The Impact of September 11th on European Security and Defense Policy and Coercive Prevention: The German Perspective

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INTRODUCTION

Upon entering office, the newly elected Bush Administration put issues such as missile defense on top of its foreign and security policy agenda. However, given transatlantic discourse up to the attacks of September 11th, topics like the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) still seemed relevant to partners on both sides of the Atlantic. This paper shall argue that while the focus of conflict prevention lies in the prevention of the outbreak of violence, preventive diplomacy and its coercive elements also strive at preventing further regional escalation and the re-occurrence of violence. In that sense, conflict prevention is strongly linked with post-conflict peacekeeping. Transatlantic relations, particularly in the late 1990s, served as a context to organize and coordinate peacekeeping in the Balkans, with the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as the main diplomatic, political, and economic platforms in the absence of corresponding UN mandates.

How are transatlantic relations relevant to the topic of conflict prevention? Given European interest in institutionalizing conflict prevention within the bodies of the EU in the second half of the 1990s, they do matter. While there were intentions to incorporate conflict prevention within the Council of Ministers, today within the EU, conflict prevention is a strong focus of the EU Commission. To mainstream conflict prevention, cooperation between the High Representative of EU Foreign and Security Policy on the one side and the EU Commission on the other side seems necessary to successfully link issues of conflict prevention with the common foreign and security policy of the EU. Also, given peacekeeping missions within Europe, like the Balkans in the 1990s—be they more or less robust—the close coordination between allies, either within the EU or NATO, proved essential. While the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) have been NATO
missions, European or EU member countries contributed increasingly to peacekeeping throughout the Balkans, with the U.S. role decreasing as years went by. Transatlantic relations as an issue of real politik also mattered as to how non-EU NATO members, such as Turkey, cooperated with non-NATO EU members, such as Sweden, in post-conflict reconstruction and peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia.

It can be concluded that transatlantic relations are of relevance for how Europe and North America deal with humanitarian crises, such as large-scale intra-state conflicts or other global threats. Given September 11th, such threats arguably concern the global war against terrorism. Before September 11th changed parameters for transatlantic relations, U.S. presidential elections in November 2000 already had an impact on European-U.S., and in particular on German-U.S. relations.

This article will provide information, on how some European countries, specifically Germany, may have hoped for the EU to play a stronger role in conflict prevention in the 1990s, while establishing a common European foreign and security policy, including ESDP. The paper will argue that Germany, by “hiding behind the EU,” risks not fulfilling its responsibility as a crucial ally in the EU and NATO when it comes to the application of (coercive) preventive diplomacy, as in the case of Iraq. The paper will in this regard take recent developments in German-U.S. relations into account.

I. METHODOLOGY

Originally, this paper was based on research regarding the role of perceptions in bilateral relations, between Germany and the U.S. Corresponding research started in the summer 2000, several months before the U.S. presidential elections in November 2000. The overall goal was, to examine conflict manifestations on multiple policy issues of global relevance and of mutual interest to both Germany and the U.S. Research focused upon U.S. expectations for its allies, such as Germany and other EU member states, to share more of the burden in crisis areas, e.g., the Balkans.

Having analyzed German-U.S. relations in recent years, the following phases were identified: the pre-Bush phase, the Bush phase, and the post-September 11th Bush phase. Policy issues of particular interest generally concerned U.S. leadership, the role of NATO, and contributions by the EU and Germany.

A. During the pre-Bush phase, the following policy issues were addressed: the long-term stabilization in the Balkans and a common European foreign and security policy, including the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Relevant questions concerned U.S. expectations for Germany as an ally and partner in NATO and the EU, and German reflection of such expectations. The aftermath of Kosovo could be characterized by European uneasiness about U.S. dominance in contrast to U.S. uneasiness about European unwillingness or incapability to act without the U.S. in the Balkans.
B. The *Bush phase* lasted from presidential elections in November 2000 to September 11, 2001, including the two visits of President Bush to Europe in the early summer of 2001. The main case studies were missile defense and NATO enlargement. The following question was highlighted: would the “display of charm” by President Bush during his first European visits convince Europeans, particularly the Germans, about U.S. commitment to the world and continued consultation with allies about the importance of these issues?7

Before these visits, it seemed likely that the Bush Administration might need Germany in NATO, especially given Germany’s long-standing partnership with France and its good relations with Vladimir Putin in Russia. However, this did not turn out to be the case: The Bush Administration was warmly welcomed by Spain and Italy, and Britain, once saddened about the end of the special Clinton-Blair axis, had already turned around. Furthermore, the sudden reconciliation between President Putin and President Bush on NATO enlargement and missile defense came as a surprise to German political elites—or rather disillusion. Having charmed Britain, Spain, and Italy, the core assumption needed to be changed: the Bush Administration could easily bypass Germany and France, the latter of which had worked closely with the U.S. in Macedonia. The continuing flare-up of anti-Bush and anti-American sentiment in German news and journals threatened to isolate Germany with regard to its relations to the U.S. This conclusion was already drawn in July to August 2001, and served as a starting point for further analysis post-September 11th.

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C. The *post-September 11th Bush phase* began on September 11, 2001 when parameters defining transatlantic and German-U.S. relations changed one more time since the end of the Cold War. Issues of potential tensions, like the Kyoto Protocol, the Balkan syndrome, missile defense, or burden sharing, suddenly were not on top of the transatlantic agenda anymore. Germany declared its post-World War II era over and NATO was confronted with its first case of collective defense.

NATO had not yet officially declared it would renew its relationship with Russia. However, by fall 2001, “*NATO forever transformed*” became the major case study of this research project.8 All former case studies could be subsumed under NATO’s peace-enforcing, peacemaking, and peacekeeping roles. NATO has been a considerable player in Kosovo and Macedonia. It would be judicious to further relations with Russia and to
address the war against global terrorism. The September meeting of NATO Ambassadors in Poland of September 2002 further highlighted the ongoing transformation of NATO. How to keep NATO relevant and how to streamline its command structures in anticipation of further enlargement were an impressive prelude to the NATO Summit in Prague of November 2002. NATO’s Transformation Declaration of October 6, 2002, stated NATO would go global where the threat was based on UN resolutions. The U.S. proposal to create a NATO reaction force, which was agreed upon at NATO’s November Summit in Prague, will clearly have an impact on EU rapid reaction forces. It might render European reaction forces almost irrelevant, since NATO reaction forces would cover both soft and hard power missions, including civil or humanitarian crisis intervention, peacekeeping, and fighting global terrorism. Germany is likely to be one of the unhappier countries about this development. While Britain had always perceived ESDP as being incorporated into NATO, Germany may have regarded ESDP as the ultimate soft-power alternative to NATO. Furthermore, France has always been suspicious about U.S. leadership in NATO.

What domestic constraints exist for Germany’s current government coalition?

In the post-September 11th Bush phase, the following questions were relevant: what will happen to foreign and security policy, a potential source of conflict between Germany and the U.S., in the long run? Will German-U.S. relations be strengthened by September 11th? What can Germany contribute to a coalition against terrorism and a multinational peacekeeping force? What domestic constraints exist for Germany’s current government coalition?

II. THE ROLE OF (COERCIVE) PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY—FROM A GERMAN PERSPECTIVE

Figure 1 illustrates the concept of a wider field of prevention. It refers to hard and soft power intervention and includes both short-term and long-term measures.

To be more specific, the model on the wider field of conflict prevention considers the following two types of potential activities by a variety of actors:

- First, short-term (military) intervention to stop violence or genocide and to enforce peace;
- Second, long-term transformation of a conflict-habituated system into a peace system with a partnership culture.

The two categories of potential activities pose challenges to actors dealing with conflict prevention. Using Bruce Jentleson’s definition of coercive prevention, Jane
Holl presents a “model for preventing the re-emergence of violence”, whereas the Institute for Multi-track Diplomacy (IMTD) presents a “model to transform conflicts”. The two elements of intervention and transformation are linked in theory and practice; and according to John McDonald of the IMTD, “the so-called exit strategy the U.S. military keeps talking about and looking for, will only work, when the departing U.S. troops are able to leave behind a peaceful community.”

Scholars and practitioners in international relations or conflict and peace research have highlighted a shift from the power politics of the Cold War era to acknowledging the relevance of human needs, while dealing with ethnic conflicts in the post-Cold War world. More than a decade after the end of the Cold War, an end of history did not come true. The end of a bipolar world did not usher in a new era of global consensus. While using the threat of force and considering its application as a last resort to prevent further escalation of violence, the reluctance of the international community to respond early to crises in Rwanda and Bosnia showed the essential question to be how to get from early warning to early action.

The intervention in Kosovo to stop ongoing violence and to rebuild a war-torn society may illustrate that policy concepts focusing on human needs and the long-term transformation of a conflict-habituated system may not necessarily be exclusive to realist policy approaches. The bipolar model supports this argument. In that sense, the impact of all violent conflict is such that it cannot be ignored. Means of real politick, such as enforcement, and of non-violence, such as civil crisis management, may be two sides of the same coin.
The Marshall Plan in post-World War II Europe allowed Germany to transform its political system while being safeguarded militarily by a strong U.S. commitment; this fact should make the reunified Germany a committed regional key player within the EU and NATO. Given the historical experience of a complex reconstruction process that comprised economic, political, and military elements, Germany has the potential to contribute more to complex crises and post-settlement peace processes.

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For Germany, however, the contributions in question should not exclusively be economic or political. They also need to focus on the military dimension, which guarantees safety during and after interventions, as well as throughout a long-term peace process. It is precisely the history of Germany that enables it to play a constructive and active role with its allies in the context of NATO and other regional organizations. With regard to a future role of the EU in crisis management, Ambassador Vos argued in 2000 that the U.S. Administration feared “a future division of labor between EU and NATO.” Additionally, a crisis situation in Europe in which the United States was either “unable or unwilling to intervene in the aftermath of Kosovo seemed not unrealistic any more.” It was also possible that “the U.S. is willing to take part, but on a modest scale only, leaving the Europeans to assume the lead.” In the words of Vos, Europe “must be willing and able to shoulder that responsibility.”

During a speech in the German Bundestag on June 8, 2000, designed to prolong German contribution to an international security presence in Kosovo, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer stressed that it was “remarkable...how many Germans [German soldiers] in the meantime are actively involved on a community level, for example in the rebuilding of local administrations. A lot of them reported to United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and took over tasks in the civilian context and are assisting in rebuilding local administrative structures.” In addition, in spite of the difficulties, this was “an excellent commitment,” which showed that a “complex approach of crisis management with regard to the military-civilian interface for the rebuilding of democracy and rule of law is imperative.” Such a commitment also was a “precondition for the success of the Stability Pact in South Eastern Europe,” which represented a “complex response of Europe following the crises and wars in the Balkans.” According to McDonald, a playground of a multi-ethnic kindergarten in Srpska Sarajevo made by German SFOR troops was a concrete example of a well-functioning civil-military interface in practice. Unfortunately, the U.S. military was “not allowed this flexibility and is prevented from becoming involved in local community issues.”

Given this reality, a high degree of professionalization and specialization within
a modern army is vital. The challenges in question concern the establishment of security after an intervention and throughout a long-term reconstruction and peace process. Corresponding training is also very important, and should include a variety of actors from both civilian and military organizations, drawing upon the theoretical and practical expertise of those actors. The closest possible cooperation between actors concerns the civil-military interface, crucial in any post-settlement process. Additionally, in the immediate aftermath of military interventions to enforce peace, NGOs seem to share “with members of the military community a commitment to service, a willingness to work abroad among the dead and dying and also an acceptance of significant risk in their daily lives.” A concerted and efficient safeguarding of peace throughout any reconstruction process is essential: “Aid group quits Kosovo as violence continues.” For example, because of continuing violence, the Belgian branch of the humanitarian aid organization Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) was “pulling out of Kosovo, accusing the international forces of failing to prevent ‘ethnic cleansing.’” It was more than a year since UNMIK and KFOR “took over the civil and military administration.” Belgian teams of the medical relief agency, in charge of medical and mental health problems, were “eyewitnesses to the daily harassment and terror against the Serb minority in Vucitrn and Srbica and the ethnic Albanian minority in north Mitrovica.”

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The following conclusions can be drawn concerning the wider field of conflict prevention. During the Cold War, two antagonistic superpowers determined foreign and security policy deliberations. Everything was overshadowed by the nuclear threat or weapons proliferation. Pacifism seemed to offer an alternative in such a dangerous environment, particularly for non-sovereign Germany occupied by Allied forces, divided and traumatized by the Holocaust and World War II. On the other side, the Brezhnev Doctrine seemed to justify intervention by the Soviet Union within the territory of any one of its members, whenever forces hostile to socialism threatened its ideological alignment. In the post-Cold War era, NGOs seemed to have stepped into the vacuum, left by an international system that may not yet have “the structures to cope appropriately with intra-state conflicts, like in Bosnia.” The intervention of NATO on behalf of the international community in Kosovo—given that the UN Security Council was blocked—can be interpreted as a breakthrough in this respect. It had the potential to change paradigms of foreign and security policy, as well as conflict and peace research. Consequently, in late spring 1999, British Prime Minister Tony Blair proclaimed a “bold new international doctrine that would justify outside military intervention in the internal affairs of governments such as Yugoslavia.” His Doctrine of International Community argued, “National
sovereignty is less important than human rights and preventing genocide.” Acts of genocide could “never be a purely internal matter.” Five tests for intervention were given: “First, are we sure of the case? Second, have we exhausted diplomatic options?” Third, were military operations sensible? Fourth, are parties prepared for the long term? Fifth, are national interests involved? How could and should such an approach apply to the post-September 11th phase and to crises like Iraq?

In the aftermath of Kosovo, it seemed policy approaches in the context of preventive diplomacy should not be defined as the ultimate alternative to coercive means or military intervention in violent intra-state conflicts. The use of threat and its application as last resort seemed to prevent further violence escalation and genocide. Consequently, the wider field of conflict prevention does include the use of threat or force. As explained before, it consists of short-term intervention to stop ongoing violence or to enforce the peace, as well as long-term peace building to transform a conflict-habituated system. More importantly, rather than, “Will we have to intervene everywhere?” the question becomes “Where does it make sense to intervene?” The use of threat and its application to end violence or safeguard a fragile peace settlement could be regarded as an intrinsic component to successfully prevent the widening of violent intra-state conflicts.

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This seems to challenge the very roots of pacifism—particularly in Germany, where a coalition of Social Democrats and Greens ended up supporting NATO intervention in Kosovo, as Joffe pointed out in “Where Germany Never Was.” An article in the Washington Post read, “Pacifist German Turns Hawkish on Serbs.” Fischer was

[O]nce a revolutionary and a pacifist. As a youth, he opposed the Vietnam War. But today, as German Foreign Minister, he argues passionately that for the first time since World War II, Germany has no choice but to use military force alongside its NATO allies to defeat Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević and his regime.

Fischer, who did not rule out the use of NATO ground forces in the Kosovo conflicts, argued “that fighting this war will help Germany overcome its reluctance to assert itself, a hesitancy that is a legacy of its Nazi past.” Interviewed at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Fischer said, “Germans of his generation learned two lessons from World War II.” One was never again war, the other never again Auschwitz. In Kosovo, Fischer concluded, “These two notions could not be reconciled.” It was a contradiction, “but we have to live with it.” With regard to pacifism, Fischer argued that there were “other values than pacifism.”
III. GERMAN-U.S. RELATIONS FROM PRE-BUSH PHASE TO BUSH PHASE

A. Emerging challenges and important questions by the end of the pre-Bush phase

With regard to European-U.S. or German-U.S. relations, in the aftermath of Kosovo one major challenge for any U.S. administration seemed to be how to draw on the potential of Germany. Positioned at the heart of Europe, Germany seemed to have keys to U.S.-Russian and U.S.-French relations. It furthermore appeared Germany might be willing and able to use its influence to push Turkey to advance constitutional and democratic reforms. Continued U.S. leadership and commitment to Europe that acknowledges European sensitivities remains a prerequisite for a reunified Germany to mature into its growing role in Europe, notwithstanding the "Croatia-effect" that had left Germany isolated in the EU during the early Balkan crises. In that sense, a Europe fully safe and free, including Central and Eastern European countries, still remained a core American interest.

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B. European-U.S. and German-U.S. relations in the Bush phase.

So, how had European-U.S. and German-U.S. relations developed from pre-Bush to Bush? By late 2000, after the presidential elections, U.S. Senator Biden already spoke of an unholy symbiosis, in which two seemingly unrelated developments on both sides of the Atlantic—that threatened to feed on each other—seriously jeopardized “the continued military engagement of the United States in Europe.”47 In the words of Antony Blinken, however, all talk about such “phony crisis in relations only makes it more difficult to tap the full potential of the transatlantic partnership.”48

According to Paula Dobriansky and David Rivkin,

*The United States can and must maintain a first-rate military establishment capable of fighting and winning wars. President Bush articulated this fundamental truth in stating that the core U.S. strategic mission is to deter war by preparing to win swiftly and decisively.*49

In the words of Angela Stent, Germany had understood that with regard to ESDP, "the NATO link is important, and that the Petersberg tasks"50 outlined by the EU are limited, since they still focus to a large degree on civil crisis management, and therefore on soft power."51 As Mary Hampton sees it, Europe's determination to enhance its own capability might unintentionally induce a reaction by the U.S. to become more unilateral. Although it would be beneficial to enhance European capability, and readiness for civil crisis management and peacekeeping operations, this would raise the possibility that U.S. forces were unnecessary, thereby raising the unilateralist tendencies in the U.S. military. *The U.S. military was opposed to soft..."
power interventions, as humanitarian interventions and parts of peacekeeping missions, in contrast to hard power interventions, or "winning a war."\textsuperscript{52}

Figure 2 illustrates this dilemma. It diagnoses an overall soft power acceptance, but hard power reluctance beyond some European countries, particularly Germany. On the other side, it highlights hard power acceptance, but a soft power reluctance by the U.S., the early hesitation by the Bush Administration to engage in nation building for example.

An important point of this paper is not whether there is a crisis in transatlantic relations or within organizations like NATO, but rather what are the challenges the transatlantic alliance faces today, how it can stay relevant, and how they may impact bilateral relations or attitudes.

In the aftermath of Kosovo, Europeans, and particularly Germans, discussed how military intervention by NATO could be avoided in the future. Upon entering power in fall 1998, the German government had made conflict prevention and civil crisis management core topics of its foreign policy.\textsuperscript{53} The Kosovo experience also reinforced the realization (beyond European governments) that Europe needed to be able to act without the U.S., in case the superpower hesitated to engage in either peacemaking or peacekeeping. This led to the formulation of the Petersberg tasks. Whether the ESDP would strengthen a common European foreign policy, or if it would lead to stronger European commitment and contribution to NATO, was discussed intensively by Allies before President Bush entered power. It has reached unprecedented urgency and relevance post September 11\textsuperscript{th}.
1. German Anti-Americanism and German/European Commitment to NATO

On the eve of Bush’s first visit to Europe in the early summer of 2001, it finally looked like the administration had “sharply changed course on a series of foreign policy issues, stepping up U.S. involvement in several volatile regions while seeking to ease concern among allies about American unilaterism.”54 However, by late April 2001, the Economist had diagnosed an overall “souring of European opinion on the U.S.”55 Accordingly, the Washington Post reported that the “opening policies of the Bush Administration on the Balkans, missile defense, and global warming”56 infuriated many European leaders and convinced some that the new president was pursuing not closer partnership but American unilaterism.57 European governments would “at times have their own political reasons to exaggerate U.S. bullying.”58 They were not, however, “imagining an inclination among some in the administration, to impose U.S. solutions while paying lip service to the value of American alliances.” One of the lessons of the first 100 days was that even “at times of undivided U.S. power, a president must listen to the world if he is to lead it.” American foreign policy in this era of globalization was shaped as much by “the pressures and demands of allies, trading partners, and adversaries as it is by domestic politics or decision making in Washington D.C.”59 When Michael Steiner,60 then Chief Diplomatic Aide to Chancellor Gerhard Schröder visited Washington, he was “surprised to find Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Advisor, telling him that he must be aware that the only way to get results from the Russians was to be tough with them.”61 Roger Cohen concluded62 that this was one “small example of the ways in which the Bush Administration seems to be out of step in its thinking with a European Union disinclined to reopen divisions on the Continent and generally more concerned about the quality of food and the environment than possible security threats from Moscow or North Korea.”63 However, the same argument could be made that some European nations were out of touch with certain foreign policy aspects of the Bush Administration. Germany did not anticipate that the meetings in Genoa and Lubljana might warm up relations between Putin and Bush, nor did they predict what positive impact it might have regarding disarmament.64

In the aftermath of Kosovo, Europeans, and particularly Germans, discussed how military intervention by NATO could be avoided in the future.

Consequently, depending on how the Bush Administration handled issues, such as missile defense or global warming, the transatlantic relationship—and German-U.S. relations65—might become more problematic. It might in fact lead to more anti-Americanism than expected, given the fact that both sides cooperated well in the mid and late 1990s. On the other side, exaggerations by the Europeans concerning their rapid reaction forces should have been avoided as well.

Rhetoric by European allies and the absence of U.S. leadership might enhance a division of labor, with the Europeans focusing on civil crisis management and the
U.S. exclusively on collective defense. Such a divide would neither be healthy for NATO, nor appropriate for the given operational and structural needs of any complex peace process. Karsten Voigt, at the Auswärtige Amt in Berlin argued that, “NATO always has been about collective defense.” ESDP enabled the Europeans to build capacities “next to the Americans,” stressing the Petersberg tasks. Most crises within European interest, such as the Balkans, needed “exactly that.” He could not imagine a potential conflict in Europe where more hard power security was necessary, or where peacekeeping had escalated into peacemaking or full war. This question was of particular interest given crises in Kosovo and Macedonia through 2000. It furthermore highlighted the continuing relevance of ESDP and the long-term stabilization in the Balkans.

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So could and would ESDP be more than a reflection of European uneasiness, after NATO had intervened in Kosovo? Does it represent more than an attempt to counterbalance U.S. hegemony, particularly by France and Germany, while being theoretically faced with the challenge of coercive prevention? As Dutch Ambassador Joris M. Vos pointed out, the aftermath of Kosovo left Europeans with the uneasy realization that EU had not been capable—even if willing—to intervene in Kosovo without the U.S. At the same time, it was apparent that the U.S. administration had faced serious difficulties a number of times in convincing Congress of the need for American intervention in European crises.

Strobe Talbott, former Deputy Secretary of State, poignantly described the American and European feelings about the ultimate verdict on Kosovo in a speech before the Royal Institute of International Relations in London:

Many Americans are saying: never again should the United States have to fly the lion’s share of the risky missions in a NATO operation and foot by far the biggest bill. On the other hand, many Europeans seem determined never again to feel quite so dominated by the U.S. as they did during Kosovo, or, for that matter, during Bosnia. In the next crisis—whatever, wherever and whenever it is—our allies want a say in the conduct of operations more nearly commensurate with the political onus that they bear in supporting the war. At least, no one, on either side, is complacent about the status quo.

2. Intra-European sensitivities

While European countries seemed to acknowledge the political and economic long-term challenges of a peace process—referring to the Stability Pact—certain countries like Germany still leave hard power security to the Americans. In the author’s post-doctoral research of 2000-2001, this was characterized as soft power acceptance and hard power reluctance on the part of Germany. In the case of the
Bush Administration, this could be paired with U.S. reluctance to soft power, peacekeeping, and nation building.\textsuperscript{75}

Does the United States need to enter into dialogue on equal footing with other countries, particularly with its European allies? Do the Europeans finally have to match their ambitions with resources? In any given case, a strong U.S. leadership that does not ignore intra-European sensitivities\textsuperscript{76}—meaning inter-European animosities and the incapability to speak with a common voice on the one side, and domestic constraints for national European governments on the other side—will be of benefit to the U.S. and its allies.

The Washington Post argued U.S. engagement with Europe remained critical to help stabilize Central and Eastern European countries. Europe’s uncertainty about the future of its relationship with the U.S. meant that NATO expansion would never occur if the initiative was left up to Europe.

The plan of German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder for a stronger European federation raises another major question: To what extent does the continued reduction of its national sovereignty represent an attempt to avoid security-related challenges Germany faces as regional key player in Europe?

In other words, has conflict prevention and ESDP been regarded by the German government as the ultimate soft-power alternatives to any hard power action (humanitarian or military intervention) in crises, be it peacekeeping that is more robust by a coalition of the willing, either on the basis of a UN or a NATO mandate?\textsuperscript{77}

In a speech at Georgetown University, Fischer stressed that further European integration was the “only logical consequence of Kosovo.” If Europe was to develop a common European foreign and security policy and to act decisively together, further integration was the solution. However, can the reduction of national sovereignty achieve such a goal?\textsuperscript{78} Given British and French reluctance to reduce their national sovereignty, the German proposal, though arguably creative, may not only be unrealistic, but also may increase distrust beyond its partners, even if the original intent of the plan may lie in Europeanizing German foreign policy. While it can be argued that Germany has been successful in pursuing its national interests within multilateralism, the reluctance to transparently formulate national interests, in addition to those of EU, may actually hinder trust building with its neighbors. An example of the clumsiness of German diplomacy is the government’s last minute push of a German citizen to be the next director of the International Monetary Fund. Considerable challenges remain for post-reunification Germany concern political leadership, vision, and the recruitment of its political elite.

IV. EUROPEAN/GERMAN-U.S. RELATIONS IN THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11\textsuperscript{TH} BUSH PHASE

Given intra-European sensitivities, American commitment to transatlantic relations, which has been the foundation of a prospering Europe with Germany as one of its power centers, continued to be important in the post-September 11\textsuperscript{th} era.
With regard to such U.S. leadership, the following four scenarios had been envisioned in the pre-Bush and Bush-phases: First, the U.S. does not lead and the EU is either unwilling or incapable of acting. This was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s. Second, the U.S. leads and the EU is not capable of doing it alone or to contribute significantly. This was apparent during the intervention in Kosovo. Third, the U.S. assumes and claims its leadership role and the EU develops its own security and defense capabilities. This might be the British concept of ESDP, which stresses the need for ESDP not to decouple from NATO. Such an arrangement would very likely strengthen NATO and cause the transatlantic relationship to become more interrelated with further European integration. Fourth, the U.S. does not lead, and the EU continues to develop its own security and defense policy. This carries the risk of ESDP being perceived, at least by some European countries, as independent from NATO. Such a scenario might also lead to a sustainable division of labor between NATO and the EU. France has tried for many years to develop European hard power capabilities separately from NATO. Germany—with its strong pacifist tradition as a domestic constraint—may well have been tempted by ESDP providing an ultimate soft power alternative to NATO hard power collective defense.79 How would these four scenarios play out in a world after September 11, 2001?

A. Questions about German-U.S. relations in the post-September 11th Bush phase

In the aftermath of September 11th, Europeans and Germans asked themselves, “Are we all Americans?”80 What would happen to the foreign and security policy
issues that had the potential to cause misunderstandings between Germany and the U.S.? Will German-U.S. relations be strengthened by the events of September 11th? What can Germany contribute to a coalition against terrorism and a multinational peacekeeping force? What will happen to its concept or policy of (coercive) conflict prevention? Would it have to shift (more) from soft to hard power? What domestic constraints exist for Germany’s current government coalition? For the Germans, one challenge seemed to be clear: they had to acknowledge and shoulder more hard power responsibility. Ultimately after September 11th, Americans acknowledged their need for allies, and ever since then, expressed the wish for creating new alliances and strengthening old ones. The *U.S. National Strategy Report* published in September 2002 demonstrates this.

**Germany—with its strong pacifist tradition as a domestic constraint—may well have been tempted by ESDP providing an ultimate soft power alternative to NATO hard power collective defense.**

Another crucial question has been whether September 11th would strengthen European commitment in NATO, OR a common European foreign and security policy. The fact that Turkey took over the lead of the International Stabilization Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) peacekeeping troops reflected the strengthening of NATO: Turkey is in NATO and not in the EU. After the Prague Summit of November 2002, it seemed NATO was strengthened further. The agreed upon creation of a NATO reaction force should lead to more European contribution to NATO. Figure 3 provides an overview of important questions that outline the context for current and future transatlantic engagement.

As the current debate on possible war against Iraq shows, these questions have not lost their relevance since the ultimate aftermath of September 11th. Regarding Iraq, the argument could be made that a NATO and EU member can definitively have an overall impact on the Alliance, as Germany influencing France, Russia, and Turkey. Nothing exemplified that more than the recent blockage of NATO over the delivery of defensive weapons to Turkey.

**B. Core hypotheses in German-U.S. relations in the post-September 11th Bush phase**

In research conducted for the Bush phase, the overall assumption was of a soft power acceptance but hard power reluctance by certain European countries like Germany. In contrast, while Bush argued during his presidential election campaign that the role of the U.S. army was exclusively to win wars rather than carry out peacekeeping, *such statement might likely prove unrealistic in post-Taliban Afghanistan. For any peace process, not only the war, but also the peace needs to be won.* Figure 4 highlights the change in assumptions from the Bush to the post-September 11th Bush phase.

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The following conclusions could be drawn regarding U.S. leadership and a German contribution as ally and partner in all three phases:

- **During the pre-Bush phase**, the U.S. administration was pro-nation building in Bosnia and Kosovo. Germany, on the other hand, still showed a relatively strong anti-war attitude. Still, during the Kosovo intervention, Germany’s Joschka Fischer struggled to draw a line between the principle of no more war against no more genocide; 83

- During the Bush phase, the new administration claimed to be against nation building and in early September 2001—just before the September 11th attacks—even threatened to not favor the prolongation of NATO’s mandate in Macedonia. Germany showed a relatively strong pro-interventionist attitude towards the crisis in Macedonia, even though Britain and France clearly took the lead then within EU;

- **In the post-September 11th Bush phase**, the U.S. administration may not be able to avoid nation building in its global war against terrorism. For Germany, Gerhard Schröder offered military support to the U.S. and its war.

  To what extent Europe, and particularly Germany, would support the U.S. if the war stretched to other countries or lingered on, promised to be interesting throughout the post-September 11th Bush phase. Recent tensions on Iraq seem to confirm that assumption.

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**Bush argued during his presidential election campaign that the role of the U.S. army was exclusively to win wars rather than carry out peacekeeping.**

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**C. German-U.S. relations with regard to Iraq**

German Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger characterized the German-U.S. relationship post-September 11th in the following way: “I cannot remember a time when that relation was better.” Upon arriving in Washington in July 2001, the relationship had not been that good. “Your president was not given such a good description in the European media. We were faced with many problems, like the Kyoto protocol. After September 11th, I am faced with second-rate problems.”84

He has suggested to the U.S. administration: “Being a world power brings many blessings. The question is not, how can you avoid to be hated, but how can you soften things? Whenever you intervene, you will hurt somebody’s interest. You cannot avoid that. The recipe—from a German perspective—is: what you did in post-World War II era in Germany and Japan. The UN was your creation. Use them! Set good examples. You’ll get maximum respect and maybe some love.”

This concerned the ultimate aftermath of September 11th. It is important to stress that while Ischinger made these positive comments, the German government...
throughout December 2001 already provided contradictory signals. Germany’s Social-Democratic and Green government coalition refused to take over the lead for the multinational peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. Berlin thereby frustrated not only Washington, but also London. In early January 2002, German news was occupied by the resignation of Italy’s Foreign Minister Silvio Berlusconi, which according to Fischer meant considerable damage to European integration, while Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar showed full comprehension for the decision of Berlusconi. By late January, the “inhumane treatment” of captives in Guantanamo dominated German news. It was suggested that the “terror shock” had made the U.S. “blind towards the rule of law.” Bush’s State of the Union address and Schröder’s visit to Washington—to explain Germany’s refusal to take the peacekeeping lead in Afghanistan—both dominated German media by the end of January. The “axis of evil” caused considerable cynicism in German newspapers and magazines. The Süddeutsche Zeitung, for example, expressed sympathy for the German Chancellor visiting Washington DC: “Poor Gerhard Schröder. It can’t be easy being the first grumpy European to appear at the throne of the freshly appointed American Cesar.” “We won’t be treated as satellites,” cried Fischer, referring to Bush’s stand on Iraq. Germany again expressed distress about U.S. hegemony and there was much talk about “NATO being badly damaged” and “the break apart of transatlantic relations.” In the U.S., a New York Times headline summarized international perceptions of Bush’s State of the Union address: “Many in Europe Voice Worry U.S. Will Not Consult Them.”

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Soft power acceptance & hard power reluctance by the Europeans? Hard power acceptance & soft power reluctance by the US? Still after Sep 11, 2001?
Josef Joffe, a German journalist and an expert on Germany, provided the following diagnosis in an article of the German weekly Die Zeit: “Europe mobilizes against the U.S.: Germany’s Joschka Fischer and his colleague, Rezzo Schlauch, hold the Americans responsible for their own—the Germans’—feeling of helplessness. Doing so, they reaffirm what they want to fend off.”

Accordingly, The Economist asked: “Must America soon decide whether to deal with terrorists and weapons of mass destruction in partnership with Europe, or alone?” The secret policy review of the Pentagon on nuclear weapons caused considerable alarm in Germany.

During interviews in Berlin at the German think tank Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik, three of four experts on the U.S. shared the following view: “Global terrorism concerns the U.S., not Germany and not Europe.” Theoretically, a slightly different conclusion may have been drawn with the attack on German citizens in Djerba, Tunisia. In another interview, the desk officer for the EU at the German Embassy in DC, expressed: “What concerns Iraq, we’re just not playing as the U.S. wishes us to do!” Israel and Iraq clearly emerged as major conflict issues in the fourth phase.

By hiding behind Europe, Germany continues to “Europeanize” its foreign policy, thereby “Germanizing” the European Union.

In a speech by Lord Robertson at NATO headquarters in Brussels, he stressed, “NATO at 20” would go global, where the threat was. The main impact of September 11th was NATO enlargement and the NATO-Russia Council. NATO as a diplomatic platform was transforming to face new challenges.

While a representative of the German Defense Ministry concluded, “the review of NATO priorities was necessary,” a representative of the Foreign Relations Committee to the German Bundestag criticized U.S. commitment to NATO: “Rumsfeld’s statement ‘the mission determines the coalition, and not the coalition the mission’ only means that the U.S. is not supporting NATO enough.”

It is fair to conclude that perceptions of threat in Germany and the U.S. are very different. The political leadership in Germany has not articulated that Germany or Europe was at war or in a warlike situation. However, given the 3900 troops contributed to Enduring Freedom off the Somali coast, the 1200 that are part of ISAF, and the 600 German Amber Fox forces deployed in Eastern Afghanistan, this is problematic.

Accordingly, in May 2002 Wolfgang Schäuble, German opposition politician, presented the following two long-term challenges for Germany post-September 11th: first, to convince the German public that there is a threat; and second, to seriously analyze what Europe and Germany could contribute.

Bush’s speech to the German parliament pointed out the threat to Europe: the terrorists knew the European map too. In non-provocative, but clear words, his message was basic. The current German coalition government praise of the speech...
may show that Bush helped prepare the ground for Germany’s center-left government—with a strong pacifistic tradition—to sell the global war against terrorism, not only to the German public, but also their own party bases! In that logic, Foreign Minister Fischer commented on Bush’s speech: “If Bush really connects development aid [as a tool of soft power security] with military force, than his speech truly was historic!”

Where did this leave German-U.S. relations early summer 2002?

One more development considerably changed the European political landscape and the transatlantic dialogue in May 2002: the shift of France to the right. Schröder and Fischer lost their socialist counterparts in France. During one of the first meetings between French President Jacques Chirac and Schröder after French national elections, both leaders discussed the impact of NATO enlargement on EU matters. While Fischer may still regard himself as the voice of Europe, Germany has in fact become more isolated. His concept of European integration is desired by no other European government. By hiding behind Europe, Germany continues to “Europeanize” its foreign policy, thereby “Germanizing” the European Union. A meeting of Chirac and Bush in Paris in May was portrayed as warm and very friendly. Was France to be added to the Italian-Spanish-British pro-American axis in due course? In any case, Fisher’s complaints about “Europe moving to the far right” seemed to reflect a certain denial of reality. By late June to early July 2002, the conclusion was whether German-U.S. dialogue could get new impulses, largely depended upon the upcoming federal elections in September.

The appeals of President Bush in Berlin for stronger German contribution had aimed at bridging the gap with German political elites. For a short while, it appeared as if a common understanding with the German coalition government could be reached, after Bush promised Chancellor Schröder that he would not to make Iraq an urgent foreign policy topic, before German federal elections in late September 2002. However, the situation eroded further when Schröder, ignoring the promise made by the American President, instrumentalized German fear of war against Iraq, turning around an otherwise lost election.

The upheaval Schröder’s stand on Iraq caused in America shows the world that the U.S. greatly values the opinions and support of its allies. A proposal by President Chirac in early September 2002 to bridge the gap between the U.S. and European allies regarding Iraq, as well as strong support by Prime Minister Blair, should have alarmed Schröder and Fischer. There was enough reason to assume that the U.S. might indeed have strong or sufficient proof that Iraq had been trying to obtain nuclear weapons and linking it somehow to Al-Qaeda. Another alarming sign that Germany was on the road to isolation in the EU and NATO was how quickly Italy, Spain, and Poland turned around and declared support for the U.S. Given the events of 2002, German foreign policy can best be described as very reactive to major global developments rather than pro-active.

German politicians are frequently surprised by developments around them. The proposition of Defense Minister Struck at a NATO meeting in Poland that suggested Germany take over ISAF leadership was six to twelve months late. The
Germans were taken off guard by Rumsfeld’s proposal to introduce a NATO rapid stand-by force, which would limit prospects of an already under-financed EU rapid reaction force. The news had reported that Rumsfeld planned a classified briefing for all U.S. Senators after Congressional leaders had breakfast with Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. Anybody watching carefully concluded—one week before September 11, 2002—that the administration was about to start selling their case.

Such “Vogelstrauß-Policy” by the German government still continues, even while Germany tries to patch up things with the U.S. Die Welt reported, “NATO General Secretary, Lord Robertson, worries about the relations between Berlin and Washington.”

To fail to attend from the classified briefing by Rumsfeld at a NATO meeting in Poland, as German Defense Minister Struck did, and then to express that there was no new proof available, does not show the Germans take the situation seriously enough. After a meeting with Robertson, Fischer declared accordingly: “one should not expect any change of policy on Iraq by the German government. Schröder and I have already made up our minds.”

Things did not improve since the speech of President Bush in the German parliament in May 2002. Proponents of good transatlantic relations can only hope that the worst has already passed, or in the words of Rumsfeld: “who sits in a hole, should stop digging!”

Whether or not relations were seriously damaged depends on one’s own political point of view, which will highlight different aspects of the situation. What it will come down to is credibility. In that sense, the Bush Administration will not likely take Schröder seriously again. While Washington asked Berlin for support on their policy on Iraq shortly before Bush’s last visit to Berlin in May 2002, Hans Ulrich Klose, foreign policy expert of Germany’s Social-Democrats, declared in the Hamburger Tagblatt: “Attack on Iraq: Bundeswehr will be present.” He was convinced the German army would participate, and that such an attack would not even need another UN mandate.

With regard to the ability of the EU to act together, the example of the International Criminal Court (ICC) may illustrate perfectly how rapidly EU cohesion gives way to bilateral relations.

One unfortunate impact of troubled German-U.S. relations seems to have played out within the European theater itself. France has been complaining about the strong influence of Great Britain and has been arguing that the EU could formulate its own common approach regarding Iraq, thereby isolating Great Britain. On the other hand, after Schröder did not succeed in getting Blair to help him restore German-U.S. relations, his focus seems to have shifted across the Rhine, in order to persuade France to join ranks to counter U.S.-UK policy on Iraq. In any case, for Germany, an obvious and important question in the weeks and months to come is:

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what will be the price tag for either British or French support vis-à-vis the U.S.?²¹

With regard to the ability of the EU to act together, the example of the International Criminal Court (ICC) may illustrate perfectly how rapidly EU cohesion gives way to bilateral relations. When the EU Commission threatened that Eastern European countries would endanger their future EU membership if they supported U.S. demands to provide ICC exemptions for its peacekeepers, they chose NATO membership and good relations with the U.S. over possible EU membership. Also Great Britain, Spain, and Italy granted the U.S. these exemptions, thereby breaking ranks with Germany. Along with Chris Patten of the EU Commission, Germany still insists the U.S. must submit to the ICC, even though, the German government had been discussing whether they should seek for exemptions for their own peacekeepers in Afghanistan. Recently, Europeans witnessed Chirac again threatening Central and Eastern European countries with regard to their future EU membership on the issue of Iraq and their support of the U.S. administration. It remains to be seen to what extent France and Germany will succeed in keeping their leadership roles in the EU.

It remains to be seen to what extent France and Germany will succeed in keeping their leadership roles in the EU.

While recent developments may have reinvented Germany as a problematic partner in the EU and NATO, this will have an impact on NATO transformation and the challenges outlined in its October 6, 2002 declaration.²² The success of NATO enlargement, the streamlining of its operations, and the creation of a NATO reaction force will also depend on Germany as it is the largest European country.

German contribution as an ally and partner will matter as to how the alliance adapts to a new security environment, and whether NATO stays relevant. Close cooperation of allies in NATO and the EU will be necessary for hard and soft power intervention.²³ The ability of NATO to function as a platform for a coalition of those willing to support U.S. and UK policy in Iraq has already been weakened when NATO members Belgium, France, and Germany refused to provide Turkey with requested assistance.

A list of U.S. demands sent to Berlin in the fall of 2002 asked for German support of U.S. policy against Iraq, Turkish membership in EU, and creation of a NATO reaction force. This might have been an indication of how crucial the discussion of Germany's future contribution to the alliance is.²⁴ The message was very clear: Germany was given a second chance to prove its reliability at the NATO Summit in Prague. It seems unlikely that the German government used this chance to the satisfaction of the U.S. administration and other European allies, when it blocked the NATO decision-making process with France in February 2003.

The U.S. proposition to establish a NATO reaction force surprised Germany's Defense Minister. It counters Germany's concept and idea of ESDP as the ultimate soft-power alternative to NATO (peace-enforcing and peacemaking) interventions. For weeks, Berlin did not publicly agree to the plans. Official statements initially
did not go further than declaring the proposal “most interesting.”

V. CONCLUSION

Germany has long been one of America’s most dependable allies. For a while, it almost seemed as if Berlin might supplant London in a special relationship with Washington.

Germany’s course to self-isolation in EU and NATO is not, however, new. Even before September 11th, the Bush Administration was successful in reaffirming Great Britain, Spain, and Italy—but not to German political elites—U.S. commitment to volatile regions in the world and continued consultation with its allies. The German government was reluctant and stunned by the sudden rapprochements around them, particularly between Putin and Bush. Today, Germany seems to be isolated at least on two fronts: first, regarding its stand on Iraq; second, its concept of European integration is not desired by France, the UK, Spain, nor Italy. The recent deal between France and Germany regarding a (more or less) common policy on Iraq indicates that both countries may focus on finding common ground to pursue their national interests and on counterbalancing U.S. and British policy.

In summary, by hiding behind Europe, Germany still continues to Europeanize its foreign policy. Doing so, it uses the EU for its own national interest, with France or alone. It risks to not adequately addressing soft and hard power security challenges as a sovereign member of NATO and the EU in the 21st century. For its friends and partners, it is important to consider these circumstances in order to understand what they can expect from the re-elected German leftist coalition government.

Throughout the Prague Summit, German media focused on whether Bush and Schröder would shake hands. The New York Times analyzed the Summit speech of President Bush and concluded: “Mr. Bush assailed nations that are ‘inward-looking or isolated by indifference,’ clearly a reference to Chancellor Schröder’s use of his opposition to the American campaign against Saddam Hussein as a centerpiece of his recent re-election campaign...from John F. Kennedy’s ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’ speech, to Ronald Reagan’s controversial visit to the Bitburg cemetery, post-war American presidents have emphasized reconciliation and unity when speaking of Germany, not memories of war. This time, however, Mr. Bush seemed to be reminding Germans that Europe today stood shoulder to shoulder with America despite them, not because of them.”

Notes


2 Either incorporated in or separate to NATO. The role of Europe’s rapid reaction forces has to be mentioned in this regard, and most recent developments, which allow ESDP to use NATO assets (which arguably further strengthens NATO).

3 Either incorporated in or separate to NATO. The role of Europe’s rapid reaction forces has to be mentioned in this regard, and most recent developments, which allow ESDP to use NATO assets (which
arguably further strengthens NATO).


5 See Michaela Hertkorn, Why conflict prevention does not exclude the use of force (Berlin: Mensch und Buch Verlag, 2002).


10 Michaela C. Hertkorn, Why Conflict Prevention Does not Exclude the Use of Force (Berlin: Mensch & Buch Verlag, 2000).

11 See George (1997), Forceful Persuasion. See part B. Concepts and Conflict Cases, I. Theoretical Discourses, 1.1.3. “How to address violent ethnic conflicts in the Post Cold War Era?”


13 See Michaela Hertkorn, 2002.

14 Personal interview with John McDonald, IMTD, Washington DC, spring/summer 1999.

15 See Michaela Hertkorn, 2002.


17 See Burton (1990), Conflict Resolution and Prevention, p. 15: Deep-rooted conflict included “cases of conflict with authorities between authorities, and among persons and groups within societies.” They arose “out of demands on individuals to make certain adjustments in behavior that are unacceptable, and probably beyond human tolerance and capabilities. Symptoms of deep-rooted conflict”—and these were merely symptoms—included “hostage taking, illegal strikes, public protest movements, ethnic violence, terrorism, gang warfare, and many other forms of intractable opposition to authorities at one social level or another.”


19 See Zandee, Building Blocks for Peace. Civil-Military Interactions in Restoring Fractured Societies (The Hague: Clingendael Institute), September 1998, p. 5: “The history of conflict in the twentieth century can be broken down into three phases. World Wars dominated the first half of the century, the Cold War reigned for the next forty years, while regional wars characterized the last decade. Restoring the peace following intra-state conflict entailed nothing less than recreating or rebuilding a fully functioning society, a complicated process, which not only requires restoration of a state in a material sense. Ethnic cleansing,
atrocities and crimes against the civilian population caused tremendous psychological damage. Distrust and fear are to be overcome. Without justice being done, peace does not last. This process takes years, demands patience and requires a careful approach. It incorporates many building blocks, such as restoring security, reestablishing law and order, reconstructing infrastructure and housing, recreating a functioning economy and installing a democratic government, all of which are crucial for the return of refugees and displaced persons.”


21 See Hertkorn, 2002. Remark: In the words of Witte, German options for playing a strong foreign policy role did not grow in the absence of strong U.S. leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina. By contrast, foreign policy options for Germany seem to be increasing, in the case of strong U.S. leadership in international (peacekeeping) missions.

22 See Fischer, “Towards a New Transatlantic Partnership: The United States, Europe and Germany in an Era of Global Challenge.” (Herbert Quandt Distinguished Lecture. The BMW Center for German and European Studies, Georgetown University, September 15, 2000). See Joffe (1999), “Where Germany Has Never Been Before,” p. 52: “None other than the French calls America a hyper puissance whose power needs to be reduced by the harsh discipline of multipolarity. The reasons are: America is more needed than feared, and while carrying a Unipolar stick, it usually speaks quite softly. Not even the French have tried to forge a real countervailing compact, indeed, when the crunch is on, as in Kosovo in early 1999, the French without so much as a side-swipe joined the American-led alliance against Belgrade. What was observed though was the usual economic rivalry dating back to the 1960s, as well as a more recent phenomenon, that may be labeled psychological balancing.”


25 See Lally Weymouth, “Pacifist German Turns Hawkish on Serbs,” The Washington Post, April 11, 1999: Joschka Fischer once was “a revolutionary and a pacifist. As a youth, he opposed the Vietnam War. But today, as German foreign minister, he argues passionately that for the first time since World War II, Germany has no choice but to use military force alongside its NATO allies to defeat Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and his regime.”

26 Remark: This concerns activities characterized by IMTD as structural peace building, and as structural prevention, in the definition of Carnegie Commission. See Michaela Hertkorn, 2002.


29 See “Youth Leadership Adventure Comes To Fruition,” Peacebuilder, vol. 1, no 4, Summer 2000, p. 11: “During its first round of a Youth Leadership Adventure in Bosnia-Herzegovina, thirty-seven Serb, Croat and Bosniak youth between the ages of seventeen and twenty-six implemented a variety of projects. A kindergarten, initiated by training participant Kristina Seljica, could for example, not have been completed without German SFOR troops having laid the playground.”

30 Remark: Personal interview with McDonald at IMTD, Washington, DC in summer 1998 and spring/summer 1999.

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together, to brainstorm on necessary adjustments in training for post-conflict reconstruction and peace building. Representatives of government, NGOs, international organizations, academia, financial institutions and the military participated. The training highlighted challenges for the civil-military interface. See Olsen and Davis, “Training U.S. Army Officers for Peace Operations: Lessons from Bosnia,” USIP Special Report, Washington, DC, October 29, 1999: “National debates fuelled by the recent U.S. military experience in Bosnia produced a series of lessons that ranged from force protection to civil-military implementation strategies.” These lessons should “inform U.S. military policy for its present deployment in Kosovo.” One of the most important lessons to emerge from the Bosnian experience was “the need to refocus the training and development of senior military leaders for participation in peace operation.”


38 See Dictionary of International Relations, 1998, p. 57: “In a speech to the Fifth Congress of the Polish communist party which asserted that the socialist commonwealth as a whole had a right of intervention in the territory of any one of its members whenever forces hostile to socialism threatened its ideological alignment. What became known thereafter as the Brezhnev Doctrine asserted that the unity of the communist bloc took precedence over such principles as domestic jurisdiction and equality of states.”

39 Remark: In contrast to this logic and in the aftermath of Kosovo, it seems that repressive policy by a nation state against parts of its population to preserve the unity of its territory, like in the case of former Yugoslavia, does not dispose of sufficient legitimacy anymore. The protection of individuals and people, within the boundaries of a nation state, ranks higher than the protection of a state’s unity.

31 Remark: Even though NGOs may already have filled gaps during the Cold War, there seems to have been a growing influence of NGOs in unofficial diplomacy with the end of the Cold War.

32 See “U.S. Acts on Kosovo Misconduct Report,” BBC News, September 19, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newswid_931000/931873.stm: The U.S. Army ordered “changes in the way its soldiers are trained after a report found that American peacekeepers have beaten civilians and indecently assaulted women in Kosovo.” See “Reign of Terror,” TIME.com Europe, September 26, 2000: Even before the U.S. Army released its report into the abuse of civilians by GIs in Kosovo, the word was out: “A tiny knot of American soldiers harassed and mistreated Kosovo civilians because the troops had prepared for war and not been adequately schooled in peace-keeping.” The investigation was ordered by General Eric Shinseki, the Army chief of staff, after Staff Sergeant Frank Ronghi had been charged with raping and murdering a Kosovar Albanian girl in January. See Results of 15-6 Investigation. Unit Climate and State of Discipline. Within the 314th Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, Task Force Falcon, Kosovo Force, (obtained at the Public Relations Office, Pentagon, Arlington VA, October 15, 2000).

33 See Michaela Hertkorn, 2002.


35 Remark: Throughout much of the Kosovo intervention, NGOs delivered humanitarian assistance to internally displaced people.


38 See Judy Hertkorn and Michaela Hertkorn, 2002.

39 Remark: In contrast to this logic and in the aftermath of Kosovo, it seems that repressive policy by a nation state against parts of its population to preserve the unity of its territory, like in the case of former Yugoslavia, does not dispose of sufficient legitimacy anymore. The protection of individuals and people, within the boundaries of a nation state, ranks higher than the protection of a state’s unity.

40 Interview with McDonald at IMTD, spring 1997 and summer 1998: So-called ethnic conflicts were based on the following. First, people whose needs were denied always fought for their identity. Second, within the last century, most former empires fell apart. Third, the world internationally lacked the structures to cope with intra-state conflicts, even though theoretically, it was all in the UN Charter.

41 See “Blair Sets Out Intervention Doctrine,” The New York Times. “His Doctrine was set out to the Chicago Economic Club, turning the Brezhnev Doctrine of the 1960s on its head.”

free?"


44 See Joffe, National Interest, Summer 1999, p. 45: "Germany does not have to write a new script and to have a new costume. Germany is like a Gulliver who likes his ropes. In his mind are etched two commanding lessons from history. Whenever he strikes out on his own, he reaps not hegemony but ever-larger disaster, as in 1914 and 1939. But, when he accepts the bonds of multilateralism and community in all things economic and military, he flourishes beyond belief. Such twin lessons are not easily unlearned, and the speed with which they are internalized by a new government supposedly free of yesteryear's restraints may well serve as a testimony to their strength and endurance. But why not at least maneuver a bit more freely now that Germany's excruciating dependence on the West has vanished along with bipolarity?" The short answer was that there was "no need for post-Cold War Germany—the Berlin Republic—to stray from the mainstream of Western policy."

45 See "Pacifist German Turns Hawkish on Serbs," The Washington Post, April 11, 1999, A. 23: "If we accept Milosevic as a winner, it would be the end of the Europe I believe in." His generation had asked "their parents why did it happen in Germany during the war and why did you not resist?" This had been the [crucial] question we had to "ask ourselves now. Both the German public and the government" were shocked, Fischer argued that Milosevic was "ready to act like Stalin and Hitler did in the 40s: to fight a war against the existence of a whole people."

46 Ibid: "Fischer's hawkish position does not sit well with all his constituents. Many pacifists in the Greens party do not accept the idea of Germany fighting a war. Given his early pacifism, he never expected to be granting an interview in NATO headquarters defending a bombing campaign. But, we could not accept Milosevic's policies and bow our knees in front of this ethnic cleansing. We would give up all the successes of the last four decades in Europe."


49 Presentation at American, German and European Military Involvement in the Balkans: Lessons Learned, Future Challenges, and Implications for Transatlantic Relations, (workshop at AICGS, November 29, 2000).


52 Mary Hampton, presentation at American, German and European Military Involvement in the Balkans: Lessons Learned, Future Challenges, and Implications for Transatlantic Relations, (workshop at AICGS, November 29, 2000).

53 Remark: See web pages of German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.auswaertiges-amt.de


Europe should not let missile defenses come between them,”

“Europe: the mood is shifting,”

Opposition of Allies to a Missile Defense,”

Europe pose prickly challenge to U.S.,”

in Genua alles nach Wunsch—Putin ein Partner von Herbert Winkler,”

transatlantischen Beziehungen nach dem Regierungswechsel in den U.S.A,”

opposition to missile defense. Rumsfeld makes a case,”

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beispiellosen Krawallen,” DPA, July 22, 2001; “Headlines from Germany. Ambassador Talks with Bush,

8: Globalisierung hilft allen—Pläne für Krisengebiete—Uneins über Klimapolitik—Konsequenzen aus

entziehen—Powell: Bonner Klimakompromiss ‘fuer die U.S.A nicht akzeptabel’,”


Raketenabwehrpläne,” FAZ, July 26, 01; “U.S.A wollen sich Herausforderung durch Klimawandel nicht


8: Globalisierung hilft allen—Pläne für Krisengebiete—Uneins über Klimapolitik—Konsequenzen aus beispiellosen Krawallen,” DPA, July 22, 2001; “Headlines from Germany. Ambassador Talks with Bush,


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Joschka Fischer earlier this year had laid important groundwork for the handling of some of the more
difficult bilateral and transatlantic issues. President Bush emphasized again how important good relations

with Germany are to him”.


63 “Der neue U.S.-Präsident, Namensartikel von Karsten D. Voigt, Koordinator für die deutsch-
amerikanische Zusammenarbeit,” Berliner Morgenpost, December 18, 2000; “Karsten Voigt: Das

Deutsch-Amerikanische Verhältnis nach der Präsidentenwahl,” DLF, January 2, 2001; “The

transatlantischen Beziehungen nach dem Regierungswechsel in den U.S.A,” SPIEGEL ONLINE, February

2, 2001; Jackson Janes, “Getting to Know You: Germany’s Foreign Minister Fischer’s Visit to

Washington,” (Washington DC: AICGS), March 2001: “The calls for Minister Fischer to confront the

U.S. on the Iraq bombings were extensive in Berlin, especially among the Greens. However, some Social

Democrats were equally vocal, despite the low-key position of Chancellor Schroeder. Fischer’s predecessor

in office, Klaus Kinkel, was among the critics as was CDU foreign policy expert Karl Lamers, both accused

the Minister of being too soft.”

64 “U.S.-Sicherheitsberaterin Rice sieht ‘neue Ära der Zusammenarbeit’,” DPA, July 26, 01; “Russland
droht nach Bonner Klimakonferenz mit Todesschütz für Kyoto—Putin-Berater: Russland noch nicht zur

Ratifizierung bereit—Moskau sieht nationale Interessen gefährdet,” Agence France Presse, July 23, 01;

“U.S.A und Russland einigen sich überraschend auf Rüstungsdialog,” DPA, July 22, 01; “Für Bush life

genua alles nach Wunsch—Putin ein Partner von Herbert Winkler,” DPA, July 22, 01; “Bush und


Times, July 25, 2001: “By the end of the week, Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain, Prime Minister

Silvio Berlusconi of Italy and President Vladimir Putin of Russia all said that Mr. Bush was right to force the world to think about a new ‘strategic framework. We’re getting used to him,’ a German

says. The Balkan experience has convinced the Europeans of one thing: Mr. Bush can, under the right

conditions, be persuaded to change his mind”; “Bush, In Kosovo, Tells U.S. Troops Role Is Essential.


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67 “Ex-Yugoslavia. NATO In the Middle,” The Economist, April 14, 2001; “The five countries that have sent most men to Kosovo have different reactions to the threat. Many senior KFOR men say that the close former relations between the Americans and the Kosovar Albanians make it hard to explain now to Albanians that things have changed. The French, in the north of Kosovo, chuckle and reflect that the caution they have shown towards the Albanians since June 1999 is now proving justified.”

68 Michael Quinlen (presentation at CGES, Center for German and European Studies, Georgetown University, December 5, 2000): This related to a situation, where peacekeeping turns into peacemaking or open war, independently from what ESDP theoretically may be about. See “Europe Acts to Build Own Military Force,” The New York Times, November 20, 2000; “European defense. A long march,” The Economist, February 17, 2001, p. 54. Remark: Formulated at Cologne EU Summit in July 1999, during German EU presidency, at Nice EU Summit in December 2000, and during French EU presidency.

69 “Carlotta Gall: A Balkan Day: One Step Forward and Three Steps Back,” The New York Times, May 25, 2001; “Presveo Clashes Worsen,” BBC World News, May 14, 2001. See Lawrence Cline, (presentation at Annual Conference of New York State Political Science Association, May 2001): “Such an unhealthy division already existed on a daily basis in Kosovo. KFOR troops were confronted with different approaches by their national governments. This constrained their close cooperation. In addition, each country tried to leave the difficult jobs of enforcement that were potentially more dangerous to other NATO countries. The divide between tasks in the context of monitoring and civil conflict management and more risky security tasks was obvious.”


71 Remark: With regard to intervention, in spring/early summer 1999, Blair proclaimed a bold new international doctrine that would justify outside military intervention in the internal affairs of governments such as Yugoslavia. His Doctrine of International Community argued that national sovereignty is less important than human rights and preventing genocide. Acts of genocide could never be a purely internal matter. The following five tests for intervention existed: “First, are we sure of the case? Second, have we exhausted diplomatic options? Third, was if military operations were sensible. The fourth asked if parties were prepared for the long term. Fifth, national interests should be involved”. See Michaela Hertkorn, 2002.


73 Remark: With regard to intervention, late spring/early summer 1999, Blair proclaimed a bold new international doctrine that would justify outside military intervention in the internal affairs of governments such as Yugoslavia. His Doctrine of International Community argued that national sovereignty is less important than human rights and preventing genocide. Acts of genocide could never be a purely internal matter. The following five tests for intervention existed: “First, are we sure of the case? Second, have we exhausted diplomatic options? Third, was if military operations were sensible. The fourth asked if parties were prepared for the long term. Fifth, national interests should be involved”. Michaela Hertkorn, Conflict Prevention, Free University of Berlin, 2001.

74 Remark: Germany's current social-democratic and Green coalition government, in the aftermath of Kosovo, made conflict prevention and civil crisis management a core topic of its foreign policy. See web pages of German State Department in Berlin, www.auswaertiges-amt.de. NATO committed itself to create a new Strategic Concept for its 1999 50th anniversary. This process did not start with St. Malo, but with the Berlin NATO summit of 1996. (Ron Asmus during a personal interview, Washington DC, Fall
77 Remark: Just days before NATO summit in April 1999, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said he never shared the view that NATO was suited for great power intervention. He added that portraying the alliance as omnipresent or omnipotent would be a mistake. While Fischer supported NATO air strikes against the FRY and was eager to exhibit a Red/Green policy of continuity, he clearly felt uncomfortable with any assumptions concerning future NATO interventions. He repeatedly reminded the German public that Kosovo was an emergency that led to an emergency response, and that there were no other alternatives.

78 “Germans Offer Plan to Remake Europe Union,” The New York Times, April 30, 2001: “There is a long tradition in German foreign policy of giving up sovereignty in order to increase, indirectly, Germany’s influence over Europe”. The Economist, May 5, 01: “The German plan at first drew cross party assent at home: Germany is easily the single biggest contributor to the EU’s budget—of which 80% is spent on agriculture and regional policy. Repatriating those policies would mean that Germany paid much less towards the EU. The plan would also strengthen Germany’s institutional weight relative to other countries. France has fought tooth-and-nail to ensure that, even though Germany has the biggest population of any EU country, it has no more votes in the Council of Ministers than the other big ones—Italy, Britain and, of course, France. In the European Parliament, however, the weight of German population is acknowledged with a greater number of parliamentary seats, though small countries are still over-represented. So strengthening the parliament relative to the council boosts German influence.”


81 “Europe’s foreign policy. Guess, who wasn’t coming to dinner?” The Economist, November 10, 2001: The campaign against terror has exposed the problems of building a common European foreign policy: “It was ludicrous—but quite serious. The row over who was to be invited to dinner with Tony Blair at Downing Street on November 4th exposed just how self-obsessed the EU remains, even in the midst of a world crisis. And it also illustrated just how hard it will be to forge a common European foreign and security policy.”


86 DPA, Deutsche Presseagentur, January 23, 2002.

87 Süddeutsche Zeitung, January 30/31, 2002.

www.foxnews.com/story/6/2933.44706.00.html; “U.S. blasts Straw’s criticism of Bush speech.”
54 “Al Qaida bekennt sich zu Djerba-Anschlag. Terrorspur führt nach Deutschland,” Die Welt, April 17, 2002; “Schily announces he will travel to Tunisia to investigate suspected terrorist explosion,” FAZ, April 17, 2002.
55 Representative of the Embassy of Germany, Counselor (Political), Washington, DC, March 21, 2002.
58 Remark: NATO at Twenty includes Russia, which participates in the new NATO-Russia Council, though without veto power.
60 Presentation by a representative of Germany’s Federal Ministry of Defense, the 20th Manfred-Wörner-Seminar for German-American-Understanding, Bonn, May 6, 2002.
61 Presentation by Hans-Ulrich Klose, Member of the German Bundestag, the 20th Manfred-Wörner-Seminar for German-American-Understanding, Berlin, May 10, 2002.
63 Presentation by Wolfgang Schübbe, Member of the German Bundestag, The 20th Manfred-Wörner-Seminar for German-American-Understanding, Berlin, May 10, 2002.
65 “In Reichstag, Bush condemns terror as new despotism, seeks to reassure allies,” The New York Times,
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Remark: On February 4, 2003 in a common press conference with Chirac, Blair stressed the "good spirit of the entente cordiale." This entente was based on military agreements between England and France from on 1906 and led to the complete and disastrous isolation of the German Reich up to 1914. After Powell’s presentation at the UN on February 5, 03, commentators like Bill Kristoll or Senator McCain concluded: “Poor Germans. I am afraid the French are going to lead Germany into isolation.”

“Blair’s balancing act: bridging the U.S.-Europe divide,” *Herald Tribune*, Sep 26, 02: “After Schröder might not have succeeded in London by the end of September 2002, to get Tony Blair to help him restore German-U.S. relations, Schröder may focus now on getting France to join ranks to counter U.S.-UK policy on Iraq. In any case, for Germany, one question seems to be obvious and of importance in the weeks and months to come: what will be the price tag for either British or French support vis-à-vis the U.S.?”


Remark: Be it pre-emptive strikes in the war against global terrorism, or peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions.


Remark: In summer 2001, after Bush’s first two visits to Europe, German media and news were characterized by anti-Bush-anti-Americanism.
