In 2012, the Basque country held parliamentary elections; as a result, the emerging Bildu coalition grasped a surprising amount of seats. This separatist party follows a political platform of Ezker Abertzalea, or “patriotic left.” This platform has also been implemented by members of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) during their armed campaign movement in the region. While the more conservative Basque National Party held on to a plurality within the parliament, Bildu’s rise came as a surprise to many political strategists. This article does not seek to compare and contrast party ideology within the Basque country; rather, I aim to look at how the electoral system within the Basque country itself has influenced party identification.
Basque parliamentary elections implement a closed list with proportional representation. Essentially, potential candidates are short-listed by each party, which is not open for public choice. The voters base their decisions purely along party ideology, and are unable to decide the list of candidates themselves. The percentage of votes a party gets determines how many seats will become available to them in parliament.[1] Seats are allocated using the D’Hondt mathematical method, which is also seen in Northern Ireland. I will explore how the closed list has effected party dynamics in the Basque country, as well as exploring how open list, the Sainte-Lague system, first-past-the-post (FPTP), and rank-based voting such as single-transferable vote (STV) would change that dynamic.
Proportional Representation is analyzed as providing greater diversity of viewpoints, as more parties are represented. Proportional representation often parallels a multi-party system (though scholars debate if multi-party systems are a result of proportional electoral systems or a cause of these systems. or this reason, more parties compete for power in this system rather than in a bipolar one. On the negative side, parties in PR systems may attempt to appeal to ethnic cleavages in order to maximize support. The more competitive parties present, the more diverse the issues are which separate them. Thus, parties are more able to narrow party platforms to extremely specific issues such as ethnic identity.[2]
Closed list elections allow the parties filling seat vacancies to choose their own candidates. The essential duties of the citizen are to choose how many of these seats each party is allowed to fill. What would the Basque country look like with open list elections? Some argue open lists could increase individual divergence from party norms, and thus destabilize party power. Thus, fragmented parties and inter-party conflict could potentially increase. Along these lines, citizens would be more likely to vote for charismatic candidates who better represent their own ideas rather than parties themselves. In the 2012 elections, some scholars actually attributed the loss of seats and power of PSE due to economic downturn which was seen as weakness of socialist policies by Lehendakari Patxi López.[3] In this sense, a closed list system actually negatively affected the PSE party as a whole. Citizens were unable to express their displeasure with López on an individual level, but rather only the party level. Had open list elections taken place, the political landscape of Basque country could appear much different today. Perhaps, even, the PSE party would not have suffered as much and remained the dominant party today.
Sainte-Lague is not an electoral system so much as a mathematical formula for determining allotted seats in a proportional system. This formula is an alternative to the current d’Hondt method used in the Basque country. For brevity’s sake, I will avoid delving into the mathematical differences. Essentially, Sainte-Lague and d’Hondt implement different divisors for calculating quotas. Evidence indicates that if proportionality is determined by minimizing over-representation of the dominant party, the d’Hondt method is most successful. However, if true proportionality is based on equalizing votes for a parliamentary representative, the Sainte-Lague or equal proportions is the most proportional.[4]
Larger parties often fare better under methods that use a low quota, such as LR-Droop, STV and d’Hondt, than under methods with higher quotas, like equal proportions or Sainte Lague. Michael Gallagher explains:
It permits the construction of a provisional ranking order embracing a variety of seat allocation methods that at first sight appear to be very different. When thresholds are taken into account it becomes evident that this ranking order is not immutable, because when many parties compete the number of votes with which a party might win a seat under largest remainder methods tends to be lower than the number needed under highest average methods. Under these circumstances, even those largest remainders methods that tilt the odds most heavily in favour of larger parties can actually be more accommodating to smaller parties than are most highest average methods.[5]
Thus, in theory, the Sainte-Lague method would benefit smaller parties. Applying this formula to the 2012 Basque elections would provide a measurable test of this theory. According to the results, the Partido Popular (PP), a smaller party, would indeed gain one seat using this method. Though a small difference, it would seem, in this case, that the Sainte-Lague method would indeed benefit at least one smaller party at the expense of the most dominant party.
| Votes | 384,766
(EAJ-PNV) |
277,923
(EH BILDU) |
212,809
(PSE-EE/PSOE) |
130,584
(PP) |
21,539
(UPyD) |
30,318
(IU-LV) |
17,345
(EB-B) |
11,625
(EQUO) |
11,480
(Eb-Az) |
13,371
(OTHER) |
|
| Seats according to Sainte-Lague | 28 | 21 | 16 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Seats according to d’Hondt | 29 | 21 | 16 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
[6]Source: http://www.electionresources.org/es/eus/parliament.php?election=2012
First Past the Post (FPTP) systems evolve from a plurality system. In this particular situation, simply the candidate with the highest number of votes receives a seat.[7] In multiple-seat elections, the seats are reserved for the number of candidates receiving the most votes until the quota is filled. In the case of the Basque parliament, the first 75 vote getters would maintain seats. Alternatively, the first set amount of parties would acquire seats to divvy up amongst themselves. Larger parties often gain disproportional representation while smaller parties are left out. This also encourages the public to vote for a candidate more likely to win so their votes are not wasted on an ideological choice. Charismatic leaders, whether politically desired, are often the winners, as was also the case in an open-list system. However, the reasoning behind the choice of leader differs. In FPTP systems, the voter may not vote for their own ideal choice like one would in an open list system.[8]
The FPTP system in its most basic form would be extremely difficult to implement at the parliamentary level, especially a system in which 75 seats would need to be allocated. Ballots would extend across hundreds of candidates. Most likely, voters would pick random names. For this reason, a potential FPTP system in the Basque country may be more regionally or municipally based. Perhaps population centers would be further broken up into voting districts, with each municipality electing 1-3 candidates each for parliament. What would result could be an even more federated Basque country. This move away from centralized party dynamics could potentially weaken the centralized nationalistic sentiments. I hypothesize that by creating a municipal FPTP system for determining parliament, localized views would begin to obscure more broad nationalistic views and thus weaken these latter opinions, relatively. In New Zealand, statistics, in fact, note that a graduated transition from FPTP to PR system beginning in 2004 actually resulted in a lower voter turnout (around 5%) in local elections.[9] These results indicate that constituents under FPTP feel more confident that their choice is more directly applicable in local situations. Similarly, a 2007 Ontario, Canada referendum which would replace FPTP with a PR-type system failed. Post-vote survey analysis indicated that many of the reasons citizens rejected moving away from FPTP was that they feared Party bosses would become the norm and elections would lose local appeal.[10] Clearly, in FPTP systems, local politics can often supersede more broad opinions on a variety of issues, as these two cases have demonstrated.
Single Transferable Vote (STV) is a rank-based voting system in which a voter selects the most desired candidate from a list. As votes are counted, these candidates are elected or eliminated, and excess or outcast votes are then transferred through the second choices and so on. This system encourages candidates to attempt to seek the middle ground and gain support from others outside party lines. Candidates must realize that their own election may depend not on a voter’s first preference, but rather appealing to voter’s as a mildly supported candidate or “least bad”. This encourages a moderate and inclusive political atmosphere. Still, STV is one of the most difficult systems for voters to grasp. Larger constituencies (as the Basque parliament would be if a single bloc) create more confusion and require a tedious voting as well as vote counting system.[11] Oftentimes this results in voters simply ranking candidates in the order they appear. These negatives are similar to those of a one-ballot FPTP system.
A potential STV model, if implanted in the Basque country, could again perhaps increase the amount of voting blocs by splitting up regional constituencies. Unlike the 1-3 seat constituencies of a potential FPTP system, a Basque STV electoral system could afford 5-10 person constituencies, and allay any fears of further federalizing or weakening the government’s authority. These regional STV electoral systems could indeed moderate extremism and potential violent nationalist activity. Individual candidates would have to appeal not only to primary voters, but secondary voters as well, and perhaps be forced to reach across party lines. There could be situations in which Bildu candidates would have to encompass some views of the PSE party in order to receive transferred votes. If this were the case, these specific candidates would likely tone down their nationalist sentiments in order to be viewed as more acceptable to PSE voters. The political landscape of Basque party ideology could completely shift if this were the case, as a party platform of strong nationalism would no longer be enough to gain political ground.
Euskadi offers a unique perspective into a political landscape that has been heavily influenced by its political system. The previous analyses are but a brief predictions scenarios of Basque politics under various electoral systems. These potential outcomes are but one of hundreds. They can be influenced by many other factors such as socio-cultural climate, international, EU and global trends. The main argument of this blog is to point out that the choice of an electoral system, whether through continuation or reform, can ultimately affect the political landscape of the region and perhaps the identity of the Basque country itself. It is ultimately the responsibility of Basque politicians and citizens alike to determine the viability of various electoral systems, and the consequences of each. It is only armed with this ultimate public choice in which the Basque country can move forward on its path of forging its unique identity.
Works Cited
[1] General Basque Council, “THE STATUTE OF AUTONOMY OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY,” December 29, 1978, http://www.basquecountry.eus/t32-448/en/contenidos/informacion/estatuto_guernica/en_455/adjuntos/estatu_i.pdf.
[2] André Blais and Louis Massicotte, “Electoral Systems,” Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective, Sage, 1996, 62, https://www.sites.google.com/site/fspacburean/home/political-parties/postarefaratitlu/w9_1.pdf.
[3] Braulio Gómez Fortes and Laura Cabeza Pérez, “Basque Regional Elections 2012: The Return of Nationalism under the Influence of the Economic Crisis,” Regional & Federal Studies 23, no. 4 (September 2013): 495–505, doi:10.1080/13597566.2013.798650.
[4] Michael Gallagher, “Comparing Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Quotas, Thresholds, Paradoxes and Majorities,” British Journal of Political Science 22, no. 4 (October 1, 1992): 494.
[5] Ibid., 495.
[6] The results were calculated using election result data provided by http://www.electionresources.org/es/eus/parliament.php?election=2012 and the formulas were calculated using http://staatsrecht.honikel.de/en/sitzzuteilungsrechner.htm?parteien=10 .
[7] Donald L. Horowitz, “Comparing Democratic Systems,” Journal of Democracy 1, no. 4 (1990): 73–79, doi:10.1353/jod.1990.0056.
[8] Arend Lijphart, “Democracies: Forms, Performance, and Constitutional Engineering,” European Journal of Political Research 25, no. 1 (January 1, 1994): 1–17, doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.1994.tb01198.x.
[9] Jacky Yaakov Zvulun, “Electoral System Changes and Voter Turnout: Reflections on New Zealand General Elections,” Lex Localis – Journal of Local Self-Government 12, no. 1 (January 2014): 154, doi:10.4335/12.1.145-162(2014).
[10] George Hoff, “Covering Democracy: The Coverage of FPTP vs. MMP in the Ontario Referendum on Electoral Reform,” in Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association. University of British Columbia, June, 2008, 4–6, http://cjms.fims.uwo.ca/issues/05-01/hoff.pdf.
[11] Blais and Massicotte, “Electoral Systems.”