African States and African Interests: The Representation of Marginalized Groups in International Organizations

by Kathryn C. Lavelle

INTRODUCTION

Formal discussions concerning the "North-South dialogue" and the "New International Economic Order" of the 1970s were pushed aside with the ascendancy of neo-liberal thought in the 1980s and the subsequent end of the Cold War. Less formal, yet highly contentious, discussions of economic globalization have nonetheless emerged within a nascent transnational civil society, and have continued many of the themes associated with discussions of the past. In the present era, representatives of developing *states* rarely walk out in protest of activities in international meetings; however, activists within nongovernmental oganizations (NGOs) have brought issues onto the international agenda, and mobilized public opinion against the activities of international organizations judged to have damaging effects on the poor and marginalized within developing societies. These actors embody what for Hanna Pitkin is the essence of representation, in that they "make present in some sense of what is nevertheless not literally present."[1] Many NGOs directly deny that they perform a representative function, claiming instead that local communities can represent themselves. Intentionally or not, though, they do perform a representative function when they use their expertise and knowledge in a particular forum to carry a campaign to a new level of decision making.[2] Concurrently, states continue to represent these groups through formal mechanisms.

Therefore, the representation of relatively less powerful groups in formal international organizations has proceeded on two tracks: the ongoing state track, and a transnational society track. At times, these tracks run parallel to a common policy goal; yet at other times, civil society is actively seeking to alter the activities of a given government. In addition, these two tracks can at times compete with each other for the ability to control development resources. Therefore, as the role of both advocacy and service provision NGOs grows, the post North-South dialogue era, poses a particular analytical problem, because representation of the marginalized has become the task of individuals and organizations disproportionately headquartered

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and financed in the North. Their activities benefit citizenries in the global south because they force a necessary examination of significant issues and problems, which would otherwise be ignored. Yet their activities also have the consequence of undermining the sovereignty of southern states, and eroding the fundamental premise of International Organizations (IOs) as organizations with states as members.

This article begins to tackle the problem of North-South representation through states and NGOs by investigating the mechanisms of African state diplomatic representation to the Bretton Woods financial institutions, as well as to the U.S. government in Washington DC. The first section considers problems with the analysis of NGOs, given the nature of their relationship with African states. Extending analyses based on mutual interests to NGO activities unpacks and illuminates the complicated alliances that form within the diplomatic community. The second section seeks to demonstrate the representation of an individual African state operates in a variety of forums, and there is little official interaction between NGOs and these forums. It applies this understanding of representation to specific Bush administration proposals for the African continent, and proposes that conflict arises between NGOs and states when their policy goals conflict, i.e., when it is the objective of the NGO network to change the state's policy. Conflict also arises when states and NGOs compete for development resources, and appear to have interests in tandem. Finally, the article draws conclusions about appropriate, effective, and adequate African representation in formal IOs on behalf of both states and their citizens.

NGOs and Representation in Formal International Organizations

NGOs are difficult to isolate as analytical constructs because they are defined according to what they are not, i.e., "governmental." This difficulty in isolating them poses two problems. The first problem is that most understandings of NGOs and formal international organizations contain an implicit or explicit analogy between civil society and its relationship to the liberal state, and *transnational* civil society and its relationship to the IO. This analogy separates NGOs from IOs analytically, and thus ignores whatever activities they conduct in tandem. The second problem is that these understandings of NGOs tend to conceptualize them according to the object of inquiry, which tends to overstate conclusions about their activities, and understate conclusions about the activities of rival non-state actors.

The first problem with understanding NGOs and their representative function, i.e. the analogy of NGO to liberal state and NGO to formal IO, is that it overlooks the degree to which NGOs and formal IOs, and NGOs and developing states are, in a sense, "captured" by each other. That is, IOs and NGOs are not easily separated as analytical constructs in many cases because their functions, budgets, and operations are so closely interconnected at the international in addition to local levels. Many NGOs may play a role in advocacy within international society, but some also carry out a service delivery role. This role is frequently funded and perpetuated by the

World Bank, some UN agencies, and national governments. Countervailing pressures stem from these two roles, particularly when the advocacy role contradicts the activities of the IOs in a region.[3]

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Commenting on the similar difficulty in separating grassroots NGOs, civil society, and the African state in the domestic context, Claire Mercer argues the democratic role of NGOs is circumscribed by wider social, economic, and political cleavages. NGOs "pluralize" some spaces at the neglect of others.[4] Likewise, John Harbeson argues for the importance of investigating the political *functions* of civil society.[5] Tim Kelsall and Claire Mercer argue that NGOs' attempts to empower Tanzanian communities can, in some cases, disproportionately benefit an elite, and that the idea of development as "empowerment" is itself inserted into the community from the outside.[6] Ben Rawlence argues that NGO manipulation of local to international connections and networks have the tendency to atomize political behavior, and inhibit the growth of a nationally conscious polity with the ability to hold a national government accountable to their constituents. The fact certain individuals work for the state and then, later for an NGO contributes to a blurring of the distinction between the state and civil society, as it has been blurred since the colonial era.[7] Similarly, Ronald Kassimir argues civil society associations are themselves fields of power and authority, and not merely collective actors in opposition to the state.[8]

The second problem associated with understanding NGOs and their activities in IOs concerns the delineation of NGOs as objects of inquiry in transnational civil society. Literature on NGOs and transnational civil society has a tendency to categorize NGOs to suit the object of inquiry, and in so doing, isolate them within the broader category of "non-state" actors.[9] That is, some analyses include religious or business organizations, etc. as NGOs while others do not. The manner of isolation has the effect of magnifying their role because the other non-state actors are left unexamined. Moreover, it overstates the degree of consensus among NGOs.[10] For example, Kenneth Rutherford's study of NGO advocacy for the Ottawa Convention banning the sale of landmines does not sustain any serious discussion of *rival* state, non-state, or epistemic communities that framed the issue of the landmine ban in terms of national security.[11] Indeed, NGOs (as he defines them) were successful in introducing the issue onto the international arms control agenda. Yet why did many major powers *not* sign the convention, if anti-ban states' security-oriented arguments were incoherent? This is a difficult question to answer without considering the actions of other actors, and retreating into more interest and power based explanations.

A complete picture of NGO behavior, therefore, needs to account for a broader range of non-state actors, and to consider more than how these actors can frame issues.[12] It needs to account for how they determine policy outcomes. For example, Andrew Walter shows how NGOs *and* business organizations competed during the negotiations for a multilateral agreement on investment. While the NGOs were successful in opposing the negotiations themselves, business organizations also achieved a degree of success insofar as global investment flows have continued to grow even without an international investment regime.[13] Similarly, Lisa Jordan depicts struggles between NGOs *and* business organizations in her consideration of the contest between environmental groups and human rights groups, and U.S. oil interests (i.e. the Conoco Corp.) in Ecuador.[14]

When the picture of NGO and state activity is broadened, alliances appear to be forged based on common interests and power capacities determined by the issue at hand. Therefore, while the NGO community ostensibly seeks to work on behalf of marginalized Africans, state and society representatives do not always concur concerning policy outcomes. Differences are pronounced in certain development issue areas. For example, on the question of 100 percent debt cancellation, African states' prime concern is with retaining access to continuing inflows of finance. While some states would certainly welcome 100 percent relief, others would prefer to focus on additional, non-monetary resources for development, such as human skills or human resources. In the extreme case, there can be open tension between protestors on "behalf" of Africa, and government officials representing African states. Referring to protestors, J. Kuyembeh, the Minister of Finance from Sierra Leone, remarked:

> *I was in Seattle, and I will tell you: no one is fighting for me. Those are highly sophisticated, self-made attitudinal people who have their ideas of what the good world is and the bad world is. Quite honestly, if you go deep down there, they may fight for you; if you don't care, when you get out, you may be boxed by them . . . So, actually, it is their will they are carrying.[15]*

The debt issue is illustrative because debt is connected to a wide range of international actors: states, NGOs, banks, and IOs. Literature in economic sociology argues that with all debt, debtors depend on creditors for money. Yet creditors are beholden to their debtors once a loan is made, because the creditor then has a stake in the ability of the debtor to repay the loan. Nonetheless, in the domestic scenario, political institutions support the rights of the creditor to collect the loan. Thus, the debtor has an interest in repayment in order to avoid legal retribution, and the creditor has an interest in the return of the loan. This commonality of interest in repayment between debtors and creditors forges certain kinds of alliances between these two groups. Sovereign debt obviously complicates this relationship because the political institutions are part and parcel of the debtor by definition. Thus, lending to sovereigns is riskier, and any type of alliance is more difficult to forge.[16]

During the period of British state formation in the seventeenth century, loans to the Crown were similarly riskier than other types of loans because a creditor could

not sue the King for repayment in his own courts, and a creditor could not seize collateral from the King without the threat of political or military reprisal. Hence, the Crown was subject to higher rates of interest to accommodate the higher risk factors, and domestic capital failed to mobilize. The creation of liquid financial instruments helped to resolve the problem of long-term lending because liquid instruments allowed for the Crown to create political allies out of a broader group of creditors, who could transfer obligations among themselves according to different time frames, and thus mobilize domestic capital.[17]

The historical tradition of the sovereign forging alliances with creditors is relevant to a current understanding of alliances with respect to debt and international organizations. In using this tradition as a guide, one would expect the state to forge alliances not exclusively with other *states,* and not necessarily with NGOs, but with the non-state actors providing credit (i.e. banks, international financial organizations, etc.). When states borrow in private markets, they continue to tap certain sources of liquid capital, and they forge political alliances as did the British state during its own formation. Contemporary sovereign emerging market debt poses additional problems for both debtors and creditors because lending remains risky, and because creditors are frequently located outside the state in question. The state forges alliances with a variety of non-state actors in this issue area as it works within the constellation of international organizations.

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Whereas understandings of norms and advocacy networks would conceptualize state interests that emerge from new concepts generated by the networks, the proposition advanced here is state interests are designated by a state's position in the international structure.[18] Thus, interests coalesce around a range of non-state actors that provide development finance, and the state can be expected to forge political and economic alliances with individual sources of finance. The alliance structures of advocacy networks are similarly issue-specific, and fluid. They do not form around each claim or issue amenable to international action. Rather, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink propose that activists themselves produce the networks, wherein interests are the cultural legacy of the 1960s.[19] The networks and their associated interests also emanate from religious traditions.[20]

MECHANISMS OF AFRICAN REPRESENTATION IN WASHINGTON DC

Washington DC presents a fertile ground for investigating mechanisms of African representation and its associated networks, because most African states maintain a

diplomatic presence there, and because so many NGOs also maintain offices there. These embassies and NGO offices act through both the institutions of the U.S. government, and multilateral financial institutions, to achieve their policy goals (advocacy), and attract resources for development and other purposes (operations). However, while they may seek to serve the same constituents, states and NGOs rarely operate in tandem. This section considers formal African diplomatic representation first, and then turns to the issue of NGO activities on behalf of African constituencies.

Formal African Diplomatic Representation

African diplomatic institutions in Washington DC address both their bilateral relations with the U.S. government, as well as relations with the multilateral financial institutions, i.e. the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, that are located there. African representatives coordinate their activities through monthly meetings, as well as regional meetings. In addition, they participate in the Group of 24 (G24) preparations for annual meetings of the Bank and the Fund.

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The monthly meetings of the working group for African representatives are held at the Africa Care House, a NGO based in Washington DC, that is concerned with drawing closer connections between Africans and African-Americans. The group invites U.S. government officials, as well as representatives from NGOs, to address related issues, depending on the group's sense that a particular issue is of importance. Although the group does not vote in any multilateral agency as a bloc (as, for example, the regional blocs within the G77 have voted in the United Nations), it does serve to open a dialogue with the U.S. government on issues, and provide an opportunity for questions and answers, give and take. At these same meetings, representatives have an opportunity for exchanging ideas with each other. Regular meetings, however, are confined to ambassadors from African governments. NGOs only participate in these meetings if they are invited to speak on behalf of a particular issue.

In some circumstances, the group has been successful in acting in concert with each other, yet not in achieving the desired results. For example, the group unsuccessfully lobbied the U.S. Congress against passage of the Zimbabwe Democracy Bill, which imposed sanctions on that country following elections and growing human rights abuses in 2001. The group lobbied successfully, however, for specific aid to address flood relief.

African representatives coordinate their activities in the multilateral financial institutions more formally, through constituency groups established by the IMF and the World Bank. The Group I constituency comprises Anglophone countries, and the Group II constituency comprises francophone countries. A third set of African states operates through the Maghreb grouping. Constituency groups to the IMF and the World Bank are represented by an executive director, and an alternate to the executive boards of each institution. The constituency elects their executive director every two years, and also nominates a candidate to chair the African caucus every four years. Taken together, the Africa Group I constituency's IMF shareholding and voting power in the Fund and Bank is low. In 2001, it represented 69,968 votes, or 3.23 percent of the total.

The work of the constituency offices in Washington DC mostly concerns representing member states during board discussions. As members of the executive board, the constituency groups also cast votes in regard to the programs established between the IMF and other members when these programs are discussed. Therefore, the constituency groups participate in Africa specific as well as general policy discussions associated with the executive board. Finally, the constituency offices receive delegations headed by the ministers of finance, or central bank governors of member countries during their visits to Washington. The executive director and staff of the groups brief these delegations ahead of any negotiations or meetings with Fund management.[21]

Finally, African representatives participate in broader groupings of developing states. Unlike the United Nations system, however, the broadest of these groupings, the G77, never operated in the Bretton Woods financial institutions. Developing countries organized themselves in the Bretton Woods institutions through the G24 and various other "issue groupings" led by the North.[22] More an organization of finance ministers than heads of state, the G24 deputies discuss issues and approve a document containing details of the consensus views of member countries regarding these problems. Similar to the G77, decision-making within the G24 is by consensus. However, unlike the G77, the G24 meets twice a year, preceding the spring and fall meetings of the International Monetary and Financial Committee, and the Joint Development Committee of the World Bank and the IMF. The heads of the IMF and the World Bank, and senior officials of the UN system, address the G24 when it meets in plenary. In addition to these meetings, a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) technical support project, coordinated by Professor Dani Rodrick at Harvard University, prepares a collection of research papers for the G24 to generate analytical capacity and negotiating strength among developing countries with respect to international monetary and financial issues. The project receives financial support from the International Development Research Centre of Canada, the governments of Denmark and the Netherlands, as well as the participating countries of the G24.[23]

Therefore, these representative structures demonstrate, other than in a very informal capacity, few of the official governmental representatives from Africa in Washington DC appear to have any ongoing contact with large, northern NGOs

headquartered there to coordinate policy.[24] They do, however, receive direct and indirect support from various NGOs such as the Constituency for Africa, and governments of other countries that provide meeting facilities and development studies that are more sympathetic to the positions of developing countries in general.

NGO ACTIVITIES REPRESENTING AFRICAN INTERESTS

Within the broader NGO community, most analysts distinguish operational from advocacy NGOs, environment from development NGOs, and northern from southern NGOs. Just as it is difficult to separate states from NGOs analytically, it is difficult to separate operational from advocacy NGOs by their nature. From the outset, providing aid for a particular activity or group is itself a form of advocacy. Nonetheless, operational northern NGOs channel approximately $7.7 billion in annual assistance to developing countries. On an annual basis, the amount NGOs channel comprises at least 13 percent of official development assistance, which is more aid than either the entire UN system or the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) provide.[25] Therefore, when these NGOs take on an advocacy role, their contribution to the debate on a given development strategy is significant. Moreover, when these NGOs take a position on a given conflict in Africa, they can have a real impact on its outcome even if Africa as a region is not their exclusive domain or area of specific expertise.

NGO activities resemble those of official diplomatic representatives of African states in terms of presenting issues and seeking resources. Thus, many of these activities center on the multilateral financial institutions and institutions of the U.S. government in Washington DC. Among the groups that seek to change the workings of the World Bank, environmental and development NGOs predominate. These NGOs are mostly advocacy and operationally oriented, respectively.

As a group, the environmental advocacy NGOs have been more successful in changing Bank policies than the development operationally oriented NGOs, because the former have a singular focus on advocacy, and they have large memberships whose political activities can threaten the Bank's funding. For example, the environmental movement allied with Republicans in the U.S. Senate in the mid 1980s and with Democrats in the House of Representatives in the early 1990s to achieve their goals with respect to the World Bank.[26] NGOs publicized the negative consequences of large-scale Bank programs that forced massive relocations of indigenous peoples as well as significant negative environmental consequences. Neither of the two most prominent environmental cases (i.e. the Polonoroeste project in Brazil and the Sardar Sardovar project in India) involved Africa. Nonetheless, environmental activism motivated the World Bank to create a World Bank and NGO committee in 1982. This committee has NGO representation from each region of the developing world. Funded by the World Bank, the committee is chaired by an NGO and a Bank official.

In regional and global negotiating activities, northern governments tend to use northern NGOs as assets, in order to maintain a close relationship with them. For example, northern governments use NGOs as depositories of useful information, receptacles of institutional memories, mobilizers of media coverage, and sources of contact networks. Southern governments, on the contrary, tend to keep indigenous NGOs "at arms length." Therefore, there does not at present appear to be any countervailing group of "southern" NGOs in relation to the northern ones. When northern and southern NGOs work together, the latter are generally perceived as the "junior" partners.[27]

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Many of the NGOs in the Washington DC area have a religious affiliation. These affiliations further complicate distinctions between service provision and advocacy roles, since some religious NGOs do not provide services to those outside their faith community. In extreme cases, religious distinctions in service provision can exacerbate regional conflicts, and reinforce ethnic cleavages.

CONFLICT AMONG REPRESENTATIVES

Current initiatives of the Bush administration with respect to Africa dominate the lobbying activities of both formal and informal representation concerned with the continent. The Bush administration has set four priorities for assisting African development, related to the issues it perceives as blocking development. First of all, the Bush administration has launched a significant initiative in the fight against HIV/AIDS by proposing an additional $500 million should be targeted to twelve African countries to prevent HIV/AIDS transmission between mother and child. Secondly, the Bush administration has proposed teacher training programs to address the lack of educational opportunities in Africa. Thirdly, the administration hopes to explore free trade agreements to lower trade barriers to African countries. Finally, it hopes to address problems related to war and terrorism: specifically the wars in Congo and Sudan. Conflict among representatives of African states, and African interests, occurs over these Bush administration policies, as well as over the allocation of resources connected to them.

The first of the Bush administration initiatives, the HIV/AIDS initiative, has been widely discussed among the working group of African ambassadors in Washington DC. African diplomats have organized and lobbied for this U.S. budget allocation in the U.S. Congress, and met with representatives of the Bush administration to exchange ideas about how the money will be distributed. They have also jockeyed among themselves to present their own countries' individual AIDS initiatives in the best possible light. As a group, they have sought to keep *all* African countries within

the list of eligible recipients. Yet they are aware that governments will compete with development operational NGOs to channel the resources to African societies. Much of the pessimism with respect to the distribution of funds stems from the sense that NGOs are better connected to the institutions of the U.S. government through networks established at school, and fostered in professional settings. In short, NGOs appear to know better "how the system works."

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The other major Bush initiative to have strong NGO connections is the Bush administration's efforts to resolve the war in Sudan. War in Sudan broke out immediately prior to independence in 1956, and was at first a regional conflict between northern inhabitants of the territory who had received disproportionate benefits from the British colonial regime, and southern inhabitants of Sudan, who feared domination by the north in the post colonial state. Since the southern inhabitants had Marxist affiliations, the government in the north was aligned with the U.S. during the Cold War, and the southern rebels aligned with Ethiopia.

As the Cold War gradually approached its end, the regional conflict took on a more religious tone. A military coup in 1989 installed a government that later sided with Iraq in the first U.S. gulf war. Southern rebels, although only having a Christian minority, came to be assisted by many Christian affiliated NGOs through Kenya.[28] The Clinton administration had sought to contain the government of Sudan. However, the activities of these religious groups, through lobbying Congress and the executive directly, resulted in the Bush administration's direct engagement in the conflict. Common efforts in the war on terrorism have also improved ties between the U.S. and Sudan. The religious significance of NGOs involved with the war in Sudan is not to be understated, however, since they were highly successful in reframing the question of the war from one of containment of a regime opposed to U.S. policies, to one of religious persecution.

CONCLUSION

The vision of an emergent transnational civil society and relationships between states and IOs should not, to use Michael Bratton's terminology, "prejudge the nature of state-society relations."[29] The NGO community does not merely introduce and frame issues, as some literature would imply. Rather, it engages in an ongoing dialogue on various policy proposals, carries out service provision for other international agencies, and provides development funds and other types of finance itself. NGOs and transnational advocacy networks are therefore not analytically distinct from the states and IOs themselves. As elements of civil society, they both act on, and act as, agents of IOs and global governance.

This article has demonstrated that representation of African states and African constituencies in Washington DC takes place through formal diplomatic channels, as well as through informal networks of non-state actors in transnational civil society that advocate for a given position on an issue, and compete for resources on others. Therefore, alliances between states and these non-state actors are possible only when they have interests in common, and when there is agreement on how resources should be distributed. When policy goals conflict, and competition for resources grows, the community of NGOs divides and individual NGOs form alliances with other state and non-state actors. Since many are located and funded in the North, and also lobby northern governments, their activities have the effect of magnifying the importance of northern governments (chiefly the United States) and their positions both in the North-South dialogue, and in the multilateral institutions.

Weak *states* are system "takers" in the sense that their interests derive from their position in the overall system. NGOs, however, may not have formal political power, yet they have great capacity to include issues on the agenda that would otherwise be absent, by broadening individuals' access to information about a dispute, and by mobilizing widespread concern for the marginalized. Nonetheless, future investigations into the NGO phenomenon will have to address the fundamental difficulty in isolating NGOs as an analytical construct. This article has proposed that in the Washington DC diplomatic community, African states make alliances with each other, and with providers of finance. It has also hinted that in regional conflicts, such as that of Sudan, NGOs make alliances according to religious affiliation, and have taken their concerns to the U.S. executive and the U.S. Congress. Therefore, both state and non-state actors form alliances based on mutual interests, much as states themselves do. As in the example of state-based alliances, these alliances are highly fluid.

Notes

[1] Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, ed., *Representation* (New York: Atherton Press, 1969): 19.

[2] Lisa Jordan, "Political Responsibility in Transnational NGO Advocacy," *World Development* 28, no. 1 (2000): 2053.

[3] Jordan, "Political Responsibility." Also, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics,* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). Admittedly, Keck and Sikkink acknowledge that the networks they study operate as both agents and structures. They refrain from using the civil society analogy to describe the phenomenon. This usage, however, is not consistent within the literature.

[4] Claire C. Mercer, "NGOs, Civil Society and Democratization: A Critical Review of the Literature," *Progress in Development Studies* 2, no. 1 (2002). For an inquiry more specific to Africa, see Claire C. Mercer, "Performing Partnership: Civil Society and the Illusions of Good Governance in Tanzania," *Political Geography* (forthcoming).

[5] John W. Harbeson, "Civil Society and Political Renaissance in Africa," in *Civil Society and the State in Africa*, ed. John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994). In an early consideration of the relationship between African states and NGOs, Bratton points out that NGOs have achieved a degree of autonomy from governments, yet the autonomy is apparent because other formal organizations have failed to achieve it. In addition, NGOs have a distinct presence at the grassroots level. See Michael Bratton, "The Politics of Government-NGO Relations in Africa," *World Development* 17, no. 4 (1989): 569-87.

[6] Tim Kelsall and Claire Mercer, "Empowering the People? World Vision and 'Transformatory Development' in Tanzania," *Review of African Political Economy* (forthcoming).

[7] Ben Rawlence, "NGO Wars: The New Field of Politics in Africa," in *African Studies Association Annual Meeting* (Washington, DC: 2002). For a discussion of early NGOs and their relationship to colonial regimes, see Frederick Cooper, "Networks, Moral Discourse, and History," in *Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global—Local Networks of Power*, eds., Ronald Kassimir Thomas Callaghy, Robert Latham, 23–46, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[8] Ronald Kassimir, "Producing Local Politics: Governance, Representation, and Non-State Organizations in Africa," in *Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa: Global—Local Networks of Power*, eds., Ronald Kassimir Thomas Callaghy, Robert Latham, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[9] Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss, "Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions," in *NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance*, eds., Leon Gordenker. Thomas G. Weiss (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996). See also Rachel Brett, "The Role and Limits of Human Rights NGOs at the United Nations," *Political Studies* XLIII, no. Special Issue (1995), 96-110. And Peter Willetts, "From 'Consultative Arrangements' to 'Partnership': The Changing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at the UN," *Global Governance* 6, no. 2 (2000): 191–212, for additional conceptualizations of NGOs.

[10] Deep differences among states and NGOs, and among NGOs themselves exist. See Chadwick Alger, "The Emerging Roles of NGOs in the UN System: From Article 71 to a People's Millennium Assembly," *Global Governance* 8, no. 1 (2002): 198-9. See also Jordan, "Political Responsibility." 2062.

[11] Kenneth R. Rutherford, "The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines," *World Politics* 53, no. 1 (2000): 74–114.

[12] Van Tuijl argues, for example, human rights NGOs need to move beyond making contributions to global culture, and need to root a human rights culture in new relationships and shared institutions. See Peter Van Tuijl, "Entering the Global Dealing Room: Reflections on a Rights-Based Framework for NGOs in International Development," *Third World Quarterly* 21, no. 4 (2000): 617–26.

[13] Andrew Walter, "NGOs, Business, and International Investment: The Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Seattle, and Beyond," *Global Governance* 7, no. 1 (2001): 51–73.

[14] Jordan, "Political Responsibility," 2061.

[15] J. Kuyembeh, Basil P. Mramba, Emile Doumba, Ali Badjo Damatie, and Lucie Mboto Fouda, "African Prospects: Facing the Challenges," (paper presented at the International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, April 28, 2001).

[16] Bruce G. Carruthers, *City of Capital: Politics and Markets in the English Financial Revolution* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).

[17] Carruthers, *City of Capital.*

[18] For a discussion of the nature and composition of this structure, see Susan Strange, *States and Markets*, 2nd ed., (London: Pinter Publishers, 1988), Chapter 5.

[19] Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, 14.

[20] Colette Chabbott, "Development INGOs," in *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations since 1875*, eds., John Boli and George Thomas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999): 222.

[21] Cyrus D.R. Rustomjee, *Handbook: Africa Group I Constituency.* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund).

[22] The G24 was established in 1974 to coordinate the positions of developing countries on monetary and finance development issues in the IMF and World Bank; it is thus a smaller and more specialized body than the G77. See Group of 77—A Voice for Putting the Issues on the Global Agenda. *Journal of the Group of 77*, 1994. Special Edition. The membership of the G24 is segmented into regions. Region I (Africa) has Algeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo as members. Region II (Latin America and the Caribbean) has Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela as members. The membership of Region III (Asia and developing countries of Europe) comprises India, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Syrian Arab Republic.

[23] Aziz Ali Mohammed, "The Future Role of the International Monetary Fund," (New York and Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and Center for International Development Harvard University, 2001).

[24] The evidence for this conclusion came from a week-long study of representation. The government representatives from Africa, however, did not constitute a scientific sample. Most of the questions focused on development-related activities of NGOs.

[25] Charles Abugre and Nancy Alexander, "Non-Governmental Organizations and the International Monetary and Financial System," *International Monetary and Financial Issues for the 1990s,* IX, (1998) UNCTAD, Geneva, 107–125.

[26] Abugre and Alexander, "Non-Governmental Organizations," 116.

[27] Abugre and Alexander, "Non-Governmental Organizations."

[28] These NGOs include the Institute on Religion and Democracy, the US Committee for Refugees Samaritan's Purse, Catholic Relief Services, the Center for Religious Freedom, Servant's Heart, American Anti-Slavery Group, and Safe Harbor.

[29] Michael Bratton, "Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa," *World Politics* XLI, no. 3 (1989) 417.