘Foothold’ in Europe is a Tightening Grip
Cameron Bird
Staff Writer
European Parliamentary elections in early June this year carried what appeared to be a political shockwave throughout the continent, according to Associated Press. France dissolved its parliament, Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party gained ground, and the political composition of the European legislative body appeared to shift right. For a continent shaped by its experiences with far-right politics and the politics of nationalism, it came as a shock, and a scare, to many observers. However, the European Parliamentary elections were not the end-all, and be-all, and will not imperil the politics of Europe. That said, they are a significant indicator of a general trend throughout Europe, which could lead to perilous political circumstances. Europe is experiencing another wave of nationalist, far-right political sentiment, that is driving political parties historically left on the fringe into the main spheres of power.
Europe’s flirtation with far-right politics is well documented and is perhaps the most core element of our historical understanding of the continent. Europe’s relationship with nationalism is deeply entrenched and has always been a staple of domestic politics in varying European states. What makes European states so vulnerable to far-right extremism is the nature of their political systems. Europe is dominated by multi-party systems, where populations are represented by a multiplicity of political parties in their legislative branches of government. While this is often a healthy system of democracy, for its effective representation, it also opens the opportunity for parties that represent extremes of the political spectrum to gain a foothold.
Far-right parties have seemed particularly effective over the course of history at garnering political momentum, even if it does not translate to tangible power. This pattern has manifested itself over and over. Those who study history are well-versed in the episodes of far-right extremism in Germany, Italy, Eastern Europe, and the Balkans.
Violence had plagued these regions amidst their engagement with far-right extremism and thus served as evidence that those mistakes could not be repeated. Yet historical amnesia, in tandem with difficult social and economic circumstances, are the biggest drivers of political repetition. For more recent renditions of far-right extremism in Europe, poor economic conditions as a result of the 2008 financial crisis, and increases in immigration due to conflict in Syria, were drivers of far-right success. Yet as Lorenzo Marsili of Al Jazeera argues, the potential explanation for this most recent wave could be different. In a post-Covid world, economic conditions are certainly improving, and immigration has decreased. Governments have become more protectionist of domestic jobs, and immigration has faced tighter restrictions since the pandemic. Marsili argues, correctly, that the most recent wave could have more to do with nationalist sentiments and the fact that Europe’s geopolitical significance is waning. The tides of political fortune now favor East Asia, South America, and even some parts of Africa. For Europe, the historical record and its diminishing global economic assets, mean its power potential is
decreasing, and its credibility on the world stage faces significant scrutiny. This has correlated with a rise in nationalist sentiments across Europe. Furthermore, in an increasingly globalized world, far-right politicians continue to take advantage of identity politics. In France, ‘replacement theory’ has been weaponized to foment grievance against minority and immigrant populations by white French communities. In Germany, the extremely significant Turkish diaspora has faced growing marginalization as the white German population associates it with an influx of Muslim immigrants from conflicts in the Middle East. These have correlated with the rise of Marine Le Pen’s party and the AfD in electoral outcomes. While Germany and France are larger democracies where these trends are more widespread, they match outcomes throughout Europe’s liberal and illiberal democracies. Politico mapped out the representation of far-right parties and their level of political influence and power. Analyzed in May of this year, it provides an accurate portrait of just how prevalent far-right extremism is, particularly in Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe is notably more affected by immigration, economic hardship, and political instability. Nationalism has also been uniquely effective in these states, given the role of ethnicity, religion, and social values in its politics. Austria, Croatia, and Hungary are excellent examples of this.
Another notable dynamic at play in the rise of the far-right is the idea of the ‘establishment.’ The idea that government institutions are controlled by a small subset of individuals, who are working collectively, and coercively, to increase their own wealth and power at the expense of the rest of the population. There are additional ideas attached to this, however the far-right has used this idea to explain government failure and generate an ‘us versus them’ mentality. In doing so, politicians can create an identity rooted in opposition to democratic institutions and deep-rooted democratic values. This has played out at home in the United States, where Donald Trump has effectively weaponized the idea of the ‘establishment’ and its potential harm to his idealized American way of life. For those with nationalistic ideals, and who feel neglected by the political class, this has been an extremely effective message. According to the European Institute of the Mediterranean, this idea has been effectively weaponized in Europe as well. The anti-establishment movements of the far-right have indicated to voters that the political establishment is at the root of their problems, and new, widespread, structural change is the only way to fix it. It is an extremely effective tactic at combatting the issues outlined above. It inherently appeals to nationalist sentiments, as individuals who desire a certain version of the country they live in can place blame on the establishment for changing the country from what it once was. These figures and parties can also claim that the current issues of economic hardship, immigration, and geopolitical weakness are because of the establishment’s failures. For those feeling most neglected by their government and their society, this message is extremely appealing. The notion that systems are intentionally failing them weaponizes the politics of grievance and anger, driving people to vote more frequently. This aligns with studies, such as this one conducted at Yale, that suggest anger is a primary motivating factor in voting. The inherent issue with this type of politics is that it necessitates dramatic political action. For political figures and parties that are trying to gain access to the political system, only by decrying its existence, their options are limited to structural, overarching changes and reforms.
Simply following the status quo does not align with their message, nor will it keep them in power. Therefore, sweeping structural changes occur. This is an inherently dangerous pattern for democracies, which do not handle these types of changes effectively. Democratic systems are inherently compromising, and therefore are built to incrementally change and improve. When massive changes are undertaken, democracies are vulnerable to the power of individuals and small groups that may have values that do not align with those of a democracy. In terms of examples, there are none better than Hungary. Since the beginning of Viktor Orban’s rule in 2010, Hungary has shifted from a liberal democracy to an illiberal autocracy, one that Viktor Orban proudly relishes in. Orban’s attacks on the rule of law, and the introduction of a new constitution, have contributed to democratic backsliding, and have shown the weaknesses of Hungary’s democracy against populist-nationalist political actors seeking to centralize power, according to the Center for American Progress. While one could argue that not all European states will follow Hungary’s path due to stronger democratic institutions, it should nonetheless be a warning signal to all European states about the danger of these types of politics. It is also emblematic of how quickly democracies can experience such dramatic shifts. That places even more significance on the short time frames in which these parties could be in power, and the ability to impact democratic institutions in such a short period of time.
In terms of looking forward, Europe faces significant challenges ahead. There are obvious, tangible, political challenges, such as the strength of far-right parties in Europe’s various states. Vox continues to be a significant political player in Spanish politics and is preparing for yet another rise. The aforementioned AfD has experienced key successes in regional elections that it hopes will build into national results, according to Reuters. The FPO in Austria leads polling and appears to be the primary political force in the country, despite its extremist leanings. Perhaps most significantly, Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy party is the ruling party and is the most extreme party of its kind since Mussolini’s Fascist Party during World War 2. Meloni is in office until the dissolution of the Italian parliament and has already passed legislation warranting significant backlash from other European partners. The concern in these states for political forces opposing the far right is the normalization of fascistic tendencies within the political institutions of these governments. The political winds favor right wing ideas, as inflation, immigration, the war in Ukraine, and other geopolitical issues remain at the forefront of voters’ minds. Revisionist ideals, and challenges to the establishment, will ensure these parties a cove of political loyalty amongst the most nationalist of their populations.
Identity politics are in many ways the culmination of these trends. The combination of anti-establishment sentiment, along with political circumstances, have sown the environment for identity politics to grip entire populations. Identity is fundamental to human behavior and istherefore the most potent of avenues when attempting to garner political support. When identity is threatened, the combative nature of individuals to save their identity can result in drastic consequences. One notable outcome of this is the ‘Great Replacement Theory’ coined by Renaud Camus, a theory arguing that political actors are using immigration to replace white populations in mostly white European states, according to France 24. While it is a melting pot of various racist far-right theories, it has come to gain major notoriety even amongst the mainstream right. It is the consequence of xenophobic sentiment amongst individuals who believe they are losing power due to the influx of individuals from other countries. The far-right has taken this sentiment, and weaponized it incredibly effectively, arguing that they will shut down immigration and use other populist policies to once again provide the most advantage to white populations. Given that these states are still predominantly white, it gives them a significant political base.
Europe faces an ideological challenge that extends beyond the tangible nature of electoral power. Europe, unlike any other region, does not have any inherent resources or economic advantage driving its prosperity beyond the near future. It also will face population problems moving forward, as populations continue to increase. Resource growth will struggle to keep pace, and Europe is geographically a relatively small area for a growing population. It will remain a magnet of migration from the Middle East and still faces significant security threats in the form of Russia, terrorism, and climate change. With none of these problems going away, politicians in Europe need to figure out how to quell the tides of nationalist sentiment fears over security. If they fail to do so, they face the political tsunami of grievance and anger, that will drive them out of power and drive the country into the arms of the far-right. Europe has seen that movie before, and the sequel would be much worse.
Image courtesy of Getty Images
