Trump’s Arctic Fever: Greenland and the New Arctic Frontier
Trump’s Arctic Fever: Greenland and the New Arctic Frontier
By Alexander Elgart
“Whoever controls Greenland controls the Arctic. It is the most strategically important location in the Arctic, perhaps in the world”, said Walter Berbick, head of the Arctic Studies Group during a lecture to the U.S Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. But why is one of the most sparsely populated and inhospitable regions in the world regarded as being so strategic? Why have both the United States and China made increasingly aggressive and assertive measures towards the Arctic region within the last decade, and why has Greenland been in so many headlines lately?
Although both countries have their reasons for prying into the Arctic, the fundamental reasons are the same; trade, exploitation, and transportation. President Donald Trump recognized this, and pursued control of the Arctic and Greenland, albeit in a flawed way. If done callously, Trump’s Arctic ambitions could bring about a geopolitical competition that could very well become the next great-power flashpoint. Thus, the United States must balance assertiveness and multilateral cooperation involving Greenland and EU nations. This would ensure Greenland stays connected to both the American and the EU’s economic and security interests over that of China. Greenland urges economic diversification and private sector expansion through foreign investments. Rather than relying on rhetorical bravado or clumsy offers to “buy” Greenland, Washington should instead secure its interests through targeted private investments aligned with Greenland’s development goals.
The melting of the ice caps presents the potential for the exploitation of both uranium and rare earth minerals within the Kvanefjeld mine located on the southern coast of Greenland. The Trump administration recognized the economic potential of Greenland but also saw its potential hazards. When China established itself as a “Near Arctic State” in 2018, it also declared the creation of the Polar Silk Road. This transportation route stretches from the Bering Strait onto the Strait of Denmark, since China officially declared the Arctic a zone of strategic interest. China had made investments in Shandong Gold in Nunavut (Northern Canada) and Shenghe Strategic Holdings in Kvanefjeld in Southern Greenland (which hold a minority stake).
Furthermore, investments by the China Communication Construction Company (CCCC) to build airports in Nuuk, Ilulissat, and Qaqortoq are all such examples of Chinese strategic interests within Greenland. Such investments could threaten American interests as China would not only have access to rare earth minerals and uranium in the Arctic but also increase the potential for dual-use infrastructure in times of contention. Airports could be converted for military purposes, and Chinese control of the abundant Arctic mines of Greenland would harm American potential to produce more rare earth minerals and uranium resources. Such resources could be used to provide the basis to create clean energy and equip American and European defenses against security threats.
Although Greenland prefers both the United States and the EU for economic investments due to its shared democratic values and security interests, it also needs investments and resources to grow and prosper. With American rhetoric straining relations with Greenland, the lack of European industrial capacity to fully invest in the exploitation of the Kvanefjeld, Kringlerne, and Sarfartoq mines. Greenland’s leadership sees a pivot to China as a more stable, attractive, and lucrative alternative.
Greenland’s minister for Business and Mineral Resources, Naaja Nathanielsen recently told the Financial Times that unless both the American and Europeans are willing to engage in dialogue with Greenland and help diversify the country’s economic sector through foreign investment, it may pivot towards China if such matters are not addressed promptly. Thus, for the Trump administration to attain its ambitions in securing American national security and economic interests, it is best to provide a cooperative and multilateral stance towards Greenland and the European Union, as further assertive measures would possibly lose the credibility the two regions hold for the United States.
Instead of presenting consistent offers to buy Greenland, the United States should present incentives for U.S.-based private companies to invest in the various energy sector projects to rival the offers made by China. With the dismantling of USAID, foreign aid could instead be redirected toward investment to enhance Greenland’s promising energy sector. Such investments would provide job opportunities and expand Greenland’s economy. Foreign investment would also strengthen the logistical capacity that is needed for the maintenance of the Pituffik (Thule) Space Base in Northern Greenland which is suffering from both infrastructural and logistical deficiencies which are essential to maintaining the U.S security posture within the Arctic. Therefore, the United States must take a more collaborative approach with Greenland in order to ensure access and security throughout the Arctic as soon as possible, or Greenland will look towards China for both opportunity and stability, endangering American security interests within the region.
Alexander Elgart is a second-year graduate student at the Seton Hall School of Diplomacy and International Relations, specializing in Global Negotiation and Foreign Policy Analysis. This is Alexander’s first contribution to the Journal. Alexander completed his bachelors degree in History at SUNY Binghamton University. Alexander’s focus lies on nation-state alliance networks and non-state actors.
