

Sino-American Preventive Diplomacy During the Cold War

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INTRODUCTION

From the advent to power of the Chinese Communist Party on October 1, 1949 to the historic visits of Henry Kissinger and President Nixon in 1971-72, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States of America (USA) were bitter enemies during the Cold War. China and the U.S. fought a war in Korea from 1950 to 1953, and the two countries nearly came to war again on five different occasions: over Vietnam in 1954 and 1965, and over Taiwan in 1954-55, 1958-59 and 1962. However, the two sides were wary to come to blows again and each side engaged in efforts to help avoid this. However, the dangers of miscalculations, recklessness, or accidents were ever present. During the Korean War there was much talk in American circles about using nuclear weapons. A concerned British Prime Minister, Clement Atlee, after consulting his French counterpart, went to see President Truman to help reduce the risks of this happening. The full records on this have never been published, but there is an authoritative account on the outcome from a senior American official.¹ In 1959, President Eisenhower, concerned about the danger of continuing PRC provocations over Taiwan, sent a message to Chairman to Premier Mao via Premier Khrushchev. The minutes of Premier Khrushchev's discussion with Chairman Mao make for fascinating reading.² Another situation involving the use of preventive diplomacy occurred during the Polish crisis of 1956 when the CCP made strong representations to the CPSU against the escalation of military forces against the Polish demonstrators.

There were thus seven situations (two with Korea, three with Taiwan, one with Vietnam, and one with the USSR) that attracted preventive diplomacy and a notable range of methods of preventive diplomacy applied. Among these one can mention the following: overt and covert communications from one side to the other; diplomatic messages; ambassadorial talks; and third party intercessions. This study will be approached from the perspective of the concept of preventive diplomacy while having regard to the concept of historical analogy.

I. THE CONCEPTS OF PREVENTATIVE DIPLOMACY AND HISTORICAL ANALOGY

There have been historical studies of conflicts of the past to see whether they might have been prevented. A classic example is Richard Overy's book 1939: Countdown to War, which discusses whether the Second World War might have been preventable.³ Preventive diplomacy as a concept is a relatively recent one. It signifies efforts to head off conflicts, mitigate their effects and prevent their recurrence.⁴ The concept was first articulated during the Cold War, by then UN

Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld.⁵ In his annual report to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 1960, Secretary-General Hammarskjöld stated:

Experience indicates that ...preventive diplomacy... is of special significance in cases where the original conflict may be said either to be the result of, or to imply risks for, the creation of a power vacuum between the main blocs [in the cold war]...The ways in which a vacuum can be filled by the United Nations... differ from case to case, but they have this in common: Temporarily, and pending the filling of a vacuum by normal means, the United Nations enters the picture on the basis of its non-commitment to any power bloc, so as to provide to the extent possible a guarantee to all parties against initiatives from others. The special needs and the special possibilities for what I here call preventive United Nations diplomacy have been demonstrated in several recent cases.⁶

Since Hammarskjöld launched the concept it has come into broad use by many actors and organizations. Preventive diplomacy is a key policy of the African Union, ASEAN and other organizations.⁷

Historical analogy as a concept “signifies an inference based on the notion that if two or more events separated in time are similar in one respect, then they may be also similar in others.”⁸ Yuen Foong Khong’s book, *Analogies at War*,⁹ recalls Stanley Hoffman’s observation that the use of historical analogies in decision-making was “part of the American style.”¹⁰ In taking decisions to commit troops in Vietnam, U.S. decision-makers had likened the context in 1965 to that of Munich in 1938, namely a failure to take action as a prelude to world war. China’s leaders had also used the same type of historical analogy. Khong recalled Deng Xiaoping’s equating the 1989 student movement in Tiananmen Square as “the same stuff as what the rebels did during the Cultural Revolution.”¹¹ Building on previous scholarship on the role of “learning from history,”¹² Khong’s work examined “historical analogy” as a specific type of learning. The challenge, he considered, is to decipher exactly how such historical analogy determines specific decisions or policy outcomes.

The evidence that we shall adduce below suggests that both China and the U.S. sought to avoid their experience of being drawn into the Korean War. In the U.S.’s case this could be seen during the third Taiwan Straits crisis of 1962. In the PRC’s case this could be seen regarding the situation in Vietnam in 1965. We shall suggest in this essay that, apart from these two instances, there are historical analogies to be drawn between the two countries’ experience during the cold war and their rivalry in the 21st century.

II. PREVENTATIVE DIPLOMACY DURING THE KOREAN WAR

There are two recorded instances of efforts at preventive diplomacy during the Korean War: one by the PRC warning the Americans on October 2, 1950 not to

cross the 38th parallel, and the other by British Prime Minister Clement Atlee towards President Dwight Eisenhower seeking to lessen the risks of American use of nuclear weapons.

(A) *Chinese Message to the Americans, October 2, 1950*

Historians disagree about the intentions of a purported Chinese warning to the U.S. at the beginning of October, 1950, not to cross the 38th parallel. As Dr. Chi Kwan Mark has written, on October 2, Zhou Enlai asked Indian Ambassador K. M. Pannikar to warn Washington that China would intervene in Korea should the United States cross the thirty-eighth parallel.¹³ This warning, Mark continues, was, ignored by America.¹⁴ On October 7, the U.S./UN forces began to fight their way into North Korea. The next day, Mao issued the order to organize the Chinese People's Volunteers to assist the Korean people's war of liberation.¹⁵

In his 1960 study, *China Crosses the Yalu*, Allen S. Whiting took the view that after the Inchon landing, Beijing had tried through both public and private channels to prevent American forces from crossing the 38th parallel. In Whiting's view, Beijing had entered the war only after its warnings had been ignored and feared that the safety of the Chinese-Korean border was menaced.¹⁶ In contrast to Whiting, Chen Jian, in his 1994 book *China's Road to the Korean War*, documented that Mao's decision to enter the Korean War had been taken before Zhou Enlai made his demarche to Indian Ambassador Pannikar. Mao, according to Chen Jian, was bent on intervening in Korea and would have done so in any event.¹⁷ Chen Jian wrote:

We now know that the Chinese leaders had made the primary decision to enter the war before Zhou's warning not after it...(O)ne cannot exclude the possibility that Chinese leaders sent off the warning for the purpose of avoiding China's military involvement at the final moment...[but]...Zhou's statement could have been designed to serve China's last-minute military preparations...Second, Zhou's statement could have been made for political considerations.¹⁸

The U.S. Government certainly knew of the PRC threat to enter the war if the U.S. crossed the 38th parallel. On September 5, 1950, U.S. Consul General Wilkinson, in Hong Kong, sent a telegram to the U.S. State Department reporting on statements by PRC Premier Zhou Enlai at a recent Peking conference: "When asked position of China should North Korean troops be pushed back to Manchurian border, Zhou replied, China would fight enemy outside China's border and not wait until enemy came in."¹⁹

President Truman, in his memoirs, makes the following points. First, in his meetings with General MacArthur at Wake Island, the General had twice advised him that the PRC would not enter the war. Second, the Pannikar message had been received but discounted because, in the U.S. view, he had had a tendency to run with the Communists. Furthermore, the day after the message, the UN was due to vote

on a resolution giving the UN mission in Korea a stabilization mandate, including in North Korea, and Zhou's message might have been designed to influence the vote. Third, the State Department had received similar messages from Moscow, Stockholm, London, and New Delhi. Fourth, he had issued detailed instructions to General MacArthur on how to respond in case the PRC did enter the war.

On balance, Premier Zhou's warning to the Americans would seem to have been well-meant as an attempt at preventive diplomacy. As Chen Jian himself wrote, "...one cannot exclude the possibility that Chinese leaders sent off the warning for the purpose of avoiding China's military involvement at the final moment..."²¹

(B) Prime Minister Atlee's Mission to Washington, December, 1950 over the Risks of Nuclear War.

The British and other NATO allies of the U.S. deployed considerable efforts to help prevent the spread of the Korean War to China and, to the extent possible, to contain the conflict.²² Consideration of the possible use of nuclear weapons against the PRC came up in the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy administrations. During the Truman administration the option was apparently pressed by the U.S. Commander, General Douglas MacArthur and considered by President Truman, although MacArthur does not refer to it in his memoirs.²³

Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman has an editorial note before President Truman's diary entry for 5 December, 1950: "In what the President thought was a good press conference on November 30 he had said that he was considering all means to stop the Chinese, including the atomic bomb. Prime Minister Atlee panicked and asked to come to Washington. He arrived on December 4."²⁴ Truman's diary entry commented as follows on his lunch with Atlee: "The position of the British on Asia is, to say the least, fantastic. We cannot agree to their suggestions. Yet they say they will support us in whatever we do!"²⁵

The American records show considerable discussion by civilian and military U.S. officials about how President Truman should handle his conversations with Prime Minister Atlee on the issue of the use of nuclear weapons. Basically, they wanted the President to keep his options open and not to make a commitment against the use of nuclear weapons.²⁶ In his memoirs, President Truman dealt at length with his meetings with Prime Minister Atlee on other matters but was skeletal on the use of atomic weapons. The Communique on Atlee's visit papers over the issue as follows:

The President stated that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb. The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation.²⁷

That Atlee's visit had a cautionary effect comes out in the memoirs of Thomas C. Reed, Former U.S. Secretary of the Air Force:

Korea had been a seesaw battle... In response, the Truman White House, probably at the urging of General MacArthur... was giving serious thought to the use of nuclear weapons in Asia. 'No military option is ruled out,' the President said.

At the end of November, Clement Atlee, Prime Minister of the UK, met with his French counterpart to discuss the crisis. Then on December 3, he flew to Washington to meet with Truman.

Any written agreements reached during that visit have yet to see the light of day, but it appears the results of those Atlee-Truman discussions were two-fold: a stabilization of the nuclear crisis, and an opening of the overflight window into the western Soviet Union as a hedge against the feared surprise attack. Specifically:

1. On December 9, 1950, Truman announced there would be no use of American nuclear weapons in or around Korea without prior consultation with the British.
2. On December 16, Truman declared a National Emergency in the U.S., a declaration that activated a broad spectrum of major alerts, reserve call-ups, force movements, and resource expenditures. The President's declaration was a signal that he would deal with the crisis by conventional, not nuclear means.

The British government agreed to join in the overflights of denied territory.²⁸

Prime Minister Atlee's visit did have a positive effect in inviting more American caution over the use of nuclear weapons and was undoubtedly an instance of the exercise of preventive diplomacy. One would see similar British efforts during the second Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958, which we discuss below.

III. TAIWAN 1954-55, 1958-59, 1962

"In the aftermath of the Korean War," Michael Schaller writes, the United States and China nearly came to blows on three occasions: in Vietnam in 1954, and in the Taiwan straits in 1954 and 1958. In each incident, Beijing and Washington approached... 'the brink,' but pulled back before fighting began. To some degree, the painful lessons both sides learned in Korea modified their behavior."²⁹ The crises concerning Taiwan in 1954, 1958, and 1962 gave rise to the exercise of preventive diplomacy – as did a situation concerning Vietnam in 1965.

A. 1954

Chen Jian has written that Chairman Mao provoked the 1954 Taiwan crisis, the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu, largely for internal reasons. In the end the crisis was defused when the PRC itself decided to call a halt. Premier Zhou Enlai made a statement at the Bandung conference to the effect that China had no intention of going to war with the United States and that it was ready to negotiate with the U.S. over Taiwan. But the situation carried great dangers while it lasted. Five

strands of preventive diplomacy can be seen: first, restraint on the part of President Eisenhower, coupled with efforts by Secretary of State Dulles towards friendly countries to persuade the PRC to defuse the situation; second, referral of the situation to the UN Security Council, with a view encouraging peaceful settlement; third, U.S. bargaining with Chiang Kai-Shek and offering him a mutual defense pact to persuade the Taiwanese leader to exercise restraint and to agree to an understanding that the off-shore islands were 'outposts' not vital to the security of Taiwan; fourth, U.S. representations to the USSR to get it to use its influence on the PRC to defuse the situation; fifth, the exercise of public diplomacy by American leaders in Washington and by Premier Zhou Enlai at the Bandung conference.

President Eisenhower, in his memoirs, *Mandate for Change*³⁰ wrote: "For nine months the administration moved through treacherous cross-currents with one channel leading to peace with honor and a hundred channels leading to war or dishonor."³¹ While taking a firm stance of principle, both President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles sought to defuse the situation through back channels. Secretary Dulles, with the support of British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden, persuaded New Zealand to raise the situation before the UN Security Council. The intention was to try to persuade the PRC to exercise restraint. While pursuing this initiative to go before the Security Council, Secretary Dulles also approached several friendly countries that would be attending the Bandung conference with the suggestion that they use their influence on the PRC delegation. The U.S. State Department even provided Philippines Foreign Minister Carlos Romulo with a draft resolution for use if needed. Dulles thought that the PRC might use the Bandung meeting to gauge feelings among influential countries in deciding whether to escalate the crisis. He also thought that intercessions to the PRC delegation at Bandung might help bring the latter to exercise restraint.

Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1955-1957, Vol. II, China, Documents, carries several of the Memoranda of Conversation between Secretary Dulles and foreign leaders to get them to use their influence, as well as letters he sent to various countries. Document 195, for example, was a Memorandum of a Conversation between Secretary Dulles and General Carlos Romulo of the Philippines. In the conversation Secretary Dulles observed that "the Bandung meeting might be very dangerous, to which General Romulo agreed." Dulles stated that he believed it possible that the Chinese Communist decision whether they should attack Quemoy, Matsu, and Taiwan might depend on the attitude they found among the powers meeting at the Bandung Conference: "If this is the case a resolution deploring the use of force in the Taiwan Strait area and urging a cease-fire might deter an overt attack... The Secretary gave General Romulo a short draft resolution which might be considered at the Bandung Conference. General Romulo, after reading it said he thought it was fine and indicated that he would make use of it at the Bandung meeting."³² Document 197 in the same collection reproduces a Telegram from Secretary Dulles to the U.S. Embassy in Turkey. This was one of several such telegrams to U.S. embassies. Dulles wrote to the U.S. Ambassador as follows:

Decision on part of ChiComs whether to resort to force to make good their claims

against Formosa and offshore islands, with resultant hostilities which probably could not be confined to these islands, may in large part be determined by ChiComs judgment on whether majority of Asian nations would feel resort to force by ChiComs justified. Therefore Bandung Conference ... may have decisive effect on ChiComs' subsequent action and on whether there is peace or war in Far East.

If you believe it appropriate please convey foregoing to Foreign Minister or head of Bandung Conference delegation as my estimate and express strong hope that if at Bandung Conference subjects of peace or Formosa situation are discussed his delegation would find it possible to urge strongly that Conference call on parties concerned to renounce threat or use of force in Formosa Straits area. Such action at Bandung could in final analysis be deciding factor whether or not war breaks out in Pacific.³³

In his memoirs, President Eisenhower refers to another U.S. effort behind the scenes to get the USSR to exercise its influence on the PRC to defuse the situation. Eisenhower wrote that in May, 1955 "Secretary Dulles reported to me on a talk he had in Vienna:"

I talked alone with Molotov about the China, situation... I said we were exerting influence on the Chinese Nationalists and they should exert a comparable influence on the Chinese Communists...Molotov said they wanted peace... I urged him to think about a way of solution, and he said he would do so.

I ... think that the Soviet side may as a result of our talk put increasing pressure upon the Chinese Communists to avoid war.³⁴

In order to get Taiwanese leaders to exercise restraint and to agree to consider the offshore islands as 'outposts,' the U.S. offered and concluded a mutual defense pact with Taiwan. This was part of the process, on the American side, of containing and defusing the crisis. In the end result, Premier Zhou Enlai announced at the Bandung meeting that the PRC did not intend to go to war with the U.S. and was ready for talks with it. The U.S. seized on this statement with resultant talks between Ambassadors of the two sides. The crisis thus effectively ended.

B. 1958, 1959

The hot phase of the Taiwan Strait Crisis, 1958, again initiated by PRC shelling of offshore islands, ran from August to October of 1958. American diplomatic efforts to help contain the crisis and to keep it from escalating included restraint on the part of President Eisenhower, indications that the U.S. would not hesitate to use the nuclear option, public and private calls for a peaceful outcome, and representations to those in a position to do so to use their influence with the PRC for restraint and a peaceful resolution. The British sought to use their influence over the question of American use of nuclear weapons and the USSR sent its Foreign Minister, Gromyko, to meet Mao and urge restraint.

At the outset of the crisis Secretary of State Dulles, then ailing, wrote to Acting Secretary Dulles that "If this seems really serious and critical there is perhaps room for the good offices of some acceptable third power...Possibly this

situation could be taken to the UN Security Council as was contemplated at one stage back in 1953 or 1954.”³⁵

A White House Press Release of 4 September, 1958 sought to provide space for the PRC to step back from the crisis:

5. Despite, however, what the Chinese Communists say, and so far have done, it is not yet certain that their purpose is in fact to make an all-out effort to conquer by force Taiwan (Formosa) and the offshore islands. Neither is it apparent that such efforts as are being made, or may be made, cannot be contained by the courageous, and purely defensive, efforts of the forces of the Republic of China, with such substantial logistical support as the United States is providing.³⁶

Premier Khrushchev, concerned about the PRC dragging the USSR into a confrontation with the U.S., sent Foreign Minister Gromyko on an urgent mission to speak with Chairman Mao in Beijing. Gromyko wrote in his Memoirs that Mao was in a belligerent mood: “The general drift of Mao’s attitude was that there should be no giving way to the Americans and that we should act on the principle of meeting force with force.”³⁷ Mao told Gromyko that he was not afraid of the American’s using nuclear weapons and that the USSR, in that eventuality, “should them give them everything you’ve got.”³⁸

The British were concerned about the risk of American use of nuclear weapons. When they raised this at first with President Eisenhower he was evasive. However, on September 21, 1958, The British Foreign Secretary accompanied by the British Ambassador in Washington saw President Eisenhower in Newport, Rhode Island. Selwyn Lloyd raised the issue with President Eisenhower and he was again evasive at first. Selwyn Lloyd came back to the issue later in the conversation, whereupon the following exchange took place:

Mr. Lloyd added that the British government and its people had a frightful dilemma over the question of the use of nuclear weapons. He said that there would be no doubt that if the United States used nuclear weapons in that area, then there was ‘going to be hell to pay’.

The President responded that in his opinion, if nuclear weapons were going to be used, it would have to be an all-out effort rather than a local effort. He said that he did not plan to use nuclear weapons in any local situation at the present time.

Mr. Lloyd responded that he was relieved to hear the President say that.

The President continued that he believed nuclear weapons were not a police weapon but that you use nuclear weapons only when you wanted to destroy the enemy’s will to resist.³⁹

The potentially disastrous effects of mistakes during the Cold War could be seen during the 1958 Taiwan crisis. Mao had deliberately provoked a crisis in order to mobilize the Chinese populace behind his Great Leap Forward. China was shelling Jinmen (Quemoy) and the U.S. ended up providing naval escorts to the supply ships of the GMD. The risks of a confrontation between the PRC and the U.S. were great. Indeed, as Chen Jian has written, “given the fact that the use of nuclear weapons had been widely considered and discussed during the course of the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958, the event must be regarded as one of the most dangerous international crises in Cold War History.”⁴⁰

Mao had given strict instructions on how the Chinese forces should behave in their military activities towards the Americans involved in the crisis. Then, in the words of Mao himself, a ‘serious mistake’ had occurred. Chen Jian writes that “in an international crisis, the big picture sometimes can be changed by a small incident.” On August 24 and 27, the PLA’s Fujian frontline radio station, without Beijing’s authorization, announced that “our army’s landing operation is imminent” and called on the GMD troops to surrender and “join the great cause of liberating Taiwan.” Policymakers in Washington, as well as the Western media, immediately took this provocative message as evidence that Beijing was about to launch an amphibious landing operation against Jinmen. The same day, for the first time since the crisis began, the U.S. State Department publicly announced that the GMD – controlled offshore islands such as Jinmen and Mazu were vital to the defense of Taiwan itself.

Chen Jian notes that Beijing’s leaders were alarmed by Washington’s statement since it revealed that with any mistake, the shelling of Jinmen could turn from a CCP – GMD conflict into a direct Chinese-American military showdown. This prospect was unacceptable to Mao. No matter how provocative the chairman had been toward the United States in internal speeches and open propaganda, what he really wanted was:

A conflict short of war. After learning of the contents of the Fujian radio station’s broadcast...Mao lost [his] temper. He sternly criticized this ‘serious mistake’ reemphasizing that no one should comment on issues related to the Taiwan Strait crisis without Beijing’s approval.⁴¹

In the end it was American power and technology that brought the crisis to an end. Dino A. Brugioni, a long-time senior intelligence official, supervised the preparation of aerial reconnaissance photographs and briefing notes for the CIA during many crises, including the Cuban Missile Crisis. In *Eyeball to Eyeball: The Insider’s Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis*⁴² he provided the following fascinating account of the resolution of the 1958 Taiwan crisis:

President Eisenhower authorized U-2 missions to be flown, not only over the islands but also over the mainland. We were able to report with a high degree of confidence that there was no imminent preparation for the invasion of the offshore islands or Formosa itself. Eisenhower looked at all the briefing boards... and said, ‘We’ll see what we can do about it [the dogfights]’ In September, he decided to provide the Chinese Nationalists with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. Commencing in mid-September, the Chinese nationalists shot down over 100 MiG fighters in aerial dogfights. The U.S. government also provided the Chinese Nationalists with information as to rendezvous areas of boats and junks that could be used for an invasion. The Chinese Nationalists began bombing and strafing these areas. The offshore Quemoy-Ma-tsu island crisis was resolved.⁴³

Premier Zhou, in a statement, again stated, as in 1954, that China was prepared to talk to the U.S. and after the U.S. accepted this there were talks in the ambassadorial channel.

In 1959, notwithstanding the defusing of the 1958 Taiwan crisis the previous year, President Eisenhower remained concerned about the risks of a clash

because of the CCP confrontational attitude. When Premier Khrushchev visited him in the White House in September of 1959, he asked him to deliver a message to Chairman Mao to cool the situation. Khrushchev flew directly from Washington to Beijing to meet Mao for discussions and to deliver Eisenhower's message.

Khrushchev, Michael Schaller noted, had called on Mao to "ease international tension" by showing restraint toward Taiwan, while "Mao dismissed Khrushchev as a 'sell-out.'⁴⁴ However, the Memorandum of Conversation of the two leaders on October 2, 1959 is quite revealing. The Soviet note on the conversation has been published by the Cold War International History Project.⁴⁵

Relations between the two leaders were certainly strained and in earlier meetings on July 31 and August 3, 1958 they had raked over the many differences between them and their administrations.⁴⁶ At their meeting on October 2, 1958 the tensions between them were certainly evident. At one point the note records Mao as replying to Khrushchev on the issue of the release of prisoners "with obvious displeasure and testily."⁴⁷

Nevertheless, one sees from the Soviet note the following points worthy of note: Khrushchev calls for the cooperation of Mao for an overall relaxation of tensions. He stated: "We stand for relaxation of tensions. We only wanted the people to understand that we stand for peace. It is not worth shelling the islands in order to tease cats."⁴⁸

Mao, at the opening of the conversation stated: "As far as I understand it, the meaning of Eisenhower's observations can be summarized as follows: that moderate and restrained policy should be conducted."⁴⁹ To this Khrushchev replied: "You understand this correctly. I would like to emphasize that there is a thought in Eisenhower's message, which implies not removing forever, only postponing the resolution of the Taiwan issue. The main idea of the Eisenhower message is that there should be no war. We do not want war over Taiwan."⁵⁰

Mao follows this by saying: "Taiwan is an internal PRC issue. We say that we will definitely liberate Taiwan. But the roads to liberation may be different--peaceful and military...In our opinion, let Taiwan and other islands stay in the hands of the Jiang Jieshi-ists (Chang Kai-shekists) for ten, twenty and even thirty years."⁵¹ A bit later, Mao adds: "The presence of Americans on Taiwan arouses discontent not only in socialist countries, but also in England, in the U.S. itself and other countries."⁵² Khrushchev replies, "Eisenhower understands this" whereupon Mao retorts: "Yes, this is true. The U.S. understand(s) this, but they want to conduct talks in their direction. The U.S. government hinted that the PRC should make a declaration on the non-use of violence in the Taiwan question. The Americans want to receive guarantees on the non-use of arms, but as for them, they intend to do there whatever they want."⁵³

The two leaders then spent some time discussing the release of American prisoners held by the PRC. At one stage in this discussion, Khrushchev stated: "This is your internal affair. We do not interfere...If I touched on this issue, I did it only because I wanted to sort it out and to lay before you our point of view, since this issue stirs up the international situation."⁵⁴

Then there was a back and forth exchange between the two men. Mao stated: "That means it complicates life for the Americans", whereupon Khrushchev retorts: "This issue also complicates our life." Mao continued: "The issue of Taiwan is clear, not only will we not touch Taiwan, but also the off-shore islands, for 10, 20 and perhaps 30 years," repeating similar comments he had made earlier.⁵⁵

Khrushchev acknowledged that Taiwan is an inalienable part, a province, of China, "and on this principled question we have no disagreement...But here the main issue is about tactics. The Taiwan question creates difficulties not only for the Americans, but also for us. Between us, in a confidential way, we say that we will not fight over Taiwan, but for outside consumption, so to say, we state on the contrary, that in case of an aggravation of the situation because of Taiwan the USSR will defend the PRC. In its turn the U.S. declare that they will defend Taiwan. Therefore, a kind of pre-war situation emerges."⁵⁶

At this point Mao comes in with a rather astute remark: "So what should we do then? Should we act as the U.S. says, that is declare the non-use of force in the area of Taiwan and move towards turning this issue into an international issue."⁵⁷ Zhou Enlai then supports this point as follows: "As far as the Taiwan question is concerned, we should draw a clear line between its two aspects: relations between the Peoples Republic of China and Taiwan are an internal issue, and relations between China and America regarding the Taiwan issue this is the international aspect of the problem."⁵⁸

Khrushchev yielded the point: "This is clear, and this is how we spoke with Eisenhower, as you could see from the excerpt of the record of my conversation with the President."⁵⁹ He then added: "We do not have proposals regarding the Taiwan Question, but we would think you ought to look for ways to relax the situation. We, being your allies, knew about the measures you undertook on the Taiwan Question, and today I am hearing for the first time about some of the tenets of your position in this area."⁶⁰ Khrushchev continued by calling for better exchange of opinions on all these questions among allies.

Mao acknowledged the point about exchanges between the two sides and then continued: "I would like to clarify right away that we did not intend to undertake any large-scale military actions in the area of Taiwan, and only wanted to create complications for the United States considering that they got bogged down in Lebanon. And we believe that our campaign was successful."⁶¹ Khrushchev countered: "We hold a different opinion on this issue."⁶²

Mao then showed that the representations of Khrushchev were having some positive impact on his when he said: "Although we fire at the off-shore islands, we will not make attempts to liberate them. We also think that the United States will not go to war because of the off-shore islands."⁶³ Khrushchev conceded the point: "Yes, Americans will not go to war because of Taiwan and the off-shore islands. We are familiar with the content of the instructions that were given to [John Foster] Dulles when he went to a meeting with Jiang Jieshi...As for the firing at the off-shore islands, if you shoot, then you ought to capture these islands, and if you do not consider necessary capturing these islands, then there is no use in firing. I do

not understand this policy of yours. Frankly speaking, I thought you would take the islands and was upset when I learned that you did not take them. Of course this is your business, but I am speaking about it as an ally.”⁶⁴

After an exchange about whether the PRC had advised the USSR beforehand about its plans to shell the islands, Mao asked Khrushchev: “I would like to know what is your opinion on what we ought to do”, whereupon Khrushchev replied: “We stand for relaxation of tensions. We only wanted the people to understand that we stand for peace. It is not worth shelling the islands in order to tease cats.”⁶⁵

At this point, Mao’s position more or less converged with that of Khrushchev: “This is our policy. Our relations with Jiang Jieshi and with the Americans are two different things. With the United States we will seek to resolve issues by peaceful means. If the United States does not leave Taiwan, then we will negotiate with them until they go from there. The relationship with Jiang Jieshi is our internal question and we might resolve it not only by peaceful, but also other methods.”⁶⁶

The convergence of views builds up further. Mao added after an exchange: “The Taiwan Question is very complex”, to which Khrushchev replies: “We have a common understanding of the question of Taiwan. At the present time there is only [a difference on] the question of tactics. You always refuse to work out a policy on the question that we could understand... I would remark that we do not know what kind of policy you will have on this issue tomorrow.”⁶⁷ At this point, Mao made a categorical statement of his position: “We do not want war with the United States.”⁶⁸

Notwithstanding this, Khrushchev continued to press home the point about Mao’s unpredictability and, implicitly, about the danger of accidents: “One should not pose the issue this way. Neither you nor I want war—this is well known. The problem is that not only does the world public opinion not know what you might undertake tomorrow, but also we even we, your allies, do not know it.”⁶⁹

Mao, having already taken a categorical position against war with the United States brushes off the lecture from Khrushchev: “There could be two ways here. The first of them –to do what the Americans demand, i.e. to provide a guarantee on the non-use of force regarding Taiwan. The Americans long ago posed the question and told us about it via Eden as early as March 1955. The second way is to draw a clear line between our relations with the United States and the relations with the Jiang-Jieshists. As to the relations with Jiang Jieshi, here any means should be used, since the relations with Jiang Jieshi are our internal matter.”⁷⁰

After the meeting recessed for an hour, Mao recommended: “To do what the Americans propose is not too good for us. And the Americans do not want to reciprocate, to do what we want.”⁷¹ Khrushchev replied: “You are leaving us in an awkward position. You frame the question as if we support the position of Americans, while we stand on our Soviet communist position.”⁷²

The two sides had essentially covered their respective ground. Mao stated at this point: “Perhaps we should postpone this question indefinitely. Everyone sees that we are not close to the United States and that the United States, not us, send[s] its fleet to our coast.”⁷³ Khrushchev then retorts: “One should keep in mind that we also are not without sin. It was we who drew the Americans to South Korea. We

should undertake such steps that would allow the Americans to respond with their steps in the direction of a relaxation of the situation, to seek ways to ameliorate the situation... We raised this issue also because we do not understand your position, do not understand in particular your conflict with India..."⁷⁴ The rest of the meeting then involved a discussion about India.

We have presented the Khrushchev-Mao conversations as evidence of preventive diplomacy involving the three major powers, the U.S., USSR and China. While a large part of the discussions are about China – USSR relations, it needs to be seen against the background of efforts to prevent incidents around Taiwan from drawing in the major powers into conflict. Indeed, the risks were to recur in 1962 in the third Taiwan Straits crisis.

One can see, first, that Eisenhower's views had been transmitted to Mao. Second, Khrushchev had cautioned Mao about the dangers of unpredictability in his policies and also about the dangers of accidental conflict. Third, while reserving his position towards Jiang Jieshi as an internal matter, Mao had clearly stated that his actions in shelling the islands amounted to pin-pricks at the Americans but that he would not move to take the islands, and that he did not want war with the U.S. Fourth, he had clearly indicated that he did not want to be seen as doing what the Americans wanted him to do.

Khrushchev would undoubtedly have communicated to Eisenhower the contents of this exchange of views and the latter would have been able to understand better the views of the adversary he was dealing with and what his game was. That would not have meant a lowering of Eisenhower's guard but it might have meant that he would go the extra step before reacting to any provocation on Mao's part.

C. 1962

Michael Schaller writes: "By the summer of 1962, Nationalist harassment provoked a Chinese response. Mao redeployed major elements of the People's Liberation Army to the south China coast, opposite Taiwan. Any large scale Communist attack on the island, Kennedy's aides realized, would draw in the United States. However much he disliked China, even Dean Rusk wanted to avoid a replay of Korea. Rusk reactivated the dormant Warsaw ambassadorial channel in June, 1962, to inform Chinese officials that Washington would not support a Nationalist invasion of the mainland. Both Mao and Chiang stepped back from the brink..."⁷⁵

IV. VIETNAM 1965

During the Vietnam war in the 1960s, China gave repeated warnings to the U.S. about its involvement. According to Chen Jian, Beijing's most serious effort to warn Washington occurred on April 2, 1965, when Zhou Enlai, visiting Karachi, Pakistan, asked President Mohammad Ayub Khan to convey several points to Washington.⁷⁶ Since President Ayub Khan's visit to Washington was postponed,

Zhou, on May 28, in a meeting with Indonesian Prime Minister Subandrio, made four points: (1) China will not take the initiative to provoke a war against the United States; (2) China will honor what it has said; (3) China is prepared; and (4) If the United States bombs China, that means bringing the war to China. The war had no boundary. This meant two things: first, you cannot say that only an air war on your part is allowed and the land war on my part is not allowed. Second, not only may you invade our territory, we may also fight a war abroad. Three days later, Chinese foreign minister Chen Yi met with British charge d'affaires Donald Charles Hopkins, formally asking him to deliver the same four-point message to Washington.⁷⁷

Chen Jian writes, basing himself on the U.S. State Department Records, that policy makers in Washington did heed these messages, and thus felt the pressure to act with extreme caution in attacking the North, lest a direct confrontation with China take place.⁷⁸ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January-June 1965, carries an editorial note, Document, 321, which summarizes Washington's response to the British telegram. McGeorge Bundy, the National Security Adviser, sent a copy of the telegram to President Johnson on June 4. At his suggestion, President Johnson held a meeting on the issue the next day. The Editorial Note states that: "No other record of that meeting has been found." However, William Bundy informed the British Embassy in Washington that Hopson be authorized to reply to the Chinese that the United States had received the message.⁷⁹

Robert McNamara, in his retrospective, noted the U.S. "decision not to invade North Vietnam with its attendant risk of triggering war with China and/or the Soviet Union (a risk we were determined to minimize)."⁸⁰ Michael Schaller writes: "Several times during the next two years, American representatives in Warsaw communicated to Chinese diplomats that the United States had no intention of destroying North Vietnam or attacking China. Chinese officials made it clear that as long as American forces observed these tacit limits, Beijing would restrain its intervention on behalf of North Vietnam. By inducing this concern at the highest level of American policy deliberations, China exercised indirect but critical limits on the escalation of the war in Vietnam."⁸¹

V. PREVENTATIVE DIPLOMACY TOWARDS THE USSR: THE POLISH CRISIS, 1956.

In this discussion we kept Taiwan and Vietnam together, and now return in time to the Polish crisis in 1956.

The trilateral relationship among China, the U.S. and the USSR during the cold war involved more rivalry and strategic forays than preventive diplomacy. Following its accession to power in 1949 the CCP adopted the policy of "leaning to one side," aligning itself with the USSR. The U.S. for its part pursued a "wedge strategy"⁸² aimed to prize China away from the USSR. By the end of the 1960s, China and the U.S. grew closer together. After this rapprochement, Kissinger even provided the PRC with U.S. intelligence information on Soviet military

deployments.

There were moments during the period 1949-1970 that were particularly risky and both the U.S. and the USSR tacitly dissuaded one another from air strikes against China's nuclear facilities. Andrei Gromyko writes in his Memoirs about an occasion in 1959 when he was on a plane with the Foreign Ministers of the UK, U.S., and France, travelling from a meeting to attend the funeral of former Secretary of State Dulles. On the plane, Eisenhower's Defense Secretary McElroy came over, sat with him and gave him a clear message that they should act together against the "yellow peril." He did not react, but reported the conversation to Premier Khrushchev.⁸³

President Kennedy had Ambassador Harriman broach with Premier Khrushchev how the latter would react to an American bombing of China's emerging nuclear facility and asking Khrushchev to communicate with Mao the seriousness of his conduct. Premier Khrushchev reportedly reacted frostily to him, saying that he would not be used as a messenger.⁸⁴ Later, towards the end of the 1960s, the USSR gave messages to American diplomats that they were contemplating a strike at China's nuclear facilities and implicitly sought American acquiescence in this, which they did not receive.⁸⁵

The crises in Poland and Hungary in 1956 saw the urgent intercession of the PRC in representations to the CPSU about its handling of these two situations. Chen Jian has a chapter about this in his book, *Mao's China and the Cold War*. Stated summarily, the CCP after initially being concerned about Soviet actions, came to accept that the Hungarian crisis was one in which reactionaries were seeking to overthrow communism and sided with the CPSU in its handling of that situation. But the CCP strongly disagreed with the CPSU's handling of the Polish situation and was able to bring about changes in the stance of the CPSU. According to Chen Jian's, CCP leaders considered that "the CCP must firmly oppose Moscow's military intervention in Poland, and must do everything to stop it."⁸⁶

Mao considered that the Soviet Union's intervention in Poland's internal affairs would be "a serious violation of proletarianism." Mao urgently sent a high-level delegation to Moscow to make representations to this effect. Mao himself told the Soviet ambassador in Beijing that the Polish protesters did not plan to leave the socialist camp but only wanted to reorganize their party's politburo. The Soviet Union, he advocated, should cooperate with the Polish comrades on the basis of equality. By doing this, Poland could be convinced to stay in the socialist camp. The CCP delegation in Moscow had extensive separate meetings with Soviet and Polish representatives. They emphasized that the divergence between Warsaw and Moscow "was a matter of right and wrong, not a conflict between revolution and counterrevolution."⁸⁷ On behalf of the CCP, Liu Shaoqui pressed Mao's suggestion that the Soviet Union should adopt a thoroughly new policy toward Eastern European countries.⁸⁸

The outcome of the discussions between the Chinese and Soviet sides was the issuance of an agreed "Declaration on Developing and Enhancing the Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and other Socialist Countries," in

which Moscow promised to follow a pattern of more equal exchanges with other Communist states and parties. The Chinese government issued a statement of support for the Declaration, “praising it as a document with ‘great significance’ that will ‘enhance the solidarity between socialist countries.’”⁸⁹

The CCP’s intercession had done two things: it had stopped Moscow’s original intention to escalate its military intervention in Poland, and it had helped bring about ground rules for relations among governments and parties in the Communist countries. Both of these were positive outcomes from the CCP’s intercession; in other words, its exercise of preventive diplomacy in helping to defuse a deepening crisis in Poland and to reduce similar crises in the future.

CONCLUSION

The thrust of the study of preventive diplomacy is to document precedents, approaches and methods that have been successfully employed in the past. It is not to say that a particular method of the past is necessarily relevant to a situation of the present. But it is to say that an avenue open to the decision-maker is to consider the use of preventive diplomacy, either by one’s own efforts or through third parties. We have seen that there were some useful precedents in Sino-American preventive diplomacy during the Cold War.

The evidence reviewed in this essay suggests that five risks were particularly evident in Sino-American relations during the cold war: miscalculations, incorrect assessments, brinkmanship, recklessness, and accidents. Kim il Sung, General MacArthur, and Mao Tse Tung all miscalculated the outcomes of their military actions in Korea. A miscalculation over the use of nuclear weapons would have been devastating.

The Taiwan Strait crises of 1954 and 1958 were both the results of brinkmanship on the part of Chairman Mao. The situation in Vietnam in 1965 could have produced a greater crisis if the U.S. had undertaken reckless actions, such as putting troops in the North. Any of these situations could have triggered accidental escalation, not excluding the use of nuclear weapons. The situations in Poland and Hungary in 1956, which involved interactions mainly between China and the USSR, brought in a fifth dimension: that of dubious assessments of a crisis situation.

From the evidence reviewed, one could see that concerns of historical analogy influenced both the U.S. and China. During the third Taiwan Straits crisis the U.S. communicated to China that it did not wish to go to a war with it because of the provocations from the Taiwanese authorities. As regards the situation in Vietnam in 1965, China, mindful of its war with the U.S. in Korea, was keen to communicate to the U.S. that it did not wish to descend into war.

The five risks experienced during the Cold War all exist in the 21st century. One sees brinkmanship in the Sino-American face-off over the South China seas.⁹⁰ One has also seen recklessness in this arena. One has seen what could amount to miscalculation. And the danger of accidents could be seen when China extended

its air exclusion zone over the islands contested by it and Japan and Japanese and American planes flew through the zone. The U.S. has a treaty commitment to back up Japan in the event that it faces a military confrontation.

Seen from this perspective, there are certainly historical analogies to be drawn between Sino-American relations during the Cold War and now. Perhaps the strongest influence of the concept of historical analogy is to tell decision-makers that risks experienced during the Cold War continue to be present in our times and that all sides should engage in maximum vigilance and prudence.

Insights from the concepts of historical analogy and preventive diplomacy suggest that in the future relations between China and the U.S. the two sides should strive to develop a system of communication and mutual restraints to make sure that events do not run away with them. In particular, they should always be attentive to the risks of miscalculations, incorrect assessments, brinkmanship, recklessness, and accidents. This is important in a context in which a resurgent historical power, smarting from perceived imperialist wrongs, and advocating 'harmony' as a global governing principle, contends with a, for the time being, pre-eminent global power advocating 'freedom' as a global governing principle.⁹¹

Notes

¹ T. C. Reed, *At the Abyss, An Insider's History of the Cold War*, (New York: Ballantine Books, 2004), 42-43.

² Memorandum of conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong in Beijing, *The Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project*, Fall/Winter 2001, pp.262 – 270, at p. 265.

³ R. Overy, *1939: Countdown to War*, (London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 2009).

⁴ K. Cahill (Ed.), *Preventive Diplomacy*, (New York: Basic Books, 1996).

⁵ Dag Hammarskjöld, Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General, UN General Assembly Official Records, 15th Session, Supp. No. 1A, 31 August, 1960, p.4.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ See the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy, adopted at the 8th ARF, 25 July, 2001: <http://www.aseansec.org/3571.htm>. The African Union has a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) grounded in preventive diplomacy.

⁸ Zheng Wang, "The Dangers of Historical Analogies," *The Diplomat*, 25 July 2014.

⁹ Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). See also J. Record, « "Periods of Reasoning by Historical Analogy : Munich, Vietnam, and American Use of Force since 1945," Occasional Paper no. 4, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, March 1998.

¹⁰ Ibid., 7. See Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Travels or the Setting of American Foreign Policy*, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968); Andrew J. Taylor and John T. Rourke, "Historical Analogies in the Congressional Foreign Policy Process," *The Journal of Politics*, 57, (1995): 460-468. doi:10.2307/2960316. David Patrick Houghton. "The Role of Analogical Reasoning in Novel Foreign-Policy Situations," *British Journal of Political Science*, 26, (1996): 523-552.

¹¹ Khong, *Analogies at War*, 6.

¹² Jack S. Levy. "Learning and Foreign Policy: Weeping a Conceptual Minefield," *International Organization*, 48, (1994): 279-312

¹³ K. M. Pannikar, *In Two Chinas*, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955), 110. H.S Truman,

Memoirs, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1956) Vol. 2, p. 362.

¹⁴ Chi-Kwan Mark, *China and the World Since 1945*, (London: Routledge, 2012), 26. See also, N. Tarling, Britain, *South-East Asia and the Impact of the Korean War...*, p. 61. S. Dockrill, in M.S. Dockrill and J.W. Young (Eds.), *British Foreign Policy 1945-1956*. Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1989, p. 183. See also, Chen Jian: "Zhou's warning made through Ambassador Pannikar had been totally ignored." – <http://www.history.army.mil/books/korea/20-2-1/sn39.htm>, consulted on 17 July, 2013, Chapter XXXIX, The Big Question, pp. 7-8. Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 26.

¹⁶ Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War*, (New York: Macmillan, 1960).

¹⁷ Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 110.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 110. In Note 73 on this chapter, Chen Jian adds: "In fact, both Mao and Zhou later stated that if the United States had listened to Zhou's warning and stopped at the 38th parallel, China would not have sent troops to Korea. These statements, though, are open to doubt."

¹⁹ FRUS, 1950, Vol. VII, p. 698.

²⁰ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs, Vol II: Years of Trial and Hope*, (New York: Doubleday, 1956), 360.

²¹ Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War*, 110.

²² William Stueck, "Why the war did not expand beyond Korea," in *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 5,45.

²³ General D. MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1964). President Eisenhower in his memoirs, *Mandate For Change*, writes that the need to use atomic weapons "was suggested to me by General Macarthur while I, as President elect, was still living in New York. The Joint Chiefs of Staff" were pessimistic about the feasibility of using tactical atomic weapons on front-line positions, in view of the extensive underground fortifications which the Chinese communists had been able to construct; but such weapons would obviously be effective for strategic targets in North Korea, Manchuria, and on the Chinese coast." Dwight Eisenhower, *Mandate for change 1953-1956: The White House Years* (NY: Doubleday, 1963), p.180. See further, G.H. Bennett, *The American Presidency 1945-2000* (Phoenix: Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing Ltd., 2000): "General Douglas MacArthur...requested nuclear weapons to halt the Chinese onslaught. He also requested a naval blockade of China and the bombing of Chinese airfields in Manchuria, where in fact MiG jets piloted by Russians were flying in support of communist ground forces in Korea." P. 44.

²⁴ *Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman*, Edited by Robert H. Ferrell, (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), p. 202.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 203.

²⁶ See, Minutes of Truman-Atlee Discussions, December 4, 1950, FRUS (1950), 3, 1706-170

²⁷ Communique, December 8, 1950, reproduced in President Truman's *Memoirs*, Vol.II, op.cit., 411-413.

²⁸ T. C. Reed, *At the Abyss*, 42-43.

²⁹ Michael Schaller, *The United States and China: Into the Twenty First Century*, (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 145.

³⁰ D. D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*. (New York: Doubleday, 1963).

³¹ Ibid., 483.

³² FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. II, China, Document 195, Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 8, 1955, 2.35 p.m.

³³ Ibid, document 197 : Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Embassy of Turkey.

³⁴ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Memoirs*, op. cit., p 482.

³⁵ FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XIX, China, Document 41: Memorandum from Secretary of State Dulles to Acting Secretary of State Herter and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson).

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³⁷ Andrei Gromyko, *Memoirs*, (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 251.

³⁸ Ibid., 251-252.

³⁹ FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XIX, China, Document 103: Memorandum of Conversation.

⁴⁰ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 202.

⁴¹ Jian, 184-85.

⁴² Dino A. Brugioni, *Eyeball to Eyeball: The Insider's Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (New York, Random House, 1992).

⁴³ Brugioni, 38-39.

⁴⁴ Michael Schaller, *The United States and China*, 152.

⁴⁵ "Memorandum of Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong in Beijing," *The Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project*, Fall/Winter 2001, 262 – 270.

⁴⁶ The Soviet notes of these meeting are also published in the same issue of the *Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project*, Fall/Winter 2001, 250 – 262.

⁴⁷ "Memorandum of Conversation," *The Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project*, 264.

⁴⁸ "Memorandum of Conversation," 265.

⁴⁹ "Memorandum of Conversation," 262.

⁵⁰ "Memorandum of Conversation," 262-263.

⁵¹ "Memorandum of Conversation," 263.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ "Memorandum of Conversation," 264.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ "Memorandum of Conversation," 264-265.

⁶⁵ "Memorandum of Conversation," 265.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Michael Schaller, *The United States and China*, 155.

⁷⁶ See Transcript, Zhou Enlai's conversation with Ayub Khan, 2 April, 1965 in "77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977". Westad, Odd Arne et.al. (Eds)., *Cold War International History Bulletin*, working paper, no. 22, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D.C., 1998, 79-85.

⁷⁷ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, 217. Michael Schaller, *The United States and China*, 161.

⁷⁸ See Editorial Note, FRUS, 1964 – 68, 2: 700-701.

⁷⁹ FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January – June 1965, Document 322.

⁸⁰ Robert S. McNamara, *In Retrospect. The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam*, New York, Time Books, 1995, p.211.

⁸¹ Michael Schaller, *The United States and China*, 161.

⁸² Schaller, 141.

⁸³ Andrei Gromyko, *Memoirs*, 174. Defence Secretary McElroy told him: "The yellow peril is now so great that it just cannot be dismissed. And it is not just a matter of taking it into consideration...We ought to combine against China."

⁸⁴ S.M. Hersh, *The Dark Side of Camelot*. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1997), 441-442.

⁸⁵ Michael Schaller, *The United States and China*, 168.

⁸⁶ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, 147.

⁸⁷ Jian, 152.

⁸⁸ Jian, 154.

⁸⁹ Jian, 154-155. Following a visit to Warsaw at the beginning of 1957, Zhou Enlai sent a report to Chairman Mao telling him: "...the dispatch of their troops to Warsaw was clearly interference with the internal affairs of a brotherly party by armed forces, but not an action to suppress counter-revolutionaries. They [Moscow] admitted that they had committed a serious mistake... About the Polish question, it is crystal clear that the Poland incident was a result of the historical antagonism between the Russian and Polish nations." <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117033> : Report, 'My Observations on the Soviet Union'. Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and the Central Leadership, 24 January, 1957.

⁹⁰ Geoff Dyer, *The Contest of the Century. The New Era of Competition with China – and How America Can Win*, (New York: Knopf, 2014).

⁹¹ Roger Cohen, "China versus America", *The New York Times*, October, 21 2014, 9.