{"id":3338,"date":"2016-03-16T16:22:03","date_gmt":"2016-03-16T20:22:03","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/blogs.shu.edu\/diplomacy\/?p=3338"},"modified":"2018-04-19T17:17:56","modified_gmt":"2018-04-19T21:17:56","slug":"un-sanctions-fueling-the-fire","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.shu.edu\/journalofdiplomacy\/2016\/03\/un-sanctions-fueling-the-fire\/","title":{"rendered":"UN Sanctions: Fueling the Fire?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>In northeast Asia, 2016 literally started off with a bang.\u00a0 Unrest in the Korean peninsula has been all too lively so far this year.\u00a0 Between nuclear tests and a satellite launch, the Democratic People\u2019s Republic of Korea has the world wondering what it will do next.\u00a0 On March 2<sup>nd<\/sup> the United Nations Security Council implemented through unanimous vote, a new resolution that <a href=\"http:\/\/www.un.org\/apps\/news\/story.asp?NewsID=53354#.VuRR2ZMrJPM\">imposes new sanctions<\/a> against the DPRK. Although these new UN sanctions are somewhat different from the previous ones, will they be more effective or even worse; will they be counterproductive?<\/p>\n<p>Based on North Korea\u2019s past reactions to \u201charsh\u201d sanctions, it is likely that it will continue to respond negatively and lash out in protest by displaying its nuclear capabilities.\u00a0 China also plays a vital role in this situation and the way in which it utilizes the new sanctions may determine Pyongyang\u2019s next move.\u00a0 Strictly enforcing the sanctions may push Kim Jong-un to his limits and a disaster could occur.<\/p>\n<p>North Korea is one of the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.iss.europa.eu\/uploads\/media\/Brief_23_DPRK_sanctions.pdf\">most sanctioned countries<\/a> in the world.\u00a0 Particularly in recent years, UNSC sanctions against the state follow the times where it has taken dangerous actions to gain the attention of the outside world.\u00a0 When North Korea reacts drastically, so do the member states on the Security Council.\u00a0 However, the North Korean government typically reacts poorly to the sanctions and responds angrily.\u00a0 This back and forth pattern of indirect communication does not seem to be producing any kind of constructive result.\u00a0 After all, the aim of the sanctions has been nuclear non-proliferation and that certainly has not happened.<\/p>\n<p>The countries most involved in and affected by the conflict tried for many years to engage North Korean leadership through the Six Party Talks.\u00a0 Unfortunately, the talks have not taken place since 2009 and communication with the Kim regime is at an all-time low.\u00a0 Since the end of the talks, North Korea launched a long-range rocket in 2012, conducted its third nuclear test in 2013, launched missiles in the same year, and in 2014 it fired artillery shells across waters with South Korea.\u00a0 Needless to say, tensions have escalated quickly.<\/p>\n<figure id=\"attachment_3342\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-3342\" style=\"width: 950px\" class=\"wp-caption alignnone\"><a href=\"https:\/\/blogs.shu.edu\/journalofdiplomacy\/files\/2016\/03\/169582258.jpg\" rel=\"attachment wp-att-3342\" data-rel=\"lightbox-image-0\" data-rl_title=\"\" data-rl_caption=\"\" title=\"\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"wp-image-3342 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/blogs.shu.edu\/journalofdiplomacy\/files\/2016\/03\/169582258.jpg\" alt=\"Kim Jong Un communicating with several members of the military.  \" width=\"950\" height=\"534\" srcset=\"https:\/\/blogs.shu.edu\/journalofdiplomacy\/files\/2016\/03\/169582258.jpg 950w, https:\/\/blogs.shu.edu\/journalofdiplomacy\/files\/2016\/03\/169582258-300x169.jpg 300w, https:\/\/blogs.shu.edu\/journalofdiplomacy\/files\/2016\/03\/169582258-768x432.jpg 768w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 950px) 100vw, 950px\" \/><\/a><figcaption id=\"caption-attachment-3342\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Kim Jong Un communicating with several members of the military.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>The lack of contact with Pyongyang combined with new sanctions has resulted in an increasingly unpredictable and concerning situation.\u00a0 It is important that we consider the potential grave effects sanctions could have on North Korea\u2019s decision making.\u00a0 The state seeks to defend itself from outside forces such as the U.S. and South Korea.\u00a0 For the most part, the North\u2019s only ally has been China, which has acted as its main trading partner and biggest source of <a href=\"http:\/\/www.cfr.org\/china\/china-north-korea-relationship\/p11097\">food, arms, and energy<\/a>.\u00a0 Thus, if it feels as though it is being threatened and betrayed by China, then it is very likely that extreme measures will be taken to protect its borders. If China were to strictly enforce the sanctions and completely cut off all trade and funding to the DPRK, then Kim may interpret this as abandonment or an attack.\u00a0 In return he would respond with another display of nuclear might.\u00a0 Kim loves to play the victim as an excuse for engaging in precarious practices.\u00a0 Giving him more opportunity to act in this way may not be the best strategy.<\/p>\n<p>There is really no perfect answer for how we should respond to North Korea\u2019s threats and nuclear growth.\u00a0 However, leaders must think about the effects of previous sanctions and consider if enforcing them is the best option.\u00a0 It\u2019s too late to revoke the sanctions, but China has yet to do much about them.\u00a0 Perhaps it should stay this way.\u00a0 Although China\u2019s frustrations with the DPRK have grown in subsequent years, its relationship with the Kim regime is vital for regional stability.\u00a0 Beijing has already sent a message by agreeing to the sanctions on the UNSC, but it can send another message in how it reacts to them. Perhaps China can strategically play the game that the DPRK has drawn everyone into.\u00a0 Beijing has publically appeared as the \u201cbad cop\u201d through supporting the UN sanctions.\u00a0 Now it may be able to stabilize the conflict by diplomatically engaging Pyongyang as a \u201cgood cop\u201d, in secret, and providing some concessions for its cooperation.\u00a0 It is important for China to instill in Kim some level of trust in order to bring stabilization to the peninsula.\u00a0 Whether or not this is the preferred outcome, at least for now stabilization is more promising at this point than denuclearization.<\/p>\n<p>&#8212;<\/p>\n<p><em><b>Lauren Greenwood<\/b><span style=\"font-weight: 400\"> is an associate editor for the Journal of Diplomacy and a first year graduate student at Seton Hall University. \u00a0She is pursuing her M.A. in Diplomacy and International Relations and specializing in Foreign Policy Analysis and Asia. \u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n<p>Follow Lauren on Twitter:\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/twitter.com\/laurengreenwd1\" target=\"_blank\">@laurengreenwd1<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Follow the Journal on Twitter:\u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/twitter.com\/JournalofDiplo\" target=\"_blank\">@JournalofDiplo<\/a><\/p>\n<p>&#8212;<\/p>\n<p>Image Sources:<\/p>\n<p>Defencetalk.com<\/p>\n<p>AFP\/Stringer\/Getty<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In northeast Asia, 2016 literally started off with a bang.\u00a0 Unrest in the Korean peninsula has been all too lively<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":63,"featured_media":3340,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"colormag_page_container_layout":"default_layout","colormag_page_sidebar_layout":"default_layout","_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[342,174,634,304],"tags":[292,14,377,403,63],"class_list":["post-3338","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-asia","category-featured-2","category-editorial-blog","category-united-nations","tag-china","tag-north-korea","tag-nuclear-security","tag-sanctions","tag-united-nations"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.shu.edu\/journalofdiplomacy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3338","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.shu.edu\/journalofdiplomacy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.shu.edu\/journalofdiplomacy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.shu.edu\/journalofdiplomacy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/63"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.shu.edu\/journalofdiplomacy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3338"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.shu.edu\/journalofdiplomacy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3338\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3344,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.shu.edu\/journalofdiplomacy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3338\/revisions\/3344"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.shu.edu\/journalofdiplomacy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3340"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.shu.edu\/journalofdiplomacy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3338"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.shu.edu\/journalofdiplomacy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3338"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.shu.edu\/journalofdiplomacy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3338"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}