NATO’s Deterrence Handcuffs: How the West’s Strategy Backfired

By: Robbie Hughes

The ongoing war in Ukraine is a sobering testament to the unintended consequences of NATO’s deterrence strategy toward Russia. In its bid to extend NATO’s sphere eastward and create a collective defense buffer, the West has not only misjudged Russia’s reaction but handcuffed itself in the process. Now, as Ukraine burns, NATO’s deterrence stance has left it paralyzed—unable to meaningfully intervene without risking catastrophic escalation with a nuclear goliath. This is not merely a strategic misstep; it’s a failure to recognize how deterrence, applied without sensitivity to an adversary’s fears and insecurities, can backfire and lead to the very conflict it aims to avoid. 

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has expanded steadily eastward, absorbing former Soviet-bloc nations and pressing closer to Russia’s borders. The West’s logic has been simple: the more countries within NATO, the greater the security against Russian influence or aggression. Yet, from a realist perspective, this expansion was bound to stoke Russian insecurity. As NATO reached closer to its border, Russia began to see itself increasingly surrounded by a military alliance led by the United States—the most powerful nation in history and a longtime rival. 

The critical moment came in April 2008, during NATO’s Bucharest Summit, where it was declared that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually be folded into the alliance. The then-Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, opposed this move, citing her belief that Putin would interpret it as a declaration of war. Her caution proved prescient. To Russia, a NATO-aligned Ukraine represented an existential threat, a red line that NATO repeatedly chose to cross. Rather than offering true security, NATO’s eastward push only intensified Russia’s fear of encirclement, leading Putin to see military action as his only path to survival. 

Deterrence is traditionally a strategy intended to dissuade aggression by signaling the overwhelming costs of hostile action. Yet NATO’s deterrence approach has paradoxically limited the alliance’s ability to respond to the crisis it helped provoke. The fear of a nuclear confrontation with Russia has created a high-stakes stalemate, restraining NATO’s direct involvement and limiting its response to sanctions, weapons shipments, and diplomatic support. While Ukraine bears the brunt of Russia’s aggression, NATO finds itself handcuffed to the sink as the kitchen burns down, unable to put out the flames without risking nuclear escalation.

NATO’s restrained stance has only emboldened Russia. Putin’s calculations reflect an understanding that, while NATO nations may continue to support Ukraine indirectly, they will stop short of deploying troops or engaging in any actions that might escalate into direct conflict. This dynamic has left NATO in a strategic bind, exposing a fundamental flaw in its deterrence posture: by attempting to contain Russia, NATO’s very presence near Russia’s borders has heightened Moscow’s sense of insecurity and provoked the aggressive response it sought to deter.

To understand Russia’s perspective, one need only recall America’s own stance on foreign military alliances close to its borders. The Monroe Doctrine declared any European interference in the Western Hemisphere a threat to U.S. security, establishing a principle of exclusive influence in its neighborhood. In 1962, the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba triggered the Cuban Missile Crisis, a confrontation that nearly brought the world to nuclear war. Why, then, should Russia not feel the same way about NATO—a nuclear-charged alliance—on its doorstep?

For Russia, a Ukraine aligned with NATO, coupled with Western support for pro-Western political movements, represents a direct threat to its sphere of influence and security. The West’s strategy to bring Ukraine into its orbit through NATO membership, EU integration, and democratic support ignored Russia’s explicit, repeated warnings that it considered such moves unacceptable. From Russia’s perspective, NATO’s encroachment was not merely a sign of containment but an attempt to undermine Russian sovereignty and influence in its own region.

By expanding NATO and promoting Western-style democracy in Ukraine, the West set in motion a dangerous cycle of escalation. In 2004, the West-supported Orange Revolution overturned the victory of the pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych, and in 2014, during the Euromaidan protests, Yanukovych was once again ousted, this time with significant Western backing. These events—aimed at moving Ukraine closer to Western political and economic standards—were, for Russia, further evidence that the West intended to turn Ukraine into a Western-aligned democracy on Russia’s doorstep.

Russia’s response has been consistent. In 2008, only four months after NATO’s declaration to include Ukraine, Russia invaded Georgia, another NATO-aspiring state, to assert its sphere of influence. In 2014, following the ousting of Yanukovych, Russia annexed Crimea, securing access to the Black Sea and countering NATO’s influence. When NATO countries, especially the U.S., ignored these clear signals, the table was set for the conflict we see today. 

This is not to justify Russia’s actions but rather to explain them. In failing to consider the security concerns of its rival, the West has driven Russia into a corner, reinforcing a fight or flight instinct. In this sense, NATO’s deterrence posture has backfired, producing a cycle of insecurity that traps the West in a position where its actions, rather than fostering peace, escalate the likelihood of broader conflict. 

In the face of this crisis, NATO must dust off the drawing board and reassess the validity of its strategic calculus. Its current deterrence approach, grounded in a hypocritical doctrine of security that dismisses Russia’s own concerns, has instead escalated insecurity, intensified conflict, and left NATO paralyzed as Ukraine suffers. Deterrence without diplomacy has proven dangerously short-sighted, undermining the very stability it sought to protect. If NATO and the West are serious about lasting peace, they must abandon the flawed presumption that power alone will prevent conflict. A new strategy—one that acknowledges Russia’s security concerns without conceding to aggression—is the only path forward to secure both Ukraine’s future and Europe’s stability.

Robbie Hughes is a first year Graduate student at the Seton Hall School of Diplomacy & International Relations, specializing in International Human Rights and Foreign Policy. He is editorial board member and Deputy Editor in Chief at the Diplomacy Journal. Robbie completed his bachelor’s degree in Public Policy & Governance from Saint Francis Xavier University in Nova Scotia, Canada. This is his first piece published with the Journal.