

Peacebuilding: The UN Playing a Constructive Role

Remarks by Ambassador Richard Williamson to the U.S.
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I appreciate having this opportunity to address the United States Naval Staff College. It is my understanding that you are military officers from 34 countries, all proven professionals-in-arms.

At the United States Mission to the United Nations we take the work of our Military Staff Committee personnel very seriously. Their work is central to our Mission. The United States military officers at our Mission are important interlocutors with the UN Secretariat on violent flashpoints and armed conflicts worldwide. They provide information, perspective and advise on the entire range of military issues. As the United States Ambassador to the United Nations for Special Political Affairs, I rely upon their insights daily in carrying out my responsibilities in the UN Security Council.

The United States supports efforts to improve all aspects of UN peacekeeping. With over 37,000 military members deployed in 15 United Nations peacekeeping missions, we want to ensure it's done safely, effectively, and efficiently. The United States Mission to the United Nations continuously seeks to reform and improve the structure and management of the UN in order to bolster its performance and credibility. The United States has welcomed efforts to improve UN peacekeeping such as the Brahimi Report,¹ works from the Peacekeeping Institute, at the U.S. Army War College,² and the recently published concluding report *Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century*.³

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these objectives, the U.S. Mission to the UN is in the forefront of the campaign to strengthen UN peacekeeping and to create strong regional capabilities to manage conflict.

To achieve this objective, it is important to understand the nature of peacekeeping operations. As Professor Steven Ratner has written, there has been a “sea of change in the nature and purposes of peacekeeping, one of the UN’s most cherished inventions. Envisioned at its creation as a stop-gap measure to preserve a cease-fire between two hostile armies, peacekeeping has, since the end of the cold war, come to include something vastly different—the employment of UN operations to implement an agreed political solution to the underlying conflict between antagonists.”⁴

Also, to strengthen UN peacekeeping operations, we must learn from ongoing missions; what works and what does not work and why. Therefore, I thought it might be useful if I share with you some of my observations about four peacekeeping operations.

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ETHIOPIA-ERITREA (UNMEE)

According to most experts, “Ethiopia’s acceptance of Eritrea’s independence, *de facto* in 1991, *de jure* in 1993, had resolved one of the major causes of regional instability and conflict in the Horn of Africa.”⁵ But events proved the experts were wrong.

In May 1998, a large-scale military conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea over disputed border areas created devastation on military and civilian targets. After four weeks of intense fighting, hostilities ended. However, fighting flared again in February 1999. Soon 80,000 people had been killed. By the year 2000, both countries were exhausted and sought a way to achieve peace. The Algiers Peace Agreement, signed in December 2000, established a pathway to peace. It called for the UN to send a peacekeeping force to monitor a buffer zone to separate belligerent forces and monitor a cease-fire. Meanwhile, both countries agreed to abide by the decision of an independent Border Commission in The Hague which would consider agreed upon criteria and establish their national borders.

In its design, the UN Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE) is a traditional peacekeeping mission. It was created as “a stop-gap measure to preserve a cease-fire between two hostile armies” while a political process worked to settle the dispute. Both hostile parties wanted to stop the carnage. Both agreed to call upon the UN to help guarantee the end of armed conflict. And both belligerents had signed onto a political process to resolve the issue in dispute.

In essence, the UN Peacekeeping Mission bought time while the International Border Commission in The Hague sorted out the dispute. The belligerents, who wanted to end the fighting in UNMEE, had a vehicle to provide confidence measures that the shooting war would end. In the Border Commission they had a third party to resolve the dispute which, inevitably, both Addis Ababa and Asmara could and would blame politically for failing to fully satisfy either country's territorial desires.

As we meet today, there has been to-ing and fro-ing. Both sides have huffed and puffed. But, the reality is that there has not been shooting as a result of violations of the buffer zone monitored by UN peacekeepers. The International Border Commission has rendered its decision on the border. Both sides profess unhappiness about this or that detail of the decision, both blame the Commission for alleged injustices, and both have accepted the new border. The large demining project to enable the setting of pillars for demarcation has begun and will be assisted substantially by UNMEE. And, barring some unforeseen development or gross miscalculation by one of the belligerents, the new border will be demarcated, refugees will return home, and UNMEE will be a success.

In this process UN peacekeepers made a valuable contribution to peace. But they did not impose a peaceful settlement on the Ethiopia/Eritrea war. They did not force either hostile party to do that which they did not want to do. Nonetheless, the UN peacekeepers were critical to the successful settlement of this needless and bloody war.

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SIERRA LEONE (UNAMSIL)

In March, 1991, a group of Sierra Leone dissidents, Liberians loyal to Charles Taylor and a few mercenaries, invaded eastern Sierra Leone. The next month Foday Sankoh and the RUF⁶ claimed credit for starting the rebellion. That is how it began, the long cross-border and civil war that devastated Sierra Leone.

The UN's peacekeeping role in Sierra Leone was not a traditional operation. It was a post-cold war intervention. In Sierra Leone, the Security Council employed UN operations to implement a political solution to the underlying conflict between antagonists. And, at first, the UN failed.

In July 1998, the UN Security Council created the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). In its early years, UNAMSIL failed to quiet tensions and did not end the violence. The low point came in May 2000, when 700 UNAMSIL peacekeepers were captured and held hostage by rebels. But then events changed.

The emboldened RUF crossed the border into Guinea. They were met by a mightier force. The Guinea armed forces drove the RUF from their land and

followed the RUF back into Sierra Leone. The Guinea forces soundly defeated them. They broke the back of the RUF.

The decisive military victory over the RUF provided the conditions for a success story. And a coordinated international burden-sharing effort has helped realize success in Sierra Leone.

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From 2000, UNAMSIL⁷ has had a robust mandate to protect itself and civilians against violence.⁸ This allowed UNAMSIL to establish a secure environment throughout the country. No area was “off-limits” to UNAMSIL, which had overwhelming resources to carry out its task: 17,500 troops plus a civilian human rights, development and elections staff.⁹

In addition to a strong UN component, there was direct power intervention. The United Kingdom came to the assistance of Sierra Leone big time.¹⁰ The British provided an additional military presence, as well as training to the Sierra Leone army. At one point, there was a British soldier with every single platoon of the Sierra Leone army helping train them to be disciplined, professional, effective soldiers. And the UK became Sierra Leone’s largest provider of bilateral assistance.

Also, in Sierra Leone, there was a fully coordinated effort by the international community. For example, while the United Kingdom trained the Sierra Leone Army and police, the United States trained seven battalions of West African peacekeepers for participation in UNAMSIL. We also provided non-lethal military equipment to Guinea when it was attacked by the RUF from bases in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

Also, a broad range of tools was employed to help Sierra Leone. The United Nations Security Council imposed targeted economic sanctions against Liberian President Charles Taylor to get him to stop his support to the RUF.¹¹ Bilateral donors fund the large Disarmament, Demobilization, Reconciliation and Reintegration (DDRR) program to bring combatants in from the bush. And to end the cycle of violence and impunity that fueled Sierra Leone’s civil war, the international community funds both a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a Special Court to ensure accountability and to help bring some reconciliation to a land long victim to a savage civil war.

The international burden-sharing helped keep the political and security conditions in place that, in turn, kept the parties in the peace process. In Sierra Leone, neither side could win a military victory, but each side had the security umbrella provided by UNAMSIL. Cross-border support for the RUF rebels dried up. The combatants had an alternative, perhaps even an attractive alternative, to continued fighting in the DDRR program. And the United Nations had well-trained resources to draw upon to give UNAMSIL teeth.

As we meet today, Sierra Leone looks like a success story. Generally, the RUF rebels have disarmed and demobilized, and they seem to be reintegrating into society. Both the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions are up and operating. Hopefully, those who committed the worst crimes against humanity will be brought to justice. In May, free and fair elections were held. The government is working to project its reach and authority beyond Freetown into the countryside. In all these areas, the United Nations has made a major contribution.

However, Sierra Leone still has a long way to go. Its economy is in a desperate condition. The judicial system is plagued by corruption. And instability in neighboring Liberia threatens. Time will tell. But Sierra Leone has come a long way. And a strong United Nations role, a robust mandate for UNAMSIL, the great power intervention and continuing investment of Britain, and a fully coordinated international effort all contributed to the success thus far. UN peacekeeping played a significant role, but UN peacekeepers alone did not achieve this progress.

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (MONUC)

The story of war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the DRC is desperately sad. In the past four years, nearly three million people in the Congo have died as a result of war and the consequences of war; disease and famine. Despite mineral riches and fertile ground, people starve to death in the Congo every day. It is a large country, nearly the landmass of Western Europe. Despite the active involvement by the international community, including the United Nations, a real lasting peace in the DRC, including elections, the removal of all foreign forces from the country, and restoration of DRC sovereignty remains a distant prospect. Why? Because the political will of the parties and conditions for peace are not there. In the DRC, no international burden-sharing nor UN effort can produce that political will or conditions for peace. The Congo is a dramatic example of the limits of UN power. The international community cannot build peace, if the parties do not have the will to make peace or the conditions are not in place to force the parties to agree to peace.

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A few weeks ago the DRC and Rwanda signed a peace agreement in Pretoria, South Africa. In it Rwanda commits to withdraw its troops from the eastern Congo, and the government in Kinshasa¹² agrees to stop supporting the so-called negative forces, the Ex-Far and Interhamwe,¹³ and to turn over to the International Criminal Court in Rwanda the genocidiers now living in Kinshasa. Hopefully, this will provide a path to peace. Notably, the United Nations played no active role in brokering this agreement. The South African Government played that role. And the United States

applied significant bilateral pressure on the parties. But we should be cautious. There have been DRC peace agreements in the past, all of which have quickly fallen apart.

As I have already mentioned, the DRC covers a very large landmass. It has a population of approximately 52 million people. The DRC population is ethnically diverse. After the horrendous genocide in Rwanda where 800,000 people were killed in a matter of months, the genocidiers were driven from Rwanda and settled in the eastern Congo.¹⁴ This large influx of refugees was very destabilizing. Colonel Kagame, who led the Tutsi remnants of the Rwandan Army to successfully drive the Hutu genocidiers from his country, followed them all across the Congo to within a few miles from Kinshasa in the west. The DRC called for help from its neighbors. Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia answered the call and sent troops to the DRC, and eventually drove the Rwandan Army back to the eastern Congo. For years now, the DRC has had foreign armed forces from each of these countries plus Uganda within its borders. Also, Rwanda and Uganda have had various proxy rebel groups that they have sponsored to advance their interests. Most of these foreign armed forces have extracted the rich resources of the Congo and sent much of that wealth home. Tens of thousands of armed men, conflicting interests fed by resource extraction, an enormous geographic area, all these elements have contributed to overwhelming the limited capacity of UN peacekeepers to bring peace and stability to the Congo.

In 1999, the warring parties in the DRC agreed to a “peace process” referred to as the Lusaka Framework.¹⁵ It produced a cease-fire and an end to organized fighting. A UN observer force, MONUC,¹⁶ has a limited mission to monitor cease-fire lines and plans for the eventual DDRRR¹⁷ of rebel forces. The principle parties to the conflict—the Governments of Rwanda and the DRC, and the various rebel forces—have not been prepared to give MONUC a more robust security and disarmament mandate such as UNAMSIL has had in Sierra Leone. And, given the size of the DRC, MONUC is not a force that could be able to provide blanket security throughout the country.

In the DRC there has been no great power intervention. Neither former colonial power Belgium nor traditional patron France has seen a role on the ground for themselves. There is no great power military presence or training in the Congo. The French are engaged in significant diplomatic efforts, as is the United States, but no more.

Possible coordination of international efforts is difficult due to the complicated scenario in the DRC. There are a half-dozen countries with foreign forces in the Congo, even more domestic-based rebel forces, some of which are proxies for neighboring countries, and a general lack of clear “good hats” and “bad hats.” The great powers have different interests and allies in the region. The international community’s efforts are splintered among competing mediation efforts.¹⁸ While the United States and other UN Security Council members work closely to bolster the parties’ commitment to moving forward with the Lusaka Peace Process, the specifics are difficult because the parties disagree on approaches and tactics.

And, in the DRC, the UN Security Council has been unable to use all the tools at its disposal. Sanctions against the states supporting armed groups in the DRC are not appropriate at this time because they have legitimate security concerns that the DRC Government has been unwilling or is unable to address. The parties in conflict will not agree on the modalities of a DDRRR program, so the UN Security Council cannot use a DDRRR program to build momentum for an overall peace process. While the international community appears ready to support a democratic transition in the DRC with training and technical support once the fighting ends, no political agreement on a transition has been reached.

For now, the DRC has demonstrated that the international community cannot build peace, including through the use of UN peacekeepers, in a large scale, complex conflict if the parties do not have the will to make peace. In Sierra Leone, the conditions were there. In Sierra Leone an integrated, coordinated burden-sharing approach kept the parties feet to the fire. In the Congo, so far, the conflicted parties have not demonstrated a commitment to peace and the conditions are not in place to force them to a peace process. The ongoing tragedy in the Great Lakes Region is that without that, no UN peacekeeping force nor great power intervention can make it happen.¹⁹

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If the parties to the DRC do take the right steps, then the United States and the international community will have to be prepared to respond with an international burden-sharing approach with all the components used in Sierra Leone to bolster those steps. The United States will need to work multilaterally to put that burden-sharing coalition together. And, quite possibly, the United Nations will prove the best mechanism to make that happen.

AFGHANISTAN (UNAMA)

Following the evil terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, the United Nations sanctioned military action against the Taliban regime in Kabul.²⁰ Soon thereafter, the United States led a coalition against the Taliban regime and quickly brought it down.²¹ Now, the international community is engaged in a process to rebuild Afghanistan so that the Afghan people can govern themselves and so that their country can know a sustainable peace. As President Bush has said, "We know that true peace will only be achieved when we give the Afghan people the means to achieve their own aspirations. Peace will be achieved by helping Afghanistan train and develop its own national army. And peace will be achieved through an education system for boys and girls which works."²²

In Afghanistan, a great deal has been accomplished, but it is too early to call it a success story. The Loya Jirga process went very well. For the first time a free and

fair elections process took place in Afghanistan that was transparent and in which women played a major role.²³ There has been a peaceful transition to a Transitional Authority under President Hamid Karzai. There are many serious challenges ahead, but the outlook is positive.

As President Bush has said, “We know that true peace will only be achieved when we give the Afghan people the means to achieve their own aspirations.”

One crucial reason that the outlook is positive is that most Afghans are committed to success. After the long Soviet occupation in the 1980's and the Taliban reign of terror in the 1990's, there is a strong desire for “normalcy.” For two decades the toll on the Afghan people was tragic, with an entire generation growing up in refugee camps and as internally displaced persons. In addition to the willingness of the Afghan people to embrace a new regime, as in Sierra Leone, there has been a coordinated international burden-sharing effort in Afghanistan. This effort, also as in Sierra Leone, has included a strong United Nations component, direct great power intervention, and the international community's willingness to use a range of military, economic and legal tools to build peace.

In Afghanistan, the United Nations does not have a UNAMSIL or other blue helmet operation. The United Nations is a political mission that has played a major role in providing political stability to the Afghan Interim Authority and in developing the capacity for a government to begin to function again. UNAMA may not have troops, but it has a civilian human rights and election monitoring group. And, in essence, UNAMA has been charged with making sure that the Bonn Agreement is implemented.²⁴

In Afghanistan, the United States has provided the Great Power Intervention. Operation Enduring Freedom has fundamentally reshaped the Afghan political landscape by bringing down the Taliban regime and by hunting down al Qaeda. While there may be anti-American sentiment in some quarters, more generally there is gratitude to Americans for getting rid of the Taliban. Coalition forces continue to provide a visible and effective presence. As the British did in Sierra Leone, the United States is training an Afghan army.

In Afghanistan, the fully coordinated international effort has resulted in different countries taking the lead in different areas. As I already have said, the U.S. is taking the lead in training the national army with support from the French. The Germans are recruiting and training an Afghan police force. The United Kingdom is coordinating counter-narcotics efforts. The European Union, and in particular the Italians, are the lead in developing the rule of law and developing a judicial system. The Japanese have stepped up to the plate on quick-impact economic and reconstruction projects. The Chinese are contributing medical supplies and military uniforms. The UN is developing and implementing a comprehensive DDR plane.

And the list goes on. Many, many nations are helping this effort and Ambassador Brahimi, the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in Afghanistan is helping ensure that these programs are well coordinated, reinforce one another, and stay on track.

Like in Sierra Leone, a strong UN component, direct great power intervention, a fully coordinated international effort using all the tools are bringing success to Afghanistan. But there is a long way to go. And there are a number of factors that could derail this progress from a possible India/Pakistan conflict to an unforeseen natural phenomenon such as drought or earthquakes. But the signs are positive. And following the successful Loya Jirga in June, the independent Afghanistan Interim Authority is helping the new political process to take root.

CONCLUSION

Reflecting on these examples, perhaps we can draw some tentative conclusions.

Generally, the United Nations capacity to make peace is limited.²⁵ The UN cannot impose its solution onto a war situation. It cannot dictate a peace onto warring parties. This is especially true in a large and/or complex conflict. However, if some combination of soldiers, diplomats, politicians and civil society succeed in creating the opportunity for peace, the United Nations can be an instrument to see it through.²⁶

Soldiers, military might, can change the dynamic of a conflict by acting as a deterrent, changing the military status-quo, or changing the military calculations of possible victory. The United Kingdom did this in Sierra Leone as did the United States in Afghanistan. Are UN peacekeepers alone incapable of responding robustly enough to make peace? Probably.

If the military situation shifts due to events on the ground or the threat of outside intervention, diplomats often can succeed in brokering a peace deal. Threats of wrath from the international community or imposing sanctions²⁷ can help change the dynamic to give peace a chance. Politicians responding to growing discontent of their people, occasionally voiced through elections, or taking account of a military assessment that victory is not possible,²⁸ sometimes are forced to give peace a chance.

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When these situations are created, the United Nations can help preserve the opportunity. Through relatively inactive (but robust) UN peacekeepers the UN can help prevent slippage. In Sierra Leone this has been a combination of monitoring and enforcing the terms of the peace agreement. The United Nations can help disarm combatants as it has done in Sierra Leone, El Salvador,²⁹ Eastern Slavonia,³⁰ and as planned for in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The United Nations

can provide temporary civil administration while creating conditions for a long-term, stable, sustainable, independent country. Examples of this would include East Timor and Kosovo.

The United Nations can help peace take root by showing former combatants the attractiveness of the alternatives to fighting and thereby strengthen the voices of peace.

The United Nations can provide a face-saving way out for the loser who can hand over the administration of a country to a “neutral” party. For example, it would have been very difficult for Indonesia to relinquish power in East Timor immediately to an East Timorese, especially not to Xanana Gusmao, whom they had just released from prison.³¹ The United Nations can help peace take root by showing former combatants the attractiveness of the alternatives to fighting and thereby strengthen the voices of peace. This is another side of DDRR programs. The International communities’ quick inflow of development projects, often through the UN, help provide “benefits of peace.” This has happened in Bosnia, East Timor, Afghanistan and elsewhere.

The two or more sides of any conflict mistrust each other. The longer and bloodier the war, the greater the mistrust. They often need an honest broker. The United Nations often plays this role.³²

A great deal of the work at the United States Mission to the United Nations is assessing the ripeness of a conflict for resolution, trying to use bilateral and multilateral tools at our disposal to move unripe situations to fruition.³³ Once a situation is ripe for resolution, there are many ways the United Nations can play a constructive role. But we need to be realistic and smart about what we ask the UN to do.

Notes

¹ Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-5/2000/809) August 2000.

² For example, Chris Seiple, *The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions* (Peacekeeping Institute/CSL, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 1996), ed. Karen U. Kwiatkowski, *African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) Past, Present, and Future* (Peacekeeping Institute /CSL, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 2000.)

³ The Challenges Project, the Swedish National Defense College and Challenges Project Partner Organizations (Elanders Gotab, Stockholm, 2002).

⁴ Steven R. Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War* (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1995) p. 1.

⁵ For an excellent discussion of the causes and impact of this conflict see Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll, *Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War* (Ohio University Press, Athens, Ohio, 2000.)

⁶ The Revolutionary United Front.

⁷ The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone.

⁸ UNSCR 1346, paragraph 3. S/Res/1346(2001).

⁹ Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Reconciliation.

¹⁰ There was an effort by the Organization for African Unity to mediate peace in 1998-1999. In 1999-2000, South Africa attempted to mediate an internal agreement in the DRC. At present, Secretary-

General Kofi Annan has appointed a Special Envoy to facilitate direct, all-inclusive negotiations on a transitional government in the DRC. Parallel to this, the Facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, Sir Kenneth Masire, remains in place to move the Dialogue forward as well.

¹¹ For an interesting discussion of why only a distinctly African approach to African problems can succeed, see Peter Schwab, *Africa: A Continent Self-Destructs* (New York, New York, St. Martin's Press, 2001).

¹² UNSCR 1368(2001) condemned the World Trade Center attacks and recognized the right of Member States to individual or collective self-defense. When the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom, we sent an Article 51 notification to the UN informing them that the U.S. was exercising its right to self-defense.

¹³ The United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7, 2001. Kabul fell on November 13, 2002.

¹⁴ President George W. Bush remarks to the George C. Marshall ROTC Award Seminar on National Security, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia, April 17, 2002.

¹⁵ Report of the Secretary-General, "The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security," A/56/1000-S/2001/737, July 11, 2002.

¹⁶ The "Bonn Agreement" was the agreement reached in Bonn, Germany, between all the various elements of the Afghan leadership, exclusive of the Taliban, which charted the roadmap for the post-Taliban Afghanistan state. It affirmed a commitment to develop a gender-sensitive, ethnically balanced, human rights respectful state, and sets out the establishment of four commissions to help guide that development: constitutional, human rights, civil service, and judicial. It also established an Interim Authority for Afghanistan which would (and did) give way to a Transitional Authority selected by the process of the Emergency Loya Jirga. Finally, the Bonn Agreement mandated a Constitutional Loya Jirga within 18 months of the Transitional Authority's establishment.

¹⁷ For an interesting discussion of the elements in peacemaking, see Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, *How Nations Make Peace* (New York, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1999).

¹⁸ Some good reading on the UN's peacekeeping track record and ability includes, John Hillen, *Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations* (Washington, D.C., Brassey's, 1998), Dennis C. Jett *Why Peacekeeping Fails* (New York, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1999), A. Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (New York, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1994), Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, eds, *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (New York, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995), Edward C. Luck, *Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization 1919-1999* (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 1999) pp. 133-95, and Sarah B. Sewall, *Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivalent Engagement* (Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002) p. 191-224. See also, David Halberstam, *War In A Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals* (New York, New York; Scribner; 2001). See also, ed. John Norton Moore and Alex Morrison, *Strengthening the United Nations and Enhancing War Prevention* (Durham, North Carolina; Carolina Academic Press; 2000).

¹⁹ International sanctions may be as simple as political isolation, but usually must hit commercial interests in order to be effective.

²⁰ El Salvador is an example of the first while Croatia and Indonesia are examples of the second.

²¹ ONUSAL participated in the oversight of disbanding paramilitary units, the reform of the military and creation of a new police service that included ex-guerrillas.

²² In UNTAES, weapons were bought back from Serbs before the area was reintegrated with Croatia.

²³ Note that ex-rebel leader Xanana Gusmao was elected the first President of the newly independent East Timor during the UN's interim administration.

²⁴ Often one party is significantly weaker than the other and the "broker" becomes an advocate for that side. The UN Electoral Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) preceding the popular consultation is an example. Some argue this is what UNMIK should be doing in Kosovo. This also is what UNAMA is doing in working to de-conflict regional power plays in Afghanistan.

²⁵ The concept of "ripeness" was developed by I. William Zartman. It comes from "ripe for resolution", i.e., that point at which the parties perceive the costs and prospects of continued confrontation to be more burdensome than the costs and prospects of a solution.

