By Sophia Harding<\/p>\n
The title of \u201c<\/span>world\u2019s coolest dictator<\/span><\/a>\u201d has been claimed by Nayib Bukele. Bukele was elected president of El Salvador on June 1st, 2019 and has since risen to international prominence for his success in the war against violent gangs. Although human rights advocates and democracies around the world have been wary of his consolidation of power, there has been <\/span>broad support<\/span><\/a> for his policies from other Latin American countries and from Salvadorians themselves. Bukele has embraced the controversy surrounding his presidency. In 2021 he changed his <\/span>Twitter biography<\/span><\/a> to \u201cworld\u2019s coolest dictator.\u201d While Bukele has successfully implemented counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies to secure stability in El Salvador, I believe he has failed to address the most important aspect of COIN: institution building, specifically the establishment of long-term economic stability.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n I worked in Latin America for a time during my undergraduate degree and have closely followed politics in the region over the last few years. El Salvador has become a model that many <\/span>other countries<\/span><\/a> in the region have considered emulating. But the mano dura or \u201ciron fist\u201d strategies Bukele has used to fight organized crime are not unique to him. These strategies bear a resemblance to <\/span>COIN security tactics<\/span><\/a> developed by the United States to fight terrorism. COIN is used to fight an enemy which blends into the civilian population, a designation which applies to both terrorists and gangs. However, <\/span>David Galula<\/span><\/a>, a military officer and scholar influential in the development of COIN, argues that COIN extends beyond security measures. It aims to introduce a socio-political transformation. Security measures will not last if they are not accompanied by institution-building and economic reforms.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Clear, Hold\u2026\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n The mantra of COIN is <\/span>Clear-Hold-Build<\/span><\/a>. During the first two stages, counterinsurgency forces clear an area of enemies and occupy it to ensure they do not return. Bukele has cleared gangs in El Salvador through massive arrests. On <\/span>March 27, 2022<\/span><\/a> he declared a state of emergency that allowed him to suspend constitutional rights such as due process. Under these conditions, police officers can arrest and hold citizens as young as 12 years old without a warrant. As of August 2024 Bukele had jailed more than 81,000 people, or <\/span>1 in 57 Salvadorians<\/span><\/a>. <\/span>Human rights advocates<\/span><\/a> are alarmed that at least 22,000 of the people arrested are innocent and only 7,000 have been since released. However, the arrests significantly reduced gang violence. According to government data, homicides went down 50% in 2022 and 70% in 2023. Bukele boasts that El Salvador is now<\/span> safer than Canada<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n And Build<\/b><\/p>\n Bukele has been less effective at the last step in COIN: building. <\/span>Anthony Cordesman<\/span><\/a>, a prominent American national security analyst, argued that defeating ISIS alone would not bring stability to Iraq. Instead, lasting peace would require establishing economic stability and growth. The same idea can be applied to organized crime. In Brazil the <\/span>Unidades de Pol\u00edcia Pacificadora<\/span><\/a> cleared neighborhoods of gangs through police occupation but were unable to prevent their return because the program was not accompanied by improved public services. Bukele\u2019s extensive incarceration efforts have come at a significant cost. The country\u2019s debt is at <\/span>84% of its GDP<\/span><\/a>. The government now faces the challenge of reducing national debt without cutting essential social programs relied upon by a quarter of Salvadorians living in poverty. In an attempt to spur economic growth, Bukele has embraced unconventional measures, including making El Salvador the first country to adopt <\/span>cryptocurrency as legal tender<\/span><\/a>. Yet, cryptocurrency adoption has struggled to gain widespread acceptance, and its adoption has made the International Monetary Fund (IMF) hesitant to provide El Salvador with much-needed loans. The foreign investment and tourism that have gone up during Bukele\u2019s presidency benefit the wealthy while the rates of extreme poverty have <\/span>doubled<\/span><\/a>. Bukele cannot expect to sustain the security he has established in the country if a large percentage of the population remains impoverished with no opportunity for economic growth.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Bukele Isn\u2019t Done<\/b><\/p>\n Bukele’s presidency is still in progress, and we are evaluating his efforts in the midst of his COIN operation rather than at its conclusion. He may have a long-term plan which includes implementing more effective economic reforms, or his current economic reforms might need more time to take effect. However, his actions to date have not demonstrated a commitment to this kind of long-term planning. While Bukele\u2019s government spending addressed the immediate security crisis, it has exacerbated the challenge of long-term economic growth. The lack of government transparency and democratic backsliding orchestrated by Bukele has made many private investors and companies that El Salvador needs to survive wary of conducting business there. He has doubled down on his commitment to cryptocurrency, even though the returns have been <\/span>minimal<\/span><\/a>. These don\u2019t seem to be the actions of a man who is concerned with the long-term economic success of his country.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n The Test of Time<\/b><\/p>\n Bukele has used COIN tactics to achieve unprecedented success in El Salvador\u2019s war against gangs. The mass arrests have led to a <\/span>70%<\/span><\/a> drop in crime, but his methods have yet to demonstrate long-term sustainability. Without addressing the underlying economic challenges, El Salvador\u2019s current security gains may prove temporary rather than marking a true turning point for the nation. Salvadoran-Americans and concerned U.S. citizens should lobby U.S. Congress to leverage its influence over the <\/span>IMF<\/span><\/a> to secure a much-needed loan for El Salvador. This loan would stabilize the current economy and put the country on a path to grow its GDP, the necessary next step in the war against gangs.<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Sophia is a first year graduate student in the school of diplomacy specializing in Global Negotiation and Conflict Management and Post State Reconstruction and Sustainability. She is passionate about finding creative solutions to difficult problems and hopes to use her degree to work as a policy writer.<\/span><\/i>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" By Sophia Harding The title of \u201cworld\u2019s coolest dictator\u201d has been claimed by Nayib Bukele. 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