

# **Making Aid Meaningful: An Analysis of Funding Patterns in PEPFAR I**

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*A major obstacle to effective foreign aid delivery is the complex bureaucracy that accompanies it. The 2003 United States (US) President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), created by the Bush administration to fight HIV/AIDS in the developing world, tried to insert novel processes into the US's outdated mode of international assistance. The program broke from past practices in three ways: it combined federal agencies from multiple departments into interagency teams; it relied on a network of privatization involving international and local partners in the developing world; and it prioritized strong alignment with host governments. Yet an analysis of PEPFAR I spending data reveals that by the end of the program, only two US government agencies commanded most of the program's funding, and local NGOs and foreign governments were not receiving a large amount of the money directly, questioning how well the program met its goals during its first five years.*

## **INTRODUCTION**

The United States (US) President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), established by former President George W. Bush, is consistently referred to as "the largest federal assistance program in history to address a single health issue."<sup>1</sup> This international aid plan – totaling \$15 billion in funding between 2003 and 2008, and up to \$48 billion for the following five years<sup>2</sup> – is considered one of President Bush's few foreign policy successes.<sup>3</sup> There is no doubt that the program has made progress in fighting HIV/AIDS in (and beyond) the fifteen PEPFAR focus countries in Africa, Southeast Asia, and other parts of the developing world.<sup>4</sup> Since its creation, over two million people living with HIV/AIDS have been put on antiretroviral treatment, and the program has benefitted more than ten million HIV-positive individuals.<sup>5</sup>

The PEPFAR program exhibits a true blurring of the public and private sectors on the international stage. Bureaucrats in Washington are the ones that oversee the partnerships that PEPFAR staff make with private groups and foreign governments; in turn, the private organizations and host governments are the ones who use the PEPFAR funds on the ground. PEPFAR I, the first phase of the program,<sup>6</sup> was designed to enhance HIV/AIDS services abroad by: (1) engaging multiple agencies inside the US Government (USG) and holding them accountable; (2) privatizing services, with an emphasis on local organizations; and (3) working closely with foreign governments and abiding by their national HIV/AIDS plans.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, in 2009, former Global AIDS Coordinator Mark Dybul wrote that "the first and defining principle [of PEPFAR] is country ownership, and effective country ownership requires good governance, a results-based approach with accountability, and the engagement of all sectors."<sup>8</sup> After describing its founding principals in detail, this paper analyzes PEPFAR I spending data to begin to ask whether its goals were realized.

## THE EVOLUTION OF US FOREIGN AID

Although foreign aid comprises less than one percent of the US government's budget, the polity believes it consumes a much larger share.<sup>9</sup> Kettl and Fesler, in their book *The Politics of the Administrative Process*, reference a 2001 poll that revealed Americans thought the government spent too much money on foreign aid. When asked what a suitable percentage of the budget would be, the majority of respondents called for a "decrease" in aid to around ten percent of the federal budget – literally ten times the amount of money actually being spent at the time.<sup>10</sup> Unlike domestic programs from which Americans directly benefit, the high level of funding that the public perceives goes to other countries places foreign aid initiatives at a unique disadvantage.<sup>11</sup> Global assistance efforts are more likely to end up with rigid structures so that members of Congress can justify to their constituents where each American tax dollar is being spent.

The complicated legislation goes from the floor of Congress to the desks of executive bureaucrats, left to their own devices to structure the foreign aid programs.<sup>12</sup> Because the international aid landscape provides agencies with no direct forms of competition, they have little incentive to seek out new measures to improve their efficiency.<sup>13</sup> The result tends to be an excess of government employees, coupled with highly centralized structures. These defects in the federal government bureaucracy lead to similar problems inside the programs policymakers create.

Irwin, in "Dancing the Foreign Aid Appropriations Dance: Recurring Themes in the Modern Congresses," highlights recurring difficulties in the process of passing foreign aid appropriations legislation. These elements did not change from the 1960s to the 1990s, influenced in both decades by "an elaborate public and private dance between the administration, the respective chamber leadership, and the committee and subcommittee leadership."<sup>14</sup> He goes on to say that foreign aid receives undue attention given the small portion of the budget that it represents, used by many legislators to send home "fiscally conservative" messages to their polity.<sup>15</sup> As a result, those international aid measures that do get passed are the ones that appeal to both parties, built through "ad hoc" issue coalitions.<sup>16</sup> Such structures lead to inflexible policies that negatively impact the ways foreign aid agencies interact with aid-recipients abroad.

Prior to PEPFAR, one federal agency dominated the foreign aid stage. The 62-year-old Marshall Plan is the program that marked the beginning of United States foreign aid, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was created ten years later to implement it.<sup>17</sup> USAID is an agency where hierarchical bureaucratic structures detract from its efficiency. As early as 1975, studies came out detailing the inflexibility of its programs, which were designed in detail prior to USAID interpreting the situation on the ground.<sup>18</sup> Rondinelli mentions one report, written in 1981, that notes: "the disparities between the flexible, responsive and participatory characteristics of development projects that were needed to alleviate poverty in developing countries and the rigid blueprint approach to project design and management required by AID."<sup>19</sup> USAID's rigid structure was designed in response to public criticism that foreign aid management requires close attention, since it is at the end of the day a "bureaucratic function."<sup>20</sup>

The agency's inflexibility had not improved by the 1990s, Rondinelli argues, because of pressure from other sectors of the government to retain control and accountability over projects<sup>21</sup> and presidential administration's desire to use foreign aid

to improve the US's international political position.<sup>22</sup> USAID's desire to satisfy "congressional oversight requirements" and "executive policy"<sup>23</sup> rather than work towards international developmental reform had made international aid tasks much more difficult.

Thus, as domestic bureaus began to move away from inefficient modes of government, international aid agencies did not experience the same fate. In "Scaling-Up Participation at USAID," Corneille and Shiffman recall an attempt in the 1990s by top USAID administrators to institutionalize participation-oriented practices by its staff.<sup>24</sup> At a time when development organizations in other industrialized countries were moving away from top-down to more widespread participatory procedures,<sup>25</sup> USAID tried to follow suit. While directors had always encouraged staff members to "consult local people in project development...it was not until the 1990s that a reform initiative grounded in the participation paradigm emerged inside the agency."<sup>26</sup> The shift came after a number of members of Congress argued that USAID should be absorbed by the State Department. Former President Bill Clinton objected and saved the agency, though not without Congress's shutting down 24 of its field missions and cutting a portion of its resources.<sup>27</sup>

PEPFAR devised a new strategy: it sought to make aid delivery more efficient by combining agencies that do not typically receive international aid funds with those that do, holding all agencies accountable, and creating competition between them.<sup>28</sup>

Increased efficiency can come not only from within the USG, but also from outside organizations. According to Kamarck in "The End of Government as We Know It," "governance" that spans "public, private, semipublic, and even religious" organizations has replaced the "government" that proliferated beginning in the 1930s.<sup>29</sup> Long before PEPFAR, President Ronald Reagan (and Margaret Thatcher, his counterpart in Great Britain) began to emphasize the benefits of privatized programs. President Bill Clinton also took a lead role in the privatization revolution, proclaiming that "the era of big government is over" in his 1996 State of the Union address.<sup>30</sup> By the middle of the 1990s, Savas writes, "privatization of state and local services in the United States was universal...and it had become a policy of the federal government."<sup>31</sup> President George W. Bush followed suit during his eight years in office.<sup>32</sup> Through the combined efforts of these and other top politicians, the federal government today exhibits substantial "blurring and mingling" of the public and private sectors.<sup>33</sup>

Coupled with this shift, developed countries around the world have also begun to recognize the importance of involving local organizations when implementing international aid projects.<sup>34</sup> In her article "Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of

Accountability under International Law," Laura Dickinson writes that privatization of international initiatives is becoming the *modus operandi* of foreign aid delivery in the United States and other industrialized countries around the world.<sup>35</sup>

While international law has not been crafted to apply fully to nongovernmental actors, Dickinson argues that using private sector counterparts in foreign countries may increase accountability because of the donor's ability to include specific accountability measures – both financial and legal – into the contracts they create with private groups.<sup>36</sup> Monitoring and evaluation requirements can also strengthen the institutional capacity of the private organizations participating in the contract.<sup>37</sup> Potential pitfalls include poor monitoring and evaluation systems, inappropriate reporting requirements,

and vagueness in the legality of contracts, which can be avoided if the federal government overseeing the international privatization process is *decentralized*, with employees who are easy to reach and flexible in terms of their programming.<sup>38</sup> PEPFAR I tried to reap the benefits of privatization while avoiding the downsides by using international organizations as the medium through which it could engage local groups in each host country.

The program also attempted to improve the impact of aid money on the countries themselves. The World Bank produced a report in 1998 called *Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't and Why*, which found that aid's impact largely depends on recipient countries' policy regimes.<sup>39</sup> The authors of *Assessing Aid* conclude that aid should partially be doled out based on a recipient country's governmental structure, with autocracies and other non-democracies receiving less, or none at all.<sup>40</sup> Yet it is important to look at the *quality* of aid being provided in addition to recipient countries' government structures – a feature that is largely dependent on the structures of the donors themselves.

Feeny and Rogers, in "Public Sector Efficiency, Foreign Aid and Small Island Developing States," look at panel data from 1990 through 2004 in thirty-seven small island developing states to determine whether aid allocations from international donors helped these developing countries achieve positive social outcomes, an effect that "has been largely over-looked by the aid effectiveness literature."<sup>41</sup> Ultimately, they argue that "the *quality* of the expenditure is likely to be more important for changes in life expectancy *rather than the level* of expenditures" (emphasis mine).<sup>42</sup> They use the term "quality" to refer to the number of donors in each country and the ways in which these donors interact with the host governments. G. Shabbir Cheema tells us in *Reinventing Government for the 21st Century* that "the need to improve governance and public administration and to enhance the [recipient government's] capacity to carry out new functions and roles is now widely recognized."<sup>43</sup> In addition, a myriad of United Nations decrees such as the Monterrey Consensus describe in detail the importance of donors engaging host governments and local civil society organizations in their programs.<sup>44</sup>

In summary, the foreign aid literature shows us that politicians are less likely to support global assistance efforts than other government programs, given the political risks associated with it. Congressmen respond by writing policy directives that are rigid in nature and demand strict reporting procedures. They use these structures to justify to taxpayers that their money is being well spent. The job of actually designing the program then gets transferred to the executive branch – the actual implementers of the aid projects. Bureaucrats react to complicated Congressional decrees by tacking on more managers. Hierarchies get created on top of hierarchies, and small percentages of the money actually reaches the ground. Scholars have written about the inefficiencies of aid delivery, but stop short of detailing how to truly make it better. Along the same lines, they provide little guidance on how to use those foreign aid programs to effectively engage host governments and local private organizations. The PEPFAR program tried to remedy these flaws, using a multisectoral network of USG agencies and prioritizing alignment with local NGOs and foreign governments.

## PEPFAR I

The first piece of PEPFAR legislation, known as the “United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003” (H.R. 1298), was passed into law in May 2003.<sup>45</sup> The legislation received strong bipartisan support and took a mere two months and ten days to go from the floor of the House of Representatives to former President George W. Bush’s desk.<sup>46</sup> PEPFAR I provided antiretrovirals to over 1,900,000 HIV-positive individuals; prevented HIV infection of over 150,000 children; and ensured that millions of at-risk or infected individuals received HIV prevention assistance or care.<sup>47</sup> PEPFAR I allocated just under \$10 billion of its funding to fifteen “priority” countries – 12 in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as Vietnam, Haiti, and Guyana (referred to collectively in this paper as the PEPFAR focus countries). The rest of the funding went to support the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, as well as bilateral programs in other developing countries.<sup>48</sup>

H.R. 1298 called for the creation of a new Global AIDS Officer within the executive branch,<sup>49</sup> citing the need for “strong coordination...among the various agencies of the United States to ensure effective and efficient use” of PEPFAR funding.<sup>50</sup> The Bush administration responded by creating the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC), headed by the Global AIDS Officer. OGAC’s staff is small in number, but its work is of great consequence: the office is charged with overseeing the PEPFAR teams located in the fifteen PEPFAR priority countries, as well as managing activities in non-priority countries. In this capacity, OGAC establishes PEPFAR’s overall strategy, allocates funding to each of the countries, and provides target guidance to the country teams, as well as other types of technical assistance on an as-needed basis.<sup>51</sup>

PEPFAR I was not without its critics. Some people argued that the program spent too much money on HIV/AIDS at the expense of other health crises,<sup>52</sup> and others have questioned PEPFAR’s methods of allocating funds. Commentators (both within and outside the USG) have criticized PEPFAR’s creators for its abstinence education requirements<sup>53</sup> and its funding procedures.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO), authorized by Congress to write reports analyzing the PEPFAR program at various points during the program’s existence, wrote a report encouraging PEPFAR to design more appropriate country-based projects.<sup>54</sup> According to the report, each year throughout PEPFAR I, OGAC would provide teams with an initial planning budget. Next, teams submitted their operational plans to OGAC and their agency headquarters. The teams waited for “OGAC’s assessment of each team’s opportunities, challenges, and process in the previous year,”<sup>55</sup> and after OGAC decided on an appropriate level of funding, PEPFAR’s interagency headquarters distributed the money to each country team.<sup>56</sup> This convoluted procedure happened every year, severely limiting interagency teams’ ability to allocate funding for multi-year projects. Such a delayed funding process within the federal government had negative consequences for the flow of funds to implementing partners working on the ground. In addition, having to create annual reports was counterproductive when long-term planning was needed to combat the disease.<sup>57</sup>

The GAO also wrote a report in 2009 that criticized some of PEPFAR’s partner selection methods, as well as its tendency to favor one USG agency – USAID – when allocating PEPFAR funds.<sup>58</sup> This report found that in-country PEPFAR officials surveyed in 2009 by the GAO were confused when determining whether to use OGAC’s



or their agency headquarters' guidelines when it came to selecting partners. The GAO also found that the reporting process for the implementing partners and sub-partners is extensive under both the PEPFAR I and PEPFAR II legislation and five-year strategies, creating inflexibility that makes working with local partners and governmental organizations difficult.<sup>59</sup>

This study supplements existing critiques of the PEPFAR program's funding allocation methods by analyzing actual funding expenditures throughout PEPFAR I.

### **THE THREE PRONGS OF PEPFAR I'S INNOVATION**

PEPFAR I's design structure was innovative in its goals ambitious. The interagency team structure and the emphasis on privatizing combined to create a program that should have been more successful and proficient than its predecessors. This paper's analysis of the spending patterns of PEPFAR I will be divided along the program's three avenues of innovation, namely: horizontal, vertical, and intergovernmental coordination.

OGAC mandated that the federal agencies working in each focus country combine to form one in-country team. The phrase "horizontal coordination" refers to agencies working alongside one another, under OGAC's direction and the guidance of individual agency headquarters in the United States.<sup>60</sup> PEPFAR tried to overcome the limits of bureaucracy by inserting multiple agencies into its aid apparatus and instituting market-based mechanisms between them.<sup>61</sup> In the end, PEPFAR I was left with an innovative interagency team structure composed of a diverse set of government staff, in each country and in Washington.

"Vertical coordination" refers to the chain going from Congress and the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) down to local groups. PEPFAR I relied on privatization of services using a system that Kamarck terms "networked government."<sup>62</sup> Inside the vertical PEPFAR hierarchy, the program goes from OGAC in Washington to federal agencies on the ground in-country, to prime partners (the private sector groups that partner directly with US government staff in-country) and finally to subprime partners (the private sector groups that receive their funds and technical assistance from the prime partners, and have little or no contact with US government staff). The prime and subprime partners are generally the organizations that either use PEPFAR funds on the ground or oversee the work of the organizations that do.<sup>63</sup>

The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness – endorsed by the US<sup>64</sup> and over 100 other countries – lists country ownership and alignment as two of the five principles of effective aid delivery.<sup>65</sup> The phrase "intergovernmental coordination" refers to the ways PEPFAR staff engages with partner countries' governments when combating HIV/AIDS. Under PEPFAR I, host government agencies were both prime partners who worked directly with US government staff and subprime partners who received funding through an intermediary (typically an international US-based organization<sup>66</sup>). Close intergovernmental collaboration requires coordinating mechanisms that are adaptable enough to be shaped by the national authority of the developing country, but also prevent misuse of funds and ensure accountability.<sup>67</sup>

Given PEPFAR I's horizontal, vertical, and intergovernmental coordination methods, we would expect that throughout PEPFAR I: more USG agencies would begin utilizing PEPFAR money; local private partners would begin using funds directly, in lieu

of international NGOs; and foreign governments would be given more direct funding to use in a multisectoral way.

## METHODS

The analysis in this paper uses PEPFAR funding allocations made public as of April 2010 to test whether, over time, PEPFAR: funneled money to all six of the USG PEPFAR agencies; increasingly channeled funds to local rather than international NGOs; and gave money straight to foreign governments to allow for more country ownership.

First, yearly country operational plans (COPs) made available on the PEPFAR website were used to analyze spending allocations among USG agencies (see Appendix A).<sup>68</sup> These plans detail the amount of money going to each USG agency inside the PEPFAR focus countries, for each year of PEPFAR I. Note that the operational plans for FY 2004 and FY 2005 were not available on the website.

For the vertical and intergovernmental analyses, the number of prime and subprime partners in each country, as well as the amount of funding they were obligated, was determined by examining which organizations were obligated funds during each fiscal year, according to the “PEPFAR Partners” section of the website (see Appendix B).<sup>69</sup> Next, a PEPFAR data spreadsheet made public from the Center for Public Integrity<sup>70</sup> was used to classify prime and subprime partners, and international and local organizations. The spreadsheet is a data set of PEPFAR funding from FY 2004 through FY 2006 that delineates which organizations are international groups, local civil society groups, and host government organizations.


## RESULTS

The results section is divided into three parts, based on the three levels of coordination analyzed in this paper: horizontal coordination, vertical coordination, and intergovernmental coordination.

### *a. Horizontal Coordination*<sup>71 72</sup>

PEPFAR I tried to overcome the limits of bureaucracy by inserting multiple agencies into its aid apparatus and instituting market-based mechanisms between them.<sup>73</sup> The graphs in this section<sup>74</sup> examine the funding breakdowns among the agencies inside each PEPFAR focus country. One purported benefit of PEPFAR I’s interagency team structure revolved around the concept of performance-based budgeting: if a particular agency was not performing up to OGAC’s standards, it would receive less funding the following year.<sup>75</sup> True agency accountability would mean that over the course of PEPFAR I, some agencies received more funds for good results while others received less,<sup>76</sup> given that the epidemiologies in each of the countries differed drastically.<sup>77</sup> To test this hypothesis, Figure 1.1 measures the percent change in global PEPFAR funding going to individual agencies from FY 2006 to FY 2009.


Figure 1.1: Proportion of total PEPFAR Funds going to each PEPFAR Agency, FY 2006 to FY 2009



For the most part, USAID (and, to a lesser extent, Health and Human Services [HHS]) received consistently high proportions of total PEPFAR funding. It is possible, however, that the reason why proportions of funds going to a particular PEPFAR agency remained relatively stagnant is that some countries' agency offices were overperforming at the same time that others were underperforming. To test whether this was the case, Figure 1.2 breaks down changes in the amount of funding going to one agency, USAID, in each focus country from FY2006 to FY2009. Only four of the fifteen focus countries saw shifts of USAID funding at or above ten percent. For eight of the focus countries, USAID was receiving the majority of PEPFAR funds by FY 2008.



Figure 1.2: Percentage Change in Funding going to USAID in each PEPFAR country, FY 2006-FY 2009




Furthermore, only seven of the fifteen PEPFAR focus teams saw an addition or a subtraction of PEPFAR agencies to their country teams in the period between 2006 and 2009, and in only one country (Vietnam) did a new addition receive more than three percent of that country's PEPFAR funds (see Appendix A).

*b. Vertical Coordination*<sup>78</sup>The graphs in this section include a number of measurements that describe the PEPFAR program's vertical coordination over the course of its first five years.<sup>79</sup> If privatization inside of PEPFAR I had worked as the program's creators had intended, we should see at least a somewhat strong transition to local organizations. The data in this section are limited due to the level of information provided by PEPFAR. They make available a list of the prime and subprime partners in each PEPFAR focus country from FY 2004 to FY 2008, as well as the funding going to each of the focus country's prime partners from FY 2005 to FY 2008. However, they do not provide information regarding the amount of funding going to sub-prime partners.

The first graph, Figure 2.1, measures the proportion of total partners that were local out of all partners in each country for FY 2004 through FY 2008.

Figure 2.1: Percentage of Local Partners out of all partners



The graph examines the percentages of local partnerships that were made in each of the focus countries. Only three of the focus countries saw a decrease in local organization involvement in the countries' PEPFAR programs. In each of the other countries, local organizations retained the same or higher percentages of all partners at the end of PEPFAR I than they had at the outset. Indeed, the overall level of local organization involvement in the PEPFAR program in FY 2008 is striking. However, many of the countries that saw an increase raised their percentage of local partners only marginally. For the most part, the numbers in FY 2004 were just as impressive (if not more so) than the measurements for FY 2008.

The graph described above does not paint the whole picture. Percentage of funding going to international organizations could have increased from FY 2004 to FY 2008 even as their numbers decreased. Similarly, the percentage of funding going to

local organizations could have decreased while the number of local groups inflated. To test these hypotheses, Figures 2.2 and 2.3 graph the percentage of prime partner funds going to international and local organizations from FY 2005 through FY 2008.<sup>80</sup> Although these data do not include the funding going to international or local subprime partners,<sup>81</sup> they nevertheless adequately measure the capacity-building efforts of the PEPFAR country teams.

Figure 2.2: Percentage of Prime Partner Funding going to International Organizations from FY 2005 to FY 2008





Figure 2.3: Percentage of Prime Partner Funding going to Local Organizations from FY 2005 to FY 2008



First, Figure 2.2 graphs the levels of prime partner funding going to international organizations. Only three of the fifteen focus countries saw an overall decrease of more than twenty percent in levels of prime partner funding going to international partners between FY 2005 and FY 2008. Additionally, at the end of PEPFAR I, only three countries saw less than fifty percent of total funds going to international groups.


Nigeria, in particular, is an interesting case. Nigeria saw one of the most drastic declines in the percentage of overall partnerships that were made with international partners.<sup>82</sup> Yet Figure 2.2 proves that though international groups became small in number by FY 2008, they continued to maintain control over the majority of the PEPFAR program's prime partner funds.

Next, Figure 2.3 looks at the percentage of funding going to local prime partners during the same time period. In seven of the focus countries, there was an increase in the percentage of prime partner funding going to local groups. However, even with the marginal increases in local involvement, for the most part international groups received much more funding in FY 2008 than local organizations. Indeed, only one focus country saw levels of prime partner funding to local organizations reach a level above thirty percent in FY 2008. Vietnam, on the other hand, saw zero dollars going to local prime partners during the entirety of PEPFAR I. Vietnam shows no change in the percentage of funding going to local prime partners because no local civil society organizations ever reached the prime partner level to begin with.

### *c. Intergovernmental Coordination*<sup>83</sup>

The phrase “intergovernmental coordination” refers to the ways PEPFAR staff engages with partner countries’ governments when combating HIV/AIDS. Under PEPFAR I, host government agencies were both prime partners who worked directly with US government staff and subprime partners who received funding through an intermediary (typically an international US-based organization<sup>84</sup>). Using data provided by PEPFAR,<sup>85</sup> I created a series of charts and graphs that analyze recipient governments’ involvement in the program. The charts include data ranging from FY 2004 to FY 2008 that reflect the varying levels of engagement with host country governments under PEPFAR I (see Appendix B).<sup>86</sup> If truly sustainable transition was taking place, their control over funds should have increased.<sup>87</sup> Figure 3.1 tracks the proportion of overall prime partner funds that were directed to host government agency prime partners (rather than international or local private partners). In general, Figure 3.1 suggests that throughout the course of PEPFAR I, host country governments rarely reached the level where they received a large portion of prime partner funds, meaning money instead went through (mainly international) civil society organizations or US government agencies.

Figure 3.1: Percentage of Funding going to Government Agency Prime Partners



This analysis is not the first to question PEPFAR I's ability to engage with host governments in developing countries. In *Following the Funding*, Ooman, Bernstein, and Rosenzweig analyzed the PEPFAR program, the Global Fund, and the World Bank along six variables, two of which relate specifically to collaboration with host governments: "work[ing] with the government" and "build[ing] local capacity."<sup>88</sup> All three donors pledged their desire to create programs that "support country-led national AIDS responses."<sup>89</sup> Yet compared with PEPFAR, the authors found that the Global Fund and the World Bank engaged much more with host government agencies: they write that "Global Fund money usually is disbursed to the national government, with money spent according to country-designed procedures and by country-selected recipients."<sup>90</sup> In addition, the World Bank Mapping for Results (MAP) funding "uniquely focuse[d] on strengthening the national AIDS response by allocating its money to particular types of recipients, such as National AIDS Councils."<sup>91</sup> Although PEPFAR country teams shared PEPFAR-related information with host government officials and asked them to approve the COP each year, the MAP and the Global Fund went much further in engaging government officials in the planning, designing, and implementing of their HIV/AIDS programs.<sup>92</sup>



At the end of the day, PEPFAR – with its reliance on private, US-based organizations – was able to use its money more quickly than the MAP or Global Fund donations that “encountered major bottlenecks” in funding because they went through the public government system.<sup>93</sup> Yet what good was PEPFAR I’s speedy funding if host governments would not be able to sustain the programs themselves? Ultimately, the authors determine that PEPFAR was driven by “achieving its globally-set programmatic targets and its accountability to Congress,” which “take precedence over any other feature.”<sup>94</sup> The program’s lack of integration with host governments might have sped up funding, but it has the opposite impact on sustainability.

## CONCLUSION: LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE

The analyses in this paper reveal that for the most part, PEPFAR concentrated its funds in two USG agencies and did not show significant sustainable transition of funds to local NGOs and foreign governments. Although PEPFAR’s creators designed a program that relied on horizontal, vertical, and intergovernmental coordination to overcome the existing bureaucracy surrounding foreign aid, an analysis of the program’s spending data does not suggest that the PEPFAR program substantially increased individual country ownership (either within foreign governments or civil society), nor did it enable the USG to employ a truly multisectoral response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. It seems that while PEPFAR I brought America closer to a model that overcomes the constraints of complex bureaucracy, a few holes remained that impeded the program’s ability to translate innovative processes into improved outcomes.

PEPFAR II is well underway, and is scheduled to disperse more than twice the amount of funding as PEPFAR I. Future PEPFAR critics should look closely at whether PEPFAR II displays an increase in funding going directly to local NGOs and foreign governments; a diversity of foreign government ministries; and more equitable financial support going to each USG PEPFAR agency. At the end of PEPFAR I, *New York Times* said that PEPFAR had created a “philosophical revolution”<sup>95</sup> – a revolution that would no doubt be enhanced by improving in these three areas.

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<sup>1</sup> "The Balm In Gilead Joins Saddleback Church in Thanking President Bush for His Leadership on Addressing HIV and AIDS Around the World." *Drug Week*. 19 December 2008. Available at: <http://www.newsrx.com/newsletters/Drug-Week/2008-12-19/161219200818137W.html>

<sup>2</sup> "About PEPFAR." *U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief*. Available at: <http://www.pepfar.gov/about/index.htm>

<sup>3</sup> Steven Radelet, "Bush and Foreign Aid." *Foreign Affairs* 82.5 (2003): 104-17. 104.

<sup>4</sup> PEPFAR I specified fifteen “priority” countries that received 66% of phase one’s \$15 billion in funds. Twelve of these countries were in Africa; the others were Vietnam, Haiti, and Guyana. This is also the convention used by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) when it writes its reports evaluating the PEPFAR program. For more information about the GAO’s nomenclature, as well as the funding breakdown used by the PEPFAR program, see: U.S. Government Accountability Office. *Global HIV/AIDS: A More Country-Based Approach Could Improve Allocation of PEPFAR Funding*. Publication No. GAO-08-480. 2008. Available at: [www.gao.gov/new.items/do8480.pdf](http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do8480.pdf). 10.

<sup>5</sup> “The Balm in Gilead.” 1634.

<sup>6</sup> This article will focus on PEPFAR I, which spanned from 2003 through 2008.

<sup>7</sup> For a discussion about the accountability measures that PEPFAR instituted inside the federal government, see: Ann E. Person, et. al. “Maximizing the Value of Philanthropic Efforts through Planned Partnerships between the U.S. Government and Private Foundations.” *Report to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services*. (Princeton, NJ: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. 2009). Available at: <http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/09/philanpart/index.shtml> 73. And: J. Stephen Morrison. “Enhancing the Rapid Response Capacity of the U.S. Global Aids Coordinator: Lessons from Other U.S. Emergency Responses.” (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2004). Available at: [http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060304\\_emergency\\_capacity\\_of\\_sgac\\_.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060304_emergency_capacity_of_sgac_.pdf) 8.

<sup>8</sup> Mark Dybul, “Lessons learned from PEPFAR.” *Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes* 51.1 (2009): 12-13. 12.

<sup>9</sup> Marc J. Hetherington, *Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP. 2005). 27.

<sup>10</sup> Donald F. Kettl and James W. Fesler, *The Politics of the Administrative Process*. (Washington, D.C.: CQ, 2005). 32.

<sup>11</sup> Carol Lancaster, *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics*. (Chicago: University of Chicago. 2007). 92.

<sup>12</sup> Thomas D. Zweifel, *International Organizations and Democracy: Accountability, Politics, and Power*. (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner. 2006). 24.

<sup>13</sup> Emanuel S. Savas, *Privatization and Public-private Partnerships*. (New York: Chatham House. 2000). 313.

<sup>14</sup> Lewis G. Irwin, “Dancing the Foreign Aid Appropriations Dance: Recurring Themes in the Modern Congresses.” *Public Budgeting and Finance*. 20 (2000): 30-48. 46.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Dennis Rondinelli, “Reforming U.S. Foreign Aid Policy: Constraints on Development Assistance.” *Policy Studies Journal* 18 (1989): 67-85. 69.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. 73.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. 75.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. 76.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. 77.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. 74.

<sup>24</sup> Faith Corneille and Jeremy Shiffman, “Scaling-up Participation at USAID.” *Public Administration and Development* 24 (2004): 255-62. 256.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. 255.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. 257.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> The mechanisms of coordination between agencies inside the PEPFAR program will be explored in more detail in Chapter 3. A number of people have written about PEPFAR’s innovative interagency team structure and the accountability measures OGAC uses to monitor how each is using funding (see, for example: Ann E. Person, et. al.

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- “Maximizing the Value of Philanthropic Efforts through Planned Partnerships between the U.S. Government and Private Foundations.” *Report to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services*. (Princeton, NJ: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. 2009). Available at: <http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/09/philanpart/index.shtml>
- <sup>29</sup> Elaine C. Kamarck, “The End of Government as We Know It.” *Market-based governance: supply side, demand side, upside, and downside*. Edited by John D. Donahue and Joseph S. Nye. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 2002). 230.
- <sup>30</sup> Jeff Madrick, *The Case for Big Government*. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 2009). 2.
- <sup>31</sup> Savas. 16-17.
- <sup>32</sup> Madrick. 3.
- <sup>33</sup> Dwight Waldo, *The Enterprise of Public Administration: A Summary View*. (Novato, Calif.: Chandler and Sharp, 1980). 164. Quoted in: Kettl and Fesler. 9.
- <sup>34</sup> Monterrey Consensus., Official Document. Mexico, 2002. Available at: <http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf>. 8.
- <sup>35</sup> Laura Dickinson. “Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of Accountability under International Law.” *William and Mary Law Review* 47 (2005): 135-237. 138.
- <sup>36</sup> Ibid. 142.
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid. 173.
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid. 171-2.
- <sup>39</sup> World Bank, “Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why.” Washington DC.: The World Bank. (1998). Quoted in McGillivray, et. Al, “Controversies Over the Impact of Development Aid: It Works; It Doesn’t; It Can, But That Depends...” *Journal of International Development*. 18 (2006): 1031-1050. 1032.
- <sup>40</sup> McGillivray, et. al. 1044.
- <sup>41</sup> Simon Feeny and Mark Rogers, “Public Sector Efficiency, Foreign Aid and Small Island Developing States.” *Journal of International Development* 20 (2008): 526-46. 528.
- <sup>42</sup> Ibid. 534.
- <sup>43</sup> G. Shabbir Cheema, “Introduction.” *Reinventing Government for the Twenty-first Century: State Capacity in a Globalizing Society*. Edited by Dennis A. Rondinelli. (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian. 2003). 1-13. 8.
- <sup>44</sup> Monterrey Consensus. 8.
- <sup>45</sup> U.S. Congress, *United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003*. H.R. 1298. 108<sup>th</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess. (17 March 2003). Available at: <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h108-1298>> 1.
- <sup>46</sup> For more information on the bill, see the Library of Congress website information at: Available at: <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR01298:@@L&summ2=m&>
- <sup>47</sup> U.S. Congress, *Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008*. H.R. 5501. 110<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2<sup>nd</sup> Sess. (27 February 2008). Available at: <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h110-5501>>. 4.
- <sup>48</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *President’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief: Partner Selection and Oversight Follow Accepted Practices but Would Benefit from Enhanced Planning and Accountability*. Publication No. GAO-09-666. 2009. Available at: <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-666>. 1.
- <sup>49</sup> H.R. 1298. 21.
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid. 11.
- <sup>51</sup> GAO-09-666. 9.
- <sup>52</sup> Colleen C. Denny and Ezekiel J. Emanuel, “US Health Aid Beyond PEPFAR: The Mother & Child Campaign.” *Journal of the American Medical Association* 300.17 (2008): 2048-2051. 2049.
- <sup>53</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Global Health: Spending Requirement Presents Challenges for*

*Allocating Prevention Funding under the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief*. Publication No. GAO-06-395. 2006. Available at: [www.gao.gov/new.items/do8480.pdf](http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do8480.pdf). 22.

<sup>54</sup> U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Global HIV/AIDS: A More Country-Based Approach Could Improve*

*Allocation of PEPFAR Funding*. Publication No. GAO-08-480. 2008. Available at: [www.gao.gov/new.items/do8480.pdf](http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do8480.pdf)

<sup>55</sup> GAO-08-480. 8.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. 15.

<sup>57</sup> Oomman, Bernstein, and Rosenzweig. 69.

<sup>58</sup> GAO-09-666. 21-22.

<sup>59</sup> GAO-08-480. 23.

<sup>60</sup> The legislation that authorized the initial PEPFAR funding – the “United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003,” also known as H.R. 1298 or the Leadership Act – is filled with passages that describe the unaligned activities of federal agencies pre-PEPFAR, which boiled down to the fact that none of them were communicating with their peers. See: U.S. Congress. United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003. H.R. 1298. 108th Cong., 1st sess. (17 March 2003). Available at: <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h108-1298>. 21.

<sup>61</sup> Morrison. 8.

<sup>62</sup> Kamarck. 231.

<sup>63</sup> Nandini Oomman, Michael Bernstein, and Steven Rosenzweig, “Following the Funding for HIV/AIDS: A Comparative Analysis of the Funding Practices of PEPFAR, the Global Fund and World Bank MAP in Mozambique, Uganda and Zambia.” *Center for Global Development Studies*. 2007. Available at: <http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/14569>. 9.

<sup>64</sup> “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability.” *United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS (UNGASS)*, 2005. Available at:

[http://www.adb.org/media/articles/2005/7033\\_international\\_community\\_aid/paris\\_declaration.pdf](http://www.adb.org/media/articles/2005/7033_international_community_aid/paris_declaration.pdf). 12. Quoted in Oomman, Bernstein, and Rosenzweig. 3-4.

<sup>65</sup> “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.” 10.

<sup>66</sup> The annual partner pages for each PEPFAR country reveal the prevalence of international NGOs acting as intermediaries between U.S. government staff and smaller host government agency prime partners. See: “Partners.” *The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief*. Available at: <http://www.pepfar.gov/partners/index.htm>

<sup>67</sup> For a discussion of the accountability issues that harm the bilateral partnerships the U.S. makes with developing countries, see: Howard Pack and Janet Rothenberg Pack. “Foreign Aid and the Question of Fungibility.” *The Review of Economics and Statistics*. 75 (1993): 258-265. 258.

<sup>68</sup> The data used to create each of the charts and graphs related to horizontal accountability can be found at the following link: “Operational Plans.” *The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief*. Available at: <http://www.pepfar.gov/about/c19388.htm>. I also used the following country operational plans, publicly available on the PEPFAR website. (1) Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator. *The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief Fiscal Year 2006: Operational Plan*. August 2006. Available at: <http://www.pepfar.gov/documents/organization/77751.pdf>. 16. (2) Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator. *The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief Fiscal Year 2007: Operational Plan*. June 2007. Available at: <http://www.pepfar.gov/documents/organization/82585.pdf>. 15. (3) Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator. *The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief Fiscal Year 2008: Operational Plan*. June 2008. Available at: <http://www.pepfar.gov/documents/organization/107838.pdf>. 16. (4) Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator. *The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief Fiscal Year 2009: Operational Plan*. February 2010. (2 March 2010). 25.

<sup>69</sup> See: “Partners.” *The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief*. Available at: <http://www.pepfar.gov/partners/index.htm>.

<sup>70</sup> See: “Newly Available PEPFAR Data.” Center for Global Development.

Available at: [http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/\\_active/hivmonitor/funding\\_data/pepfardata](http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/hivmonitor/funding_data/pepfardata).

<sup>71</sup> “Operational Plans,” *The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief*. Available at: <http://www.pepfar.gov/about/c19388.htm>. Also see Appendix A.

<sup>72</sup> The operational plans for FY 2004 and FY 2005 were not available on the website. For each country, the only document available for these years is the tentative COP written before funding was actually allocated; the numbers in this chart, however, are from summary operational plans written following funding allocations and therefore are accurate figures of how much funding each agency ultimately received for that particular year.

<sup>73</sup> Morrison. 8.

<sup>74</sup> The charts used to make the graphs in this section can be found in Appendix A.

<sup>75</sup> Morrison. 8. Morrison writes about the Global AIDS Coordinator's role in enhancing coordination between the agencies by holding them accountable for producing results. Also, Congress wrote in the first Leadership Act that approved PEPFAR I (U.S. Congress. United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003. H.R. 1298. 108th Cong., 1st sess. (17 March 2003). Available at: <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h108-1298> that one of the coordinator's duties is: "establishing due diligence criteria for all recipients of funds section and all activities subject to the coordination and appropriate monitoring, evaluation, and audits carried out by the Coordinator necessary to assess the measurable outcomes of such activities."

<sup>76</sup> Chris Collins, Thomas Coates, and Greg Szekeres, "Accountability in the global response to HIV: measuring progress, driving change." *AIDS* 22 (2008): 105-111. 111. Here, the authors write that, "With a sense of accountability comes the assertion that results can and should be measured and that institutions are answerable to a community outside their own doors." They also write on page 110 that multiple actors inside of any plan to combat HIV/AIDS must be held accountable for the results they produce.

<sup>77</sup> Elizabeth Pisani., *Wisdom of Whores: Bureaucrats, Brothels, and the Business of AIDS*. (New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2008). 271.

<sup>78</sup> The data used to create the graphs in this section can be found at: "Partners." *The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief*. Available at: <http://www.pepfar.gov/partners/index.htm>. Also see Appendix B.

<sup>79</sup> The charts used to make the graphs in this section can be found in Appendix B.

<sup>80</sup> Data for FY 2004 is not available on the website.

<sup>81</sup> PEPFAR does not publicly share this information.

<sup>82</sup> See Appendix B.

<sup>83</sup> The data used to create the graph in this section can be found at: "Partners." *The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief*. Available at: <http://www.pepfar.gov/partners/index.htm>>Also see Appendix B.

<sup>84</sup> The annual partner pages for each PEPFAR country reveal the prevalence of international NGOs acting as intermediaries between U.S. government staff and smaller host government agency prime partners. See: "Partners." *The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief*. Available at: <http://www.pepfar.gov/partners/index.htm>.

<sup>85</sup> See Appendix B for the charts used to make the figures in this section.

<sup>86</sup> The PEPFAR website includes information on host country partner types from FY2004 through FY2008 for the original fifteen focus countries of PEPFAR I. The website also has information for sixteen other PEPFAR countries for FY2008. The links to each country's Partners page for the years spanning PEPFAR I can be found at: "Partners." *The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief*. Available at: <http://www.pepfar.gov/partners/index.htm>. As was the case in the previous section, to decipher which partners were host government ministries, I relied on a spreadsheet provided by the Center for Public Integrity, found on the website for the Center for Global Development website. The spreadsheet is an imperfect data set of PEPFAR funding from FY 2004 through FY 2006. Though it did not provide accurate financial data, it helped me to delineate which organizations were international, local civil society, and local host government organizations. See: "Newly Available PEPFAR Data." *Center for Global Development*. Available at:

[http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/\\_active/hivmonitor/funding\\_data/pepfardata](http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/hivmonitor/funding_data/pepfardata).

<sup>87</sup> Jennifer Cohn and Harvey M. Friedman, "Sustainable International Partnership Building for Academic Medical Centers: Experiences with the Botswana-UPenn Partnership." *Virtual Mentor* 12 (2010): 179-183. 180.

<sup>88</sup> Oomman, Bernstein, and Rosenzweig. vii.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid. 4.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid. x.



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<sup>91</sup> Ibid. x.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid. xi.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid. xi.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid. 3.

<sup>95</sup> Sheryl G. Stolberg, "In Global Battle on AIDS, Bush Creates Legacy." *New York Times*. 5 January 2008. Available at:

<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/05/washington/05aids.html?scp=1&sq=president's%20emergency%20plan%20for%20aids%20relief%20philosophical%20revolution&st=cse>.



## APPENDIX A

Appendix A<sup>1</sup> contains the data used to create each of the charts and graphs in the results section. First, Tables A.1-A.4 list the country-by-country agency allocations from fiscal year (FY) 2006 through FY 2009.<sup>2</sup> Next, tables A.5-A.9 list the percentage changes per year, calculated using the following equation:

$$\frac{(\text{New Allocation}) - (\text{Old Allocation})}{(\text{Old Allocation})}$$

### Country-by-Country Agency Allocations, 2006 - 2009

Table A.1: 2006

Country	Department of Defense	Department of Labor	Health and Human Services <sup>3</sup>	Peace Corps	State	USAID	Total
Botswana	600,000	N/A	47,723,615	580,000	200,000	5,821,411	54,925,026
Cote d'Ivoire	N/A	N/A	35,727,872	N/A	N/A	10,880,311	46,608,183
Ethiopia	822,000	N/A	49,940,440	N/A	819,000	71,376,307	122,957,747
Guyana	359,000	150,000	9,181,800	267,000	50,000	11,719,316	21,727,116
Haiti	N/A	500,000	30,804,960	N/A	N/A	24,301,707	55,606,667
Kenya	8,395,000	N/A	72,936,102	677,582	967,550	125,293,645	208,269,879
Mozambique	887,000	N/A	37,528,898	473,200	755,000	54,774,771	94,418,869
Namibia	1,361,000	N/A	27,645,940	843,300	175,000	27,263,638	57,288,878
Nigeria	7,808,500	N/A	87,714,862	N/A	300,000	67,784,387	163,607,749
Rwanda	1,185,252	N/A	24,425,996	N/A	230,000	46,261,186	72,102,434
South Africa	1,000,000	N/A	97,293,868	372,819	865,000	122,007,743	221,539,430
Tanzania	8,800,000	N/A	53,880,581	476,000	655,000	66,156,344	129,967,925
Uganda	1,486,400	N/A	77,660,603	728,300	915,734	89,084,434	169,875,461
Vietnam	1,875,000	N/A	11,866,000	N/A	N/A	20,328,000	34,069,000
Zambia	6,065,000	N/A	58,471,462	1,700,000	1,322,546	81,463,145	149,022,153
<b>Grand</b>	<b>40,644,152</b>	<b>650,000</b>	<b>722,802,999</b>	<b>6,118,201</b>	<b>7,254,830</b>	<b>824,516,335</b>	<b>1,601,986,517</b>

<sup>1</sup> The data used to create each of the charts and graphs in Part A of the Results section can be found at the following link: "Operational Plans." *The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief*. Available at: <http://www.pepfar.gov/about/c19388.htm>. I also used the following country operational plans, publicly available on the PEPFAR website. (1) Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator. *The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief Fiscal Year 2006: Operational Plan*. August 2006. Available at: <http://www.pepfar.gov/documents/organization/77751.pdf>. (2 March 2010). 16. (2) Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator. *The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief Fiscal Year 2007: Operational Plan*. June 2007. Available at: <http://www.pepfar.gov/documents/organization/82585.pdf>. (3) Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator. *The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief Fiscal Year 2008: Operational Plan*. June 2008. Available at: <http://www.pepfar.gov/documents/organization/107838.pdf>. (4) Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator. *The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief Fiscal Year 2009: Operational Plan*. February 2010. (2 March 2010). 25.

<sup>2</sup> The operational plans for FY 2004 and FY 2005 were not available on the website. For each country, the only document available for these years is the tentative COP written before funding was actually allocated; the numbers in this chart, however, are from summary operational plans written following funding allocations and therefore are accurate figures of how much funding each agency ultimately received for that particular year.

<sup>3</sup> Includes CDC and SAMHSA

<b>total</b>							
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Table A.2: 2007

Country	Department of Defense	Department of Labor	Health and Human Services	Peace Corps	State	USAID	Total
Botswana	770,000	200,000	57,654,809	800,000	4,735,227	12,054,091	76,214,127
Cote d'Ivoire	N/A	N/A	57,231,257	N/A	30,000	27,152,761	84,414,018
Ethiopia	1,563,300	N/A	84,318,985	4,255,000	8,608,288	143,027,981	241,773,554
Guyana	300,000	350,000	8,749,360	55,000	4,050,000	14,875,160	28,379,520
Haiti	N/A	350,000	47,736,679	N/A	N/A	36,603,053	84,689,732
Kenya	13,527,275	N/A	115,684,778	1,364,500	1,673,700	235,878,929	368,129,182
Mozambique	793,000	N/A	59,591,434	1,339,720	2,530,467	97,735,095	161,989,716
Namibia	2,233,000	N/A	44,862,028	985,300	2,695,090	40,413,483	91,188,901
Nigeria	9,406,033	N/A	158,294,314	N/A	60,000	137,093,067	304,853,414
Rwanda	2,249,858	N/A	26,085,379	200,000	357,420	74,149,213	103,041,870
South Africa	1,150,000	N/A	166,586,821	727,900	1,400,000	227,912,287	397,777,008
Tanzania	15,179,432	N/A	80,224,757	950,000	7,065,644	102,062,494	205,482,327
Uganda	3,161,787	N/A	111,590,911	1,457,000	2,983,879	117,432,838	236,626,415
Vietnam	3,550,500	N/A	23,450,685	N/A	N/A	38,788,815	65,790,000
Zambia	5,563,929	N/A	83,189,522	2,100,000	1,285,000	123,874,329	216,012,780
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>59,448,114</b>	<b>900,000</b>	<b>1,125,251,719</b>	<b>14,234,420</b>	<b>37,474,715</b>	<b>1,429,053,596</b>	<b>2,666,362,564</b>

Table A.3: 2008

Country	Department of Defense	Department of Labor	Health and Human Services	Peace Corps	State	USAID	Total
Botswana	1,822,000	200,000	56,559,047	1,450,000	9,767,000	23,361,700	93,159,747
Cote d'Ivoire	300,000	N/A	64,782,172	N/A	1,775,000	53,680,731	120,537,903
Ethiopia	1,529,000	N/A	121,196,198	3,721,000	13,956,598	214,136,558	354,539,354
Guyana	N/A	400,000	8,818,895	N/A	104,400	14,476,013	23,799,308
Haiti	N/A	N/A	66,473,849	N/A	300,000	33,872,437	100,646,286
Kenya	21,293,158	N/A	162,219,578	1,042,600	11,877,906	338,361,362	534,794,604
Mozambique	751,000	N/A	89,727,057	1,770,000	2,747,760	133,628,837	228,624,654
Namibia	2,665,000	N/A	51,749,517	1,205,700	5,335,389	47,908,871	108,864,477
Nigeria	8,164,835	N/A	221,285,717	N/A	1,800,000	216,385,127	447,635,679
Rwanda	3,192,857	N/A	36,945,450	2,500,000	613,344	80,217,189	123,468,840
South Africa	1,250,000	N/A	253,066,461	863,000	7,528,000	328,190,224	590,897,685
Tanzania	25,352,444	N/A	118,211,780	1,097,100	25,120,279	143,633,956	313,415,559
Uganda	4,038,024	N/A	130,470,309	2,096,020	8,654,001	138,377,122	283,635,476
Vietnam	5,377,200	N/A	34,166,539	N/A	1,300,000	48,011,261	88,855,000
Zambia	7,605,000	N/A	99,398,580	3,888,100	4,371,000	153,983,872	269,246,552
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>83,340,518</b>	<b>600,000</b>	<b>1,515,071,149</b>	<b>19,633,520</b>	<b>95,250,677</b>	<b>1,968,225,260</b>	<b>3,682,121,124</b>

Table A.4: 2009<sup>4</sup>

Country	Department of Defense	Department of Labor	Health and Human Services	Peace Corps	State	USAID	Total
Angola	700,000	N/A	2,850,000	N/A	N/A	5,450,000	9,000,000
Botswana	1,855,000	500,000	70,261,020	1,450,000	1,480,000	16,579,138	92,125,158
Cambodia	N/A	N/A	3,950,000	N/A	N/A	14,050,000	18,000,000
Caribbean Regional	N/A	N/A	3,000,000	N/A	200,000	N/A	3,200,000
China	N/A	N/A	4,425,000	N/A	N/A	5,883,000	10,308,000
Cote d'Ivoire	400,000	N/A	69,129,182	N/A	30,000	55,273,230	124,832,412
Democratic Republic of Congo	400,000	N/A	5,286,572	N/A	378,523	10,108,152	16,173,247
Dominican Republic	295,000	N/A	2,004,000	201,000	N/A	5,750,000	8,250,000
Ethiopia	2,749,000	N/A	117,753,591	2,500,000	13,922,816	209,055,701	345,981,108
Ghana	150,000	N/A	1,000,000	164,000	50,000	6,731,000	8,095,000
Guyana	338,000	190,000	8,386,675	141,472	112,500	11,362,928	20,531,575
Haiti	N/A	N/A	61,625,444	N/A	N/A	43,908,569	105,534,013
India	627,300	200,000	7,040,805	N/A	N/A	22,581,895	30,450,000
Indonesia	250,000	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	8,750,000	9,000,000
Kenya	23,121,667	N/A	169,470,969	290,600	9,617,886	339,014,471	541,515,593
Lesotho	610,000	N/A	4,397,250	342,000	558,375	7,292,375	13,200,000
Malawi	150,000	N/A	7,262,000	460,000	230,000	17,098,000	25,200,000
Mozambique	2,415,000	N/A	92,107,393	1,387,500	2,216,351	128,251,818	226,378,062
Namibia	2,652,150	N/A	52,854,169	2,282,000	1,693,668	47,573,807	107,055,794
Nigeria	10,978,013	N/A	203,306,118	N/A	645,000	227,357,922	442,287,053
Russia	N/A	N/A	1,330,000	N/A	N/A	6,670,000	8,000,000
Rwanda	3,828,175	N/A	36,404,940	2,500,000	377,422	79,886,776	122,997,313
South Africa	1,222,358	N/A	238,297,030	863,000	2,218,374	308,812,384	551,413,146
Sudan	N/A	N/A	3,724,520	N/A	N/A	5,112,480	8,837,000
Swaziland	390,432	235,000	4,984,334	144,000	537,840	8,008,400	14,300,006
Tanzania	27,989,386	N/A	120,148,345	991,800	10,521,544	151,515,268	311,166,343
Thailand	N/A	N/A	4,250,000	N/A	N/A	1,250,000	5,500,000
Uganda	4,170,317	N/A	134,190,094	2,985,220	2,575,554	141,942,549	285,863,734
Ukraine	250,000	N/A	400,000	225,000	N/A	7,303,000	8,178,000
Vietnam	416,294	N/A	41,599,058	N/A	2,920,480	44,067,336	89,003,168
Zambia	7,855,000	N/A	101,426,337	3,388,100	2,868,489	154,833,462	270,371,388
Zimbabwe	N/A	N/A	6,670,000	N/A	50,000	19,780,000	26,500,000
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>93,813,100</b>	<b>1,125,000</b>	<b>1,579,530,000</b>	<b>20,315,700</b>	<b>53,204,800</b>	<b>2,111,250,000</b>	<b>3,859,240,000</b>

Table A.5: Percent of total funding to each agency in 2006

Agency	DoD	DoL	HHS	Peace Corps	State	USAID
Percent (%)	2.54	0.04	45.12	0.38	0.45	51.47

Table A.6: Percent of total funding to each agency in 2007

Agency	DoD	DoL	HHS	Peace Corps	State	USAID
Percent	2.23	0.03	42.20	0.53	1.41	53.60

<sup>4</sup> 2009 is the only year for which the PEPFAR website includes agency funding breakdown for more than the fifteen focus countries.

(%)						
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Table A.7: Percent of total funding to each agency in 2008

Agency	DoD	DoL	HHS	Peace Corps	State	USAID
Percent (%)	2.26	0.02	41.15	0.53	2.59	53.45

Table A.8: Percent of total funding to each agency in 2009

Agency	DoD	DoL	HHS	Peace Corps	State	USAID
Percent (%)	2.43	0.03	40.93	0.53	1.38	54.71

Table A.9: Percent change in funding from 2006 to 2009

Agency	DoD	DoL	HHS	Peace Corps	State	USAID
Percent (%)	130.82	73.08	118.53	232.05	6.33	156.06

*Individual country breakdown:*

Table A.10: Botswana Agency Allocations, 2006-2009

		DoD		DoL		HHS		Peace Corps		State		USAID	
Year	Country Total	Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)
2006	54,925,026	600,000	1.09	N/A	0.00	47,723,615	86.89	580,000	1.06	200,000	0.36	5,821,411	10.60
2007	76,214,127	770,000	1.01	200,000	0.26	57,654,809	75.65	800,000	1.05	4,735,227	6.21	12,054,091	15.82
2008	93,159,747	1,822,000	1.96	200,000	0.22	56,539,047	60.71	1,450,000	1.56	9,767,000	10.48	23,361,700	25.08
2009	92,125,158	1,855,000	2.01	500,000	0.54	70,261,020	76.27	1,450,000	1.57	1,480,000	1.61	16,579,138	18.00
Average (\$)		1,261,750		300,000		58,049,600		1,070,000		4,045,560		14,454,100	

Table A.11: Cote d'Ivoire Agency Allocations, 2006-2009

		DoD		DoL		HHS		Peace Corps		State		USAID	
Year	Country Total	Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)
2006	46,608,183	N/A	0.00	N/A	0.00	35,727,872	76.66	N/A	0.00	N/A	0.00	10,880,311	23.34
2007	84,414,018	N/A	0.00	N/A	0.00	57,231,257	67.80	N/A	0.00	30,000	0.04	27,152,761	32.17
2008	120,537,903	300,000	0.25	N/A	0.00	64,782,172	53.74	N/A	0.00	1,775,000	1.47	53,680,731	44.53
2009	124,832,412	400,000	0.32	N/A	0.00	69,159,182	55.38	N/A	0.00	30,000	0.02	55,273,230	44.28
Average (\$)		175,000		0		56,717,600		0		458,750		36,746,800	

Table A. 12: Ethiopia Agency Allocations, 2006-2009

		DoD		DoL		HHS		Peace Corps		State		USAID	
Year	Country Total	Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)
2006	122,957,747	822,000	0.67	N/A	0.00	49,940,440	40.62	N/A	0.00	819,000	0.67	71,376,307	58.05
2007	241,773,554	1,563,300	0.65	N/A	0.00	84,318,985	34.88	4,255,000	1.76	8,608,288	3.56	143,027,981	59.16

2008	354,539,354	1,529,000	0.43	N/A	0.00	121,996,498	34.18	3,721,000	1.05	13,956,598	3.94	214,136,558	60.40
2009	345,981,108	2,749,000	0.80	N/A	0.00	117,753,591	34.03	2,500,000	0.72	13,922,816	4.02	209,055,701	60.42
<b>Average (\$)</b>	<b>1,665,840</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>93,302,300</b>	<b>2,619,000</b>	<b>9,326,680</b>	<b>159,399,000</b>						

Table A.13: Guyana Agency Allocations, 2006-2009

Year	Country Total	DoD Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	DoL Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	HHS Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Peace Corps Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	State Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	USAID Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)
2006	21,727,116	359,000	1.65	150,000	0.69	5,181,800	42.26	267,000	1.23	50,000	0.23	11,719,316	53.94
2007	28,379,530	300,000	1.06	350,000	1.23	8,749,360	30.83	35,000	0.19	4,050,000	14.27	14,878,160	52.42
2008	23,799,308	N/A	0.00	400,000	1.68	8,818,805	37.06	N/A	0.00	104,400	0.44	14,475,013	60.83
2009	20,531,575	338,000	1.65	190,000	0.93	8,386,675	40.85	141,472	0.69	112,500	0.55	11,362,928	55.34
<b>Average (\$)</b>	<b>249,250</b>	<b>272,500</b>	<b>8,784,180</b>	<b>115,868</b>	<b>1,079,230</b>	<b>13,108,400</b>							

Table A.14: Haiti Agency Allocations, 2006-2009

Year	Country Total	DoD Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	DoL Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	HHS Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Peace Corps Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	State Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	USAID Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)
2006	55,606,667	N/A	0.00	500,000	0.90	30,804,960	55.40	N/A	0.00	N/A	0.00	24,301,707	43.70
2007	84,689,732	N/A	0.00	350,000	0.41	47,736,679	56.37	N/A	0.00	N/A	0.00	36,603,053	43.22
2008	100,646,286	N/A	0.00	N/A	0.00	66,473,849	66.05	N/A	0.00	300,000	0.30	33,872,437	33.65
2009	105,534,013	N/A	0.00	N/A	0.00	61,625,444	58.39	N/A	0.00	N/A	0.00	43,908,569	41.61
<b>Average (\$)</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>212,500</b>	<b>31,660,200</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>75,000</b>	<b>34,671,400</b>							

Table A.15: Kenya Agency Allocations, 2006-2009

Year	Country Total	DoD Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	DoL Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	HHS Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Peace Corps Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	State Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	USAID Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)
2006	208,260,879	8,395,000	4.03	N/A	0.00	72,936,102	35.02	677,582	0.33	967,550	0.47	125,293,645	60.16
2007	368,120,182	13,527,275	3.67	N/A	0.00	115,684,778	31.43	1,364,500	0.37	1,673,700	0.46	235,878,229	64.08
2008	534,794,604	21,293,158	3.98	N/A	0.00	162,219,578	30.33	1,042,600	0.20	11,877,906	2.22	338,361,362	63.27
2009	541,515,593	23,121,667	4.27	N/A	0.00	169,470,969	31.30	290,600	0.05	9,617,886	1.78	339,014,471	62.61
<b>Average (\$)</b>	<b>16,584,300</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>130,078,000</b>	<b>843,821</b>	<b>6,034,260</b>	<b>259,637,000</b>							

Table A.16: Mozambique Agency Allocations, 2006-2009

Year	Country Total	DoD Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	DoL Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	HHS Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Peace Corps Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	State Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	USAID Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)
2006	94,418,869	887,000	0.94	N/A	0.00	37,528,898	39.75	473,200	0.50	755,000	0.80	54,774,771	58.01
2007	161,989,716	793,000	0.49	N/A	0.00	59,591,434	36.79	1,339,720	0.83	2,530,467	1.56	97,735,095	60.33
2008	228,624,654	781,000	0.33	N/A	0.00	89,727,057	39.25	1,770,000	0.77	2,747,760	1.20	133,628,837	58.45
2009	226,378,062	2,415,000	1.07	N/A	0.00	92,107,393	40.69	1,387,500	0.61	2,216,351	0.98	128,251,818	56.66
<b>Average (\$)</b>	<b>1,211,500</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>69,738,700</b>	<b>1,242,510</b>	<b>2,062,390</b>	<b>103,598,000</b>							

Table A.17: Namibia Agency Allocations, 2006-2009

Year	Country Total	DoD Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	DoL Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	HHS Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Peace Corps Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	State Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	USAID Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)
2006	57,288,878	1,361,000	2.38	N/A	0.00	27,645,940	48.26	843,300	1.47	175,000	0.31	27,263,638	47.59
2007	91,188,901	2,233,000	2.45	N/A	0.00	44,862,028	49.20	585,300	1.08	2,655,090	2.90	40,414,483	44.32
2008	108,364,477	2,065,000	2.45	N/A	0.00	31,749,317	47.54	1,205,700	1.11	5,335,389	4.90	47,908,871	44.01
2009	107,058,794	2,652,150	2.48	N/A	0.00	32,854,159	49.37	2,282,000	2.13	1,693,668	1.58	47,573,807	44.44
<b>Average (\$)</b>	<b>2,227,790</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>44,277,900</b>	<b>1,329,080</b>	<b>2,474,790</b>	<b>49,789,900</b>							

Table A.18: Nigeria Agency Allocations, 2006-2009

Year	Country Total	DoD Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	DoL Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	HHS Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Peace Corps Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	State Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	USAID Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)
2006	163,607,749	7,808,500	4.77	N/A	0.00	87,714,862	53.61	N/A	0.00	300,000	0.18	67,784,387	41.43
2007	304,853,414	9,406,033	3.09	N/A	0.00	158,294,314	51.93	N/A	0.00	60,000	0.02	137,093,067	44.97
2008	447,635,679	8,164,835	1.82	N/A	0.00	221,285,717	49.43	N/A	0.00	1,800,000	0.40	216,385,127	48.34
2009	442,287,053	10,978,013	2.48	N/A	0.00	203,306,118	45.97	N/A	0.00	645,000	0.15	227,355,922	51.41
<b>Average (\$)</b>	<b>9,089,350</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>167,650,000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>701,250</b>	<b>162,155,000</b>							

Table A.19: Rwanda Agency Allocations, 2006-2009

Year	Country Total	DoD Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	DoL Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	HHS Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Peace Corps Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	State Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	USAID Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)
2006	72,102,434	1,185,252	1.64	N/A	0.00	24,425,996	33.88	N/A	0.00	230,000	0.32	46,261,186	64.16
2007	104,041,870	2,249,858	2.16	N/A	0.00	26,085,379	25.32	200,000	0.19	357,420	0.35	74,149,213	71.90
2008	123,168,840	3,192,857	2.59	N/A	0.00	35,945,150	29.92	2,500,000	2.03	613,344	0.50	80,217,189	64.97
2009	122,997,313	3,828,175	3.11	N/A	0.00	36,104,940	29.60	2,500,000	2.03	377,422	0.31	79,886,776	64.55
<b>Average (\$)</b>	<b>2,614,040</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>30,965,400</b>	<b>1,300,000</b>	<b>394,547</b>	<b>70,128,600</b>							

Table A.20: South Africa Agency Allocations, 2006-2009

Year	Country Total	DoD Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	DoL Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	HHS Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Peace Corps Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	State Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	USAID Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)
2006	221,539,430	1,000,000	0.45	N/A	0.00	97,293,868	43.92	372,819	0.17	865,000	0.39	122,007,743	55.07
2007	397,777,008	1,150,000	0.29	N/A	0.00	166,286,821	41.88	727,900	0.18	1,400,000	0.35	227,912,287	57.30
2008	390,897,685	1,250,000	0.21	N/A	0.00	253,066,461	42.83	863,000	0.15	7,528,000	1.27	328,190,224	55.54
2009	551,413,146	1,222,358	0.22	N/A	0.00	238,297,030	43.22	863,000	0.16	2,218,374	0.40	308,812,384	56.00
<b>Average (\$)</b>	<b>1,555,590</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>188,811,000</b>	<b>706,680</b>	<b>3,002,840</b>	<b>246,721,000</b>							

Table A.21: Tanzania Agency Allocations, 2006-2009

Year	Country Total	DoD Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	DoL Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	HHS Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Peace Corps Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	State Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	USAID Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)
2006	129,967,925	8,800,000	6.77	N/A	0.00	53,880,581	41.46	476,000	0.37	655,000	0.50	66,156,344	50.90

2007	205,482,327	15,179,432	7.39	N/A	0.00	80,224,757	39.04	950,000	0.46	7,065,644	3.44	102,062,494	49.67
2008	313,415,559	25,352,444	8.09	N/A	0.00	118,211,780	37.72	1,097,100	0.35	25,120,279	8.02	143,633,956	45.83
2009	311,166,343	27,989,386	9.00	N/A	0.00	120,148,345	38.61	991,800	0.32	10,521,544	3.38	151,515,268	48.69
<b>Average (\$)</b>		<b>19,330,300</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>93,116,400</b>		<b>878,725</b>		<b>10,840,600</b>		<b>115,842,000</b>	

Table A.22: Uganda Agency Allocations, 2006-2009

Year	Country Total	DoD Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	DoL Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	HHS Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Peace Corps Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	State Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	USAID Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)
2006	169,875,461	1,486,400	0.88	N/A	0.00	77,660,603	45.72	728,300	0.43	915,734	0.54	89,084,434	52.44
2007	236,628,415	3,161,787	1.34	N/A	0.00	111,590,911	47.16	1,457,000	0.62	2,983,879	1.26	177,432,838	49.63
2008	283,635,476	4,038,024	1.42	N/A	0.00	130,470,309	46.00	2,096,020	0.74	8,654,001	3.05	138,377,122	48.79
2009	285,863,734	4,170,317	1.46	N/A	0.00	134,190,094	46.94	2,985,220	1.04	2,575,554	0.90	141,942,549	49.65
<b>Average (\$)</b>		<b>3,214,130</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>113,478,000</b>		<b>1,816,640</b>		<b>3,782,290</b>		<b>121,709,000</b>	

Table A.23: Vietnam Agency Allocations, 2006-2009

Year	Country Total	DoD Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	DoL Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	HHS Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Peace Corps Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	State Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	USAID Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)
2006	34,069,000	1,875,000	5.50	N/A	0.00	11,866,000	34.83	N/A	0.00	N/A	0.00	20,328,000	59.67
2007	65,790,000	3,550,500	5.40	N/A	0.00	23,450,685	35.55	N/A	0.00	N/A	0.00	38,788,815	58.96
2008	88,855,000	5,377,200	6.05	N/A	0.00	34,166,539	38.45	N/A	0.00	1,300,000	1.46	48,011,261	54.03
2009	89,093,168	416,294	0.47	N/A	0.00	41,599,058	46.74	N/A	0.00	2,920,480	3.28	44,067,336	49.51
<b>Average (\$)</b>		<b>2,804,750</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>27,770,600</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>1,055,120</b>		<b>37,798,900</b>	

Table A.24: Zambia Agency Allocations, 2006-2009

Year	Country Total	DoD Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	DoL Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	HHS Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	Peace Corps Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	State Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)	USAID Allocation (\$)	Percent of Total (%)
2006	149,022,153	6,065,000	4.07	N/A	0.00	58,471,462	39.24	1,700,000	1.14	1,322,546	0.89	81,463,145	54.07
2007	216,012,780	5,593,929	2.58	N/A	0.00	83,189,522	38.51	2,100,000	0.97	1,285,000	0.60	123,874,329	57.35
2008	269,246,552	7,605,000	2.83	N/A	0.00	99,398,580	36.92	3,888,100	1.44	4,371,000	1.62	153,083,872	57.19
2009	270,371,388	7,855,000	2.91	N/A	0.00	101,426,337	37.51	3,388,100	1.25	2,868,489	1.06	154,833,462	57.27
<b>Average (\$)</b>		<b>6,772,230</b>		<b>0</b>		<b>85,621,500</b>		<b>2,769,050</b>		<b>2,461,760</b>		<b>128,539,000</b>	



## APPENDIX B

Appendix B includes the information used to create the graphs in Sections \_\_\_\_\_. The tables below include partner type amounts for those organizations obligated money<sup>5</sup> in the 32 PEPFAR Countries, 2004-2008<sup>6</sup> (Broken down into “Host Government Ministry,” “Smaller Host Government Agency,”<sup>7</sup> “International NGO/CBO/FBO,”<sup>9</sup> “Local NGO/CBO/FBO”<sup>11</sup>)<sup>12</sup><sup>13</sup><sup>14</sup><sup>15</sup><sup>16</sup>:

Table B.1 Breakdown of Partner Type, Per year, Per Country

Year	Country	Host Government Ministry	Smaller Host Government Agency	International NGO/CBO/FBO	Local NGO/CBO/FBO
2008	Angola	0	0	5	0
2004	Botswana	2	5	22	9
2005	Botswana	4	2	20	4
2006	Botswana	5	1	18	44

<sup>5</sup> This chart breaks the countries down by which organizations were obligated funds during each fiscal year, according to the “PEPFAR Partners” section of the website. See: “Partners.” The U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. <<http://www.pepfar.gov/partners/index.htm>>. (20 April 2010).

<sup>6</sup> Data for 2004-2008 is only available for PEPFAR’s 15 “Priority Countries” of PEPFAR I. There are 16 other PEPFAR countries that became partners in 2008. The information on 2008 partner types for Caribbean Regional (the thirty-second country in the agency information chart) is not available, most likely because Caribbean Regional became a PEPFAR partner country in 2009.

<sup>7</sup> Note that “Host Government Ministry” refers to a larger division of the government, while “Smaller Host Government Agency” refers to smaller government-run organizations such as specific HIV/AIDS health ministries or government-run hospitals, national and regional health centers, or universities. Both “Host Government Ministries” and “Smaller Host Government Agencies” can be either prime or subprime partners (and sometimes both, during the same year and/or from year to year).

<sup>8</sup> “Parastatal,” or quasi-government owned, organizations also fall under this category. An example of this would be a national medical institute.

<sup>9</sup> In this chart, an international organization that is in more than one PEPFAR country will be counted more than one time.

<sup>10</sup> Other possibilities for this category include international multi-lateral agencies such as the World Health Organization, international private contractors such as Chemonics International, non-PEPFAR US Government agencies such as the Defense Contract Auditing Agency, or international universities such as Harvard.

<sup>11</sup> Domestic private contractors also fall under this category.

<sup>12</sup> Money given to U.S. government agencies only is also excluded from this graph, as it is not relevant for this comparison. However, the “International NGO/FBO/CBO” category could include money given to other, non-PEPFAR agencies (as noted above).

<sup>13</sup> Prime and sub-prime partner titles are not specified because they are not relevant for this comparison, especially since international and local organizations can switch from being prime to subprime organizations depending on the country and can change sometimes even within a particular country.

<sup>14</sup> Classifications for each organization were found on the PEPFAR Data Funding spreadsheet obtained from the Center for Public Integrity.

<sup>15</sup> For the countries that joined on in 2008, their breakdowns are less accurate because they are not included in the most updated “PEPFAR funding data” spreadsheet that only goes through 2006. Many of the organizations’ names are in the native language, making it difficult to ascertain through the Internet whether they are international or local organizations.

<sup>16</sup> These numbers are estimates that are meant to depict general trends. There may be some inaccuracies due to the level of information available on the PEPFAR website.

2007	Botswana	3	0	30	15
2008	Botswana	3	1	31	11
2008	Cambodia	0	1	5	39
2008	China	1	12	6	3
2004	Cote d'Ivoire	5	1	15	17
2005	Cote d'Ivoire	4	1	16	16
2006	Cote d'Ivoire	4	1	17	28
2007	Cote d'Ivoire	5	1	23	67
2008	Cote d'Ivoire	4	5	29	40
2008	Dominican Republic	1	0	1	0
2008	Democratic Republic of Congo	0	3	9	5
2004	Ethiopia	3	6	14	3
2005	Ethiopia	2	4	27	2
2006	Ethiopia	3	3	35	15
2007	Ethiopia	4	7	49	42
2008	Ethiopia	4	12	56	78
2008	Ghana	0	0	8	10
2004	Guyana	2	1	19	13
2005	Guyana	1	1	15	9
2006	Guyana	1	0	16	18
2007	Guyana	1	0	23	18
2008	Guyana	1	0	27	18
2004	Haiti	1	1	19	1
2005	Haiti	2	6	33	39
2006	Haiti	1	0	37	28
2007	Haiti	1	0	28	4
2008	Haiti	1	0	30	4
2008	India	0	15	15	104
2008	Indonesia	0	1	2	64
2004	Kenya	4	25	68	52
2005	Kenya	3	21	49	32
2006	Kenya	0	6	31	27
2007	Kenya	0	16	68	54
2008	Kenya	1	21	53	58
2008	Lesotho	0	0	20	7
2008	Malawi	0	2	5	3
2004	Mozambique	2	2	27	11
2005	Mozambique	2	1	30	26
<b>2006</b>	Mozambique	2	0	32	43
2007	Mozambique	2	1	49	103
2008	Mozambique	2	1	66	69
2004	Namibia	1	2	14	20

2005	Namibia	1	2	18	21
2006	Namibia	1	1	17	26
2007	Namibia	1	1	23	35
2008	Namibia	1	1	15	55
2004	Nigeria	1	27	35	52
2005	Nigeria	1	58	30	55
2006	Nigeria	0	92	32	62
2007	Nigeria	2	16817	54	146
2008	Nigeria	1	296	56	175
2008	Russia	0	1	16	22
2004	Rwanda	1	28	33	51
2005	Rwanda	1	50	22	43
2006	Rwanda	0	0	11	0
2007 <sup>18</sup>	Rwanda	2	52	25	28
2008	Rwanda	2	15	31	14
2004	South Africa	5 <sup>19</sup>	9	28	8
2005	South Africa	5	22	39	65
2006	South Africa	5	24	44	93
2007	South Africa	3	28	60	310
2008	South Africa	4	99	76	352
2008	Sudan	0	0	6	3
2008	Swaziland	0	0	20	11
2004	Tanzania	2	25	43	129
2005	Tanzania	2	16	42	42
2006	Tanzania	3	22	28	66
2007	Tanzania	2	66	38	101
2008	Tanzania	3	55	61	149
2008	Thailand	1	1	3	4
2004	Uganda	2	85	46	188
2005	Uganda	2	70	38	150
2006	Uganda	3	23	30	26
2007	Uganda	2	67	49	73

<sup>17</sup> Note: Nigeria's high number of "Smaller Host Government Agencies" is due to the proliferation of government-run hospitals that received PEPFAR funding during these years as "sub-prime partners."

<sup>18</sup> The spreadsheet containing the PEPFAR funding data from 2004-2006 shows that in Rwanda, there is no clear distinction in the naming between a health center is government-run and one that is privately run. The spreadsheet specifies which is which for 2004-2006, but for 2007 the numbers are largely estimates based on the number of health centers and the trends from the previous three years (aside from the centers that carried over from 2004-6 and could therefore accurately be labeled). In 2008, there were much fewer prime and subprime partners, and nearly every health district, center, or hospital that was listed could be found on the spreadsheet from 2004-2006.

<sup>19</sup> In South Africa, larger government agencies are referred to as "National Departments" rather than "Ministries."

2008	Uganda	3	19	48	138
2008	Ukraine	0	0	4	0
2004	Vietnam <sup>20</sup>	1	1	0	0
2005	Vietnam	1	17	23	28
2006	Vietnam	1	11	14	10
2007	Vietnam	2	10	24	9
2008	Vietnam	2	38	26	15
2004	Zambia	1 <sup>21</sup>	10	40	84
2005	Zambia	2	13	48	65
2006	Zambia	1	8	40	22
2007	Zambia	2	15	66	100
2008	Zambia	3	16	76	168
2008	Zimbabwe	0	3	8	1

Next, Table B.2 below breaks down prime partner types, including funding allocations, for 2004-2008 for the PEPFAR countries<sup>22,23,24</sup>:

Table B.2 Prime Partners in each PEPFAR I Country and their funding levels

Year	Country	Host Government Ministry		Smaller Host Government Agency		International NGO/CBO/FBO		Local NGO/CBO/FBO		Own Agency <sup>25</sup>	
		#	\$	#	\$	#	\$	#	\$	#	\$
2008	Angola	0	0	0	0	5	4,496,000	0	0	2	1,969,790
2004	Botswana	1	N/A	2	N/A	18	N/A	3	N/A	0	N/A
2005	Botswana	4	17,360,900	2	3,997,440	20	21,248,800	2	1,810,000	0	0
2006	Botswana	5	22,277,500	1	666,000	16	10,290,300	6	4,281,860	3	6,473,850
2007	Botswana	3	18,044,600	0	0	25	27,124,000	4	4,764,530	3	7,412,690
2008	Botswana	3	11,806,100	1	175,000	27	37,080,400	2	6,200,000	3	5,102,300
2008	Cambodia	0	0	1	54,955	4	5,186,460	1	2,192,715	3	2,199,050
2008	China	1	1,372,100	0	0	5	5,059,500	0	0	2	1,442,320

<sup>20</sup> Note: In 2004, Vietnam was not officially a PEPFAR focus country. Available at: [www.pepfar.gov/about/tables/countries/123496.htm](http://www.pepfar.gov/about/tables/countries/123496.htm)

<sup>21</sup> In addition to “Ministries,” Zambia has “Central boards” (e.g. Central boards of health) which are also included in this category.

<sup>22</sup> The same breakdowns apply for this chart when categorizing partner types, but a fifth category has been added: “Own Agency,” referring to PEPFAR agencies that are listed as prime partners on the PEPFAR website. This means that they are receiving PEPFAR funds that they are using themselves in-country. Within each of the 5 categories, there are sub-categories detailing the number of prime partners that fall under this category (the # column) and the total funding allocations to that particular partner type (the \$ column).

<sup>23</sup> As was the case for the cumulative partner types chart, only 31 of the 32 PEPFAR countries are included, and data from 2004-2008 is only available for PEPFAR I’s 15 “Priority” countries.

<sup>24</sup> Note: 2004 funding allocations are not listed on the website. They will be listed as N/A on the graph.

<sup>25</sup> For consistency, non-PEPFAR U.S. Government agencies will still be included under the “International NGO/CBO/FBO” category.

2004	Cote d'Ivoire	5	N/A	1	N/A	14	N/A	17 <sup>26</sup>	N/A	0	N/A
2005	Cote d'Ivoire	4	2,198,070	1	3,945,885	14	30,158,100	0	0	0	0
2006	Cote d'Ivoire	4	1,800,600	0	0	12	23,430,700	1	1,650,000	1	6,439,300
2007	Cote d'Ivoire	5	6,638,000	0	0	16	43,751,400	2	5,670,000	3	8,360,620
2008	Cote d'Ivoire	4	9,054,290	0	0	22	81,224,800	3	10,305,200	3	10,096,900
2008	Dominican Republic	0	0	0	0	1	225,000	0	0	3	1,437,720
2008	Democratic Republic of Congo	0	0	1	240,415	8	4,960,340	0	0	3	1,087,910
2004	Ethiopia	3	N/A	5	N/A	13	N/A	0	N/A	0	N/A
2005	Ethiopia	2	390,000	4	3,627,530	27	61,480,600	2	475,000	0	0
2006	Ethiopia	3	713,818	3	1,345,000	27	64,837,600	2	1,625,000	2	9,150,300
2007	Ethiopia	3	2,330,000	5	6,893,250	35	133,784,000	3	2,815,000	4	7,819,310
2008	Ethiopia	3	8,414,400	5	11,294,600	28	147,055,000	4	5,198,730	3	4,136,250
2008	Ghana	0	0	3	2,250,000	0	0	0	0	2	51,400
2004	Guyana	2	N/A	1	N/A	15	N/A	0	N/A	0	N/A
2005	Guyana	1	379,947	1	1,465,615	12	14,274,700	0	0	0	0
2006	Guyana	1	330,585	0	0	12	13,835,200	0	0	4	2,117,590
2007	Guyana	1	1,359,970	0	0	17	21,909,900	0	0	4	2,896,510
2008	Guyana	1	892,000	0	0	22	17,065,900	1	2,801,915	3	2,036,020
2004	Haiti	1	N/A	1	N/A	19	N/A	1	N/A	0	N/A
2005	Haiti	1	2,055,000	1	2,480,270	25	33,997,200	5	3,569,000	0	0
2006	Haiti	1	2,270,000	0	0	20	34,597,500	4	4,940,000	2	505,000
2007	Haiti	1	9,845,000	0	0	19	40,742,200	4	8,412,080	2	1,692,300
2008	Haiti	1	15,360,000	0	0	26	36,259,300	4	12,685,000	2	5,128,030
2008	India	0	0	1	5,200,000	7	8,381,900	9	11,984,100	2	2,615,570
2008	Indonesia	0	0	0	0	2	7,187,230	0	0	1	500,000
2004	Kenya	1	N/A	14	N/A	50	N/A	9	N/A	0	N/A
2005	Kenya	0	0	11	4,746,590	34	45,784,800	4	133,686	0	0
2006	Kenya	0	0	6	18,371,600	38	30,634,800	5	34,340,000	3	8,097,170
2007	Kenya	0	0	5	28,368,400	44	126,602,000	5	23,576,200	2	9,834,940
2008	Kenya	0	0	5	36,724,800	34	86,146,800	3	9,805,000	3	10,131,700
2008	Lesotho	0	0	0	0	12	7,551,670	0	0	2	376,208
2008	Malawi	0	0	2	375,426	5	2,849,900	3	690,997	3	362,137
200	Mozambique	1	N/A	2	N/A	23	N/A	11	N/A	0	N/A

<sup>26</sup> I suspect that an error on the website is responsible for this high number.

4	e										
2005	Mozambique	2	6,155,800	1	1,724,915	28	36,511,900	3	3,313,800	0	0
2006	Mozambique	2	1,551,000	0	0	27	56,815,300	1	2,800,802	4	8,477,160
2007	Mozambique	2	600,000	0	0	30	67,880,100	2	4,939,730	4	5,959,970
2008	Mozambique	2	900,000	0	0	40	177,475,000	3	4,558,530	4	19,395,200
2004	Namibia	1	N/A	2	N/A	12	N/A	0	N/A	0	N/A
2005	Namibia	1	3,149,123	2	4,183,780	15	25,932,200	2	3,461,440	0	0
2006	Namibia	1	10,694,098	1	965,066	15	25,170,600	3	6,757,030	4	2,368,430
2007	Namibia	1	16,637,434	1	1,644,500	20	39,539,600	3	12,882,800	5	4,315,010
2008	Namibia	1	17,596,263	1	1,961,000	13	37,335,000	3	14,824,400	4	5,544,540
2004	Nigeria	1	N/A	2	N/A	23	N/A	1	N/A	0	N/A
2005	Nigeria	0	0	1	1,826,380	19	57,704,000	0	0	0	0
2006	Nigeria	0	0	0	0	16	91,109,200	1	175,000	5	13,938,700
2007	Nigeria	1	3,500,000	0	0	27	226,839,000	0	0	2	12,364,800
2008	Nigeria	0	0	0	0	26	307,380,000	2	2,682,000	2	7,859,820
2008	Russia	0	0	0	0	14	10,639,700	0	0	2	390,000
2004	Rwanda	1	N/A	1	N/A	29	N/A	0	N/A	0	N/A
2005	Rwanda	0	0	2	4,167,770	19	39,278,700	0	0	0	0
2006	Rwanda	0	0	0	0	11	29,346,200	0	0	1	1,993,000
2007	Rwanda	0	0	1	2,700,000	20	65,764,400	0	0	2	8,372,500
2008	Rwanda	1	600,000	3	5,254,040	29	78,774,600	0	0	3	9,966,220
2004	South Africa	4	N/A	7	N/A	30	N/A	6	N/A	0	N/A
2005	South Africa	3	5,738,930	11	24,030,800	36	72,371,700	15	16,772,600	0	0
2006	South Africa	4	6,025,910	13	38,633,100	36	85,414,700	21	46,161,000	2	11,772,800
2007	South Africa	3	8,013,440	8	38,722,800	43	166,160,000	33	72,800,000	5	11,726,500
2008	South Africa	3	8,241,360	15	83,781,400	52	260,509,000	44	154,767,000	4	17,446,700
2008	Sudan	0	0	0	0	4	3,187,000	0	0	1	261,687
2008	Swaziland	0	0	0	0	11	8,358,430	1	150,000	4	2,512,730
2004	Tanzania	1	N/A	5	N/A	33	N/A	6	N/A	0	N/A
2005	Tanzania	1	1,649,562	11	13,596,000	30	68,209,200	2	795,000	0	0
2006	Tanzania	2	1,690,000	5	3,894,900	22	35,966,700	1	300,000	3	4,380,110
2007	Tanzania	2	2,112,500	4	7,245,340	23	38,943,100	1	770,000	2	6,158,660
2008	Tanzania	2	3,015,680	5	8,933,950	40	126,785,000	3	5,486,650	2	3,643,040
2008	Thailand	1	1,409,821	1	220,000	2	1,171,900	0	0	2	2,947,580



200 4	Uganda	1	N/A	9	N/A	29	N/A	20 27	N/A	0	N/A
200 5	Uganda	1	2,085,000	6	16,755,400	35	58,896,000	6	30,312,400	0	0
200 6	Uganda	1	2,575,000	6	13,621,200	29	45,011,700	6	37,345,700	5	14,933,900
200 7	Uganda	1	3,445,196	6	20,541,500	28	63,511,100	4	16,777,100	2	12,983,100
200 8	Uganda	1	5,503,453	5	28,138,500	28	60,653,300	8	34,917,700	2	6,003,200
200 8	Ukraine	0	0	0	0	4	2,884,970	0	0	2	204,059
200 4	Vietnam <sup>28</sup>	1	N/A	1	N/A	0	N/A	0	N/A	0	N/A
200 5	Vietnam	1	1,711,320	2	1,255,560	14	14,222,800	0	0	0	0
200 6	Vietnam	0	0	0	0	10	16,764,900	0	0	3	3,243,000
200 7	Vietnam	2	8,864,270	3	5,590,620	16	37,281,800	0	0	3	9,206,500
200 8	Vietnam	2	15,796,200	3	8,529,950	12	31,644,100	0	0	3	4,262,250
200 4	Zambia	1	N/A	5	N/A	33	N/A	0	N/A	0	N/A
200 5	Zambia	1	205,000	6	1,361,580	37	104,340,000	1	145,000	0	0
200 6	Zambia	1	200,000	7	1,737,320	36	91,943,300	3	402,460	4	9,682,000
200 7	Zambia	1	1,150,000	10	5,231,000	45	147,688,000	2	245,000	4	11,506,200
200 8	Zambia	1	100	9	9,165,180	45	199,406,000	1	500,000	3	12,926,500
200 8	Zimbabwe	0	0	2	560,000	5	16,760,000	0	0	3	4,496,830

<sup>27</sup> I suspect that an error on the website is responsible for this high number.

<sup>28</sup> Note: In 2004, Vietnam was not officially a PEPFAR focus country. [Source: "Vietnam PEPFAR Program Results." *The U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief*. Available at: [www.pepfar.gov/about/tables/countries/123496.htm](http://www.pepfar.gov/about/tables/countries/123496.htm)]