Journal of Diplomacy

By Clare Finnegan

Although often unrecognized, the end of April celebrates two days dedicated to remembering intellectual property rights, International Copyright Day (also referred to as World Book and Copyright Day) on April 23^rd and World Intellectual Property Day on April 26^th. With both of these just passed, the current issues facing content consumers and producers deserve a second look.

There are two general distinctions in the world of counterfeiting and piracy: the theft of tangible goods and the theft of digital products. The difference between the two is not always as clear as one might expect; depending on whether an mp3 has been downloaded to a cd, it could be considered tangible or digital. People (in the US at least) tend to relate infringement of the former with Canal Street in Chinatown and of the latter with college campuses, Pirate Bay, and the now partially-defunct, file sharing platform Limewire. One name that that most don’t associate with copyright infringement is Google; despite the often missed connection, Google epitomizes the evolving conflict between digital content producers and consumers.

As a millennial with only a vague recollection of a time when Google was not the premier search engine, I share a generational appreciation for the company with the unofficial motto ‘Don’t be evil’. As an editor and researcher, Google has revolutionized fact checking with Google Books and, thanks to Google Scholar, made searching by citation infinitely easier. However, despite the many advantages of Google’s consumer content, its expansion beyond site indexing has had mixed effects within the journalism industry.

The rise of the internet has heralded the development of a new generation of content consumers, one that believes information should be accurate, available, and (in most instances) free. Traditional content creators have found it particularly difficult to adapt their business model to the online environment. Globally, journalists have had to fight to retain control of their creative content without alienating a consumer base that values responsible journalism only if it is free or deeply discounted.

The dominant position of Google (which controls approximately 90 percent of various European countries’ search-engine markets and 67 percent of the U.S. market) has forced online publishers to rely heavily on Google to direct search engine traffic to their websites. This dependant relationship, along with the development of Google News, has caused financial consternation throughout the publishing world.

Google News is a global news aggregator that provides consumers with a brief “snippet” that summarizes the content of a particular article. For the busy consumer with no time to do more than scan the headlines, Google News serves as a powerful tool for accessing the critical essence of current events. While consumers benefit from this capsulation, however, its existence is a source of alarm for content producers. Around 44 percent of users do not ‘click through’ to the original news source, which results in a serious loss of advertising revenue for online journalists. Moreover, the lack of a significant search engine competitor limits the bargaining power of content creators and precludes journalists from credibly threatening to opt out of Google’s services.

From the perspective of journalists, Google unfairly profits from the content of online publishers because Google receives significant advertising revenue generated from journalistic content searches. To remedy this situation, journalists claim that Google should share some of its advertising profits with content creators. Of course, Google disagrees. In desperation, some publishers have turned to legal action.

Litigation, however, is fraught with financial hazards for content providers. As the 2011 settlement of a Belgium newspaper suit against Google demonstrated, successful litigation does not guarantee better business prospects. The court ruled that Google News did not constitute “fair use” of intellectual property. In compliance with the court’s orders, Google removed the suing newspapers from all of its services, effectively rendering the same newspapers unreachable by most consumers. In addition to severe business repercussions, publishers pursuing legal action risk becoming social pariahs, much like their record label counterparts.

The legal arena is not the only area in which news providers have stumbled in the digital era. In the scramble to go digital, many publishers offered free online content, a precedent that most providers now want to reverse. Convincing consumers to pay for content that was once free, however, has been challenging. The online paywall of the New York Times actually may be the most effective approach for these late adopters. Although much derided in its initial debut due to the ease of circumvention, the paywall should actually be praised as a revolutionary example of price discrimination. By including easily accessible backdoors, the New York Times has managed to avoid negative backlash from consumers accustomed to free access. At the same time the newspaper has been able to generate increased subscription revenue, both digital and print.

The journalism industry has not yet resolved the digital dilemma of how to provide accurate and reliable content in a profitable manner. Google has created an online portal that provides an enhanced consumer experience; the journalism industry should embrace a similar consumer-orientated approach. Innovation, rather than legal action, is the answer to consumer support for intellectual property control.

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Clare is a master’s candidate at the Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations where she specializes in International Economics and Development. She is currently a Senior Editor and is an incoming Deputy-Editor-in-Chief for the Journal.

By Paulina Valero

Hugo Chavez’s presence and undeniable charisma, packed with a strong ideology of social revolution and anti-west creed, quickly positioned him as one of the key players in world politics and one of Latin America’s most important political figures. Without Chavez, the role of regional power leader is up for the taking. There is a debate over whether the future of Venezuela is to continue on the same path envisioned by Chavez under Nicolas Maduro – his personally appointed successor and now officially the sitting president. On the one hand, it is believed that Chavez’s influence was so strong and his philosophy so immersed in the Venezuelan psyche that Venezuela will continue to be one of the key players in Latin America regardless of who leads it, especially with the potential of its oil industry. Conversely, others would argue that Chavez’s extraordinary popularity cannot be matched and his influence will sooner or later fade away. While clearly sharing the same ideology,  after his contested and razor thin electoral win it is unlikely that Maduro will manage to sustain and further expand the support of the Venezuelan people and other key regional and global actors;  that are, critical for Venezuela’s current power position and influence. Ultimately, this is a matter of personal character.

Can we consider then, that Mexico and its new president to have a shot at regional soft power leader? Peña Nieto –from the center-right PRI– has the tools to bring Mexico to the forefront of Latin American politics. Some might argue that stepping in only after Chavez’s death might send the wrong signal. A signal not of true leadership, but one of seizing an opportunity that was unlikely to present itself with Chavez still in the picture. Regardless, we have to consider the potential this young president has given the new agenda he intends to operate under. He reinstated his party back into the presidency in the latest presidential elections, after it lost its power monopoly in 2000. Although, initially  he was believed to be a mere puppet of his party, he promised he would reform his party and has vigilantly campaigned to present the image of the “new PRI”.

From the onset of his campaign and more so after his election, Peña Nieto and his party were compelled to appeal to an unprecedented opposition, comprised for the most part of young people. He is expected to break away from party ties of extreme corruption and prove, especially to his opposition, that his government will be one of opportunity for all and not for further empowerment of those closest to him. With a stronger than ever civil society and a freer media that can and will ensure its government answers to it, democracy in Mexico is finally established. Economically Mexico is also becoming stronger. It has been a consistent advocate of a free market based on international cooperation and currently enjoys one of the strongest economies in Latin America, recently even more so than Brazil’s, and with oil reserves that can potentially, if managed appropriately, get the country to a better position relative to its regional counterparts.

Without understating Mexico’s challenges in controlling corruption, drugs and violence, the country is moving in the right direction, albeit at a slow pace. It is clear as well that the war on drugs, is far from over and that the responsibility for fixing it does not fall exclusively in the hands of the Mexican government, but to its neighbor in the North. Given the undeniable spillover effect of this issue, the US is equally invested in this challenge and joint efforts will signal further cooperation and interdependence not only in security but economically too. More importantly, it has to be recognized that Mexico is not just defined by drug violence.. Peña Nieto is certainly playing the right cards by stressing the rise of the middle class, the use of higher technology, an important manufacturing industry, increasing foreign investment in specialized industries such as airline manufacturing, astonishing tourism riches, greater participation in regional trade agreements, and a strong commitment to reducing drug-related violence.

The question here is whether or not Peña Nieto, backed by his country’s potential will become a critical figure in Latin American politics able to transform Mexico into the regional economic and political power. Considering Mexico’s strong ties with the United States and the West and close friendly relationships with the rest of Latin America, especially through the new Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) the task is not impossible. However, one cannot ignore that Venezuela, as of today, still enjoys strong support from other critical Latin American states and maintains important friendships with other global powers. This is not just a matter of strategic regional and global international relations but also personal appeal and time.

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Paulina is a second year Master’s Candidate at the Whitehead School of Diplomacy and a Senior Editor for the Whitehead Journal. She specializes in International Economic Development and International Law and Human Rights.

By Laurel Stone

This month, the world remembers the 19th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide. Despite the presence of a UN peacekeeping force, extremist Hutu groups vying for control of the country used the shooting down of a plane, which killed the presidents of both Burundi and Rwanda, as a trigger for enacting their plans of targeting the Tutsi ethnic group. Within one hundred days, these extremist Hutu militants killed over 800,000 people in their quest for political and ethnic domination.

The lack of action by the international community revealed a major flaw within the UN’s ability to act in a timely manner, leading to increased calls for the creation of early warning systems that could identify and prevent the potential for genocide to occur. Despite this realization during the 1990s, the international community is only now beginning to create policy procedures for early warning tools. If the UN is to follow through on its promise to “never again” standby as genocide unfolds, these early warning systems need to be further implemented and developed across multiple levels of global governance.

The Kenyan electoral violence in 2007 provided another instance portraying the UN’s inability to properly assess rising escalations and act in time to prevent rampant violence from occurring. These elections fragmented the peaceful society along ethnic lines, dividing neighbor against neighbor in the violent struggles encouraged by losing candidates. As international media covered the unrest, reports of mass atrocities signaled the need for international action. But the UN did not have a system in place to quickly assess the situation and deploy the necessary means to contain the violence.

After the electoral violence was mediated by creating a power-sharing government between the fighting candidates, the UN realized its need to specifically focus on developing policies to prevent genocide. In response to this acknowledgement, the UN created the Office of the Special Advisor to the Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide (OSAPG). This office created an Analysis Framework to identify the indicators of the incitement to genocide by assessing the triggers leading to mass atrocities. In addition to providing analyses of current threats, this framework offers a platform for multiple actors to adopt their own prevention policies. Agencies like UN Women specifically have utilized the OSAPG’s Analysis Framework by adding their own gender-specific indicators to use in their country programs. The mainstreaming of this framework across the UN system will greatly aid this organization in developing the early warning tools necessary to mitigate the circumstances leading to genocide.

Yet, this Analysis Framework is not the panacea for the UN’s history of inaction. The framework provides the first step to systematically identifying common triggers of mass atrocities; however, the actual implementation of this analysis is the hardest part of the prevention policy. The UN needs to continue mainstreaming this framework not only across its agencies, but also in its field operations. This requires extensive training at all levels of the UN system. While the OSAPG office has initiated this process, the UN must consistently work to fully adopt this Analysis Framework and the ideal of preventing atrocities in each level of governance.

The UN is not the only organization to address the need for adopting early warning systems. Regional organizations, like the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), also created frameworks and policy mechanisms for analyzing data indicating the likelihood of genocide occurring in ongoing conflicts. The European Union (EU) and a regional grouping of Latin American states are currently in the early stages of discussing the potential avenues for including the adoption of these early warning frameworks. Countries like the United States and Argentina are also beginning to discuss how their respective governments can implement early warning tools into national security strategies. The creation of an Atrocities Prevention Board by the US last year signaled an emerging shift in the national priorities of states to consider the need for early warning tools in domestic policies in addition to international agendas.

However, these regional and state strategies for addressing early warning capabilities are only in their infancy. These developments reflect the same implementation problem that the UN faces. Finding systematic ways to collect and analyze data can be challenging as triggers of mass atrocities can vary across instances. Furthermore, implementing a plan of action after a confirmation of impending mass atrocities is even more challenging because it requires having the ability to act in a timely manner. While these challenges, faced by both the UN and regional organizations, demonstrate the obstacles in creating effective early warning systems, another international actor has the potential to fill in the gaps left by larger organizations.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provide a potential avenue for streamlining data collection in a way that uses a visualization of threats to identify the level of risk. These visualizations of threats can be generated through a tool called crisis mapping. Civilians, aid workers, and local officials can send information about events on the ground through SMS messaging, emails, Facebook, and Twitter to websites who plot the location of the incident and the level of risk on a map. A NGO called Ushahidi actually developed a crisis mapping platform in response to Kenya’s 2007 electoral violence. Since their initial recordings of the atrocities occurring in Kenya, Ushahidi has extended its platform to cover electoral processes and escalations in violent conflicts around the world. The technological innovations allowing for these crisis mapping platforms to accurately portray escalating violence provides a vital tool for early warning systems.

Crisis mapping offers NGOs an opportunity to utilize their strengths in atrocities prevention plans by providing vital information for larger organizations. However, a key weakness again lies in the capabilities of these grassroots organizations to act upon the data collected. In order to move toward an international system that properly identifies the risk of genocide and implements preventive action, each of these international actors must create a common strategy that provides a policy of atrocities prevention.

By developing a common strategy for the creation of early warning systems, international actors can take the broad mandate of atrocities prevention and instead target the factors that are most likely to incite mass violence. Two potential avenues for a common strategy have already begun to aid the UN, states, and NGOs in their prevention attempts. The first specifically targets the enablers of genocide, those that provide the required resources to continue the violence. By exposing these third-party enablers and inhibiting their ability to aid perpetrators through enforcement mechanisms like sanctions, one crucial trigger of mass atrocities can be commonly targeted by international actors.

Another common strategy for international actors to use is the containment of hate speech. Hate speech is a common incitement for ethnic violence because leaders often use it to instill fear regarding the other ethnic group and then encourage ethnic-targeted violence. The presidential elections in Kenya last month raised the fear that hate speech could again be used to encourage ethnic targeting. Through the utilization of the crisis mapping initiative, Uchaguzi aided international workers to note the use of hate speech in the country during the elections so local officials could mediate any escalating ethnic tensions. Another group called La Benevolencija seeks to target hate speech through a media campaign that combats ethnic myths in Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC. These efforts to contain hate speech can provide a more narrow strategy for atrocities prevention efforts by honing in on a threatening catalyst to genocide.

Kenya’s presidential elections last month were hailed as a successful mitigation of potential mass atrocities. As citizens tensely awaited the electoral results, the UN, NGOs, and local leaders reminded Kenyans that violence is not the answer. By limiting the capabilities to incite violence through monitoring hate speech and targeting the crimes of the past enablers of electoral violence, Kenya experienced a much smoother transition than the elections that fragmented the country five years ago. While we can look at this one instance of success, atrocities are still occurring in multiple locations around the world.

If the international community truly wants to keep genocide from occurring again, then each level of global governance must find a common strategy that can implement atrocities prevention goals. As the UN, regional organizations, states, and NGOs remember the 19th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, acting upon this need for better early warning systems could take the hope of “never again” and turn it into a reality.

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Laurel is a Senior Editor (and incoming Deputy-Editor-in-Chief) for the Journal and a first year master’s candidate at the Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations.  She specializes in Conflict Management and International Security.

By John Henzel

Since the days of Kim Jong-il, many policymakers and pundits have been mystified by North Korea’s seemingly aberrant behavior. As a result, many latch onto the idea that the DPRK is an irrational or attention seeking nation – a state to which the typical rules do not apply. How else could the news coming out of Pyongyang make any sense? What other possible motivations could the Kims have for their supposedly bizarre array of provocations?

Well, regime security comes to mind.

The assertion that North Korea’s actions are merely pulling at the pigtails of the international community or is playing a persona for the outside world is woefully misguided. The DPRK has more salient and rational motivations for its behavior than trying to score points in international headlines. Nearly every eyebrow-raising exploit north of the 38^th parallel is tied into security, be it internal or external. Yet misperception of the North’s leadership remains prevalent.

Let’s examine the North’s nuclear weapons program. The attention myth most likely solidified in Washington’s exasperation over the Six Party Talks, where the DPRK sat down with delegates from the United States, South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan to hash out its nuclear future. According to many analysts, North Korea eventually walked away from the talks after displaying a repeated “brinksmanship” strategy to gain concessions. The logic of this approach is to induce an international incident in order to get material kickbacks, such as food aid, or to reinforce the regime’s image or standing to the rest of the world. A New York Times article accurately captures this view by calling the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program a “trump card.” That is to say, it was a means to other prizes but not an end in itself.

This argument is compelling when you think back to the DPRK of the 1990s. After threatening to leave the NPT in 1993, Pyongyang managed to secure the biggest change in U.S. policy towards the DPRK ever in the form of the Agreed Framework. If this was a game of chicken, Washington blinked. It certainly seems plausible that North Korea would learn that lesson and use it to extort everything down to the kitchen sink from the international community. After all, following the collapse of the Soviet Union – their main communist benefactor – the DPRK didn’t have many friends with open pockets.

Except, what does North Korea have to show for its behavior? If the nuclear weapons program was a “trump card” to secure other objectives, why not take the payoff? The fact remains that the DPRK has consistently walked away from lucrative deals for relinquishing its nuclear arsenal and has instead endured harsh economic sanctions and international condemnation to maintain it. Pyongyang clearly places a premium on its weapons program, yet it remains trenchant – or combative – after every new round of sanctions.

Contrary to the popular narrative in the United States then, Pyongyang’s ultimate goal for its nuclear weapons program is to have a deterrent against attack by the United States. Any benefit or leverage gained by threatening to have a nuclear program is offset by the actual benefit of possessing nuclear deterrence. North Korea needs a real strategic trump card instead of a mere bargaining chip.

This will be the case until North Korea and United States can reach an agreement to fully normalize relations. As it stands, the Kim leadership fears that Washington decision-makers’ talk of regime change north of the 38^th parallel will turn into military action – somewhat justifiably under the current administration and in the Bush era.

But who would dare meddle in the internal affairs of a nuclear weapons state, much less try to overthrow its leadership? A North Korean nuclear arsenal would change the calculus of regime change from “How many soldiers’ lives are an acceptable risk?” to “Can we risk the entire civilian populations of Seoul, Tokyo, and San Francisco?” This gives Pyongyang a reliable defensive position for once.

Deterrence explains a lot of the DPRK’s seemingly inexplicable actions. Nuclear tests one, two, and three are just that – tests to figure out problems and perfect their deterrent. After all, nobody has gone nuclear without at least one nuclear test somewhere along the line (even Israel likely participated in the Vela incident), particularly for the trickier plutonium type of bomb North Korea has been using. The only symbolism or attention seeking present in the tests was giving proof to Washington of their nuclear status and deterrent capabilities.

Each of the tests were meant as trial runs for some important factor of building a nuclear deterrent, ranging from basic ability to produce an explosion to reliable miniaturization of the technology for warhead use. After their first test fizzled in 2006 (some argue as a result of too much ambition rather than incompetence), they geared up a second in 2009 and apparently fixed the faults, thus proving their technical ability. The third test last month could be the DPRK switching to high enriched uranium (HEU) from plutonium, further testing for miniaturization (what’s the point of having a huge explosive you can’t mobilize effectively?), or both.

Of course, this deterrence strategy won’t win you any friends. In fact, it may necessitate aggressive acts and posturing to bolster the deterrent’s credibility, but it’s preferable to be alive and friendless than friendly and dead, right?

That question brings me to internal regime security. It’s important to note that what is best for North Korea as a state may not be best for Kim Jong-un and the ruling military elites.

On paper, North Korea’s choice to be a “rogue regime” and pursue strategies beyond the pale of international acceptance has clearly cost it dearly in terms of economic development and has even strained its relationship with China. If “rogue” actions drive the international community’s push for regime change, why not just abandon the nuclear weapons program, open up economically, and live happily ever after with the international community?

Because the international community will never accept the current regime. Unless the DPRK leadership dismantles its military-first, human rights abusing system entirely, calls for intervention on humanitarian grounds will persist.

The internal liberalization that would end the regime’s “rogue” standing with the international community could unleash powerful domestic forces hostile to the regime. The Kim regime doesn’t oppress its people for kicks; it oppresses its people to ensure that a popular uprising against its rule can never form. The Kim regime doesn’t bribe the military complex with a position of importance because it likes them better than other branches of government; it bribes them to ensure the military doesn’t try a hand at regime change themselves. They’ve learned the lessons of Gaddafi and of Park Chung-hee all too well, ruling out anything shy of an iron hand for internal affairs.

If the Kim regime wants to continue ruling North Korea, it will draw international ire in some form or another. Unless Kim Jong-un wants to become the next dictator to live out his last moments in a foxhole, political liberalization isn’t palatable to the regime. So it’s guaranteed that the DPRK will be condemned as a human rights violator. That realization drives Pyongyang’s fear of regime change, tying their internal and external security demands together.

The regime’s supposedly irrational behavior, ranging from stubborn insistence on missile tests to unicorn propaganda, derives from this uncomfortable position. Careful analysis shows that the quirky headlines belie a deeper narrative; the Kim regime has and will continue to emphasize its own security from internal and external threats regardless of international perception. The misperception of North Korean attention-seeking behavior causes policymakers to implement the wrong strategies, ones based on the notion of punishing a petulant child. Instead policymakers and media outlets need to reject the attention myth and formulate policy based on Pyongyang’s real strategic interests.

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John is a senior editor for the Journal and a second year master’s candidate at the Whitehead School. He specializes in international security and foreign policy analysis with a research focus on East Asia.