

Building Democracy in 21st Century Africa: Two Africas, One Solution

by Darren Kew

INTRODUCTION

Few observers of African politics are strangers to irony. The most recent of many occurred in December 2004: Ghana, which only 20 years ago seemed lost in the intrigues of military rule, successfully held its fourth national election since 1992, to the well-deserved praise of local and international observers alike. At the same time and half a continent away, Rwandan forces again crossed the border into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), threatening to reignite a region-wide war that resulted in the deaths of at least three million people between 1997 and 2003.

Thus, we see a growing division across this vast continent of 54 states: Ghana and other consolidating democracies at one end, having developed fragile democratic institutions growing in strength and increasingly good governance, and the DRC and other failed states at the other, seemingly caught in a downward spiral of authoritarianism, ethnic chauvinism, warlords, and collapsing state institutions. Several observers have noted variations of this “Tale of Two Africas”¹ that is unfolding across the continent, and many countries lie somewhere in between these two paths toward progress or decline.

Yet, African countries at both ends of this divide appear to have come to a common consensus that the democratic path is the only institutional vehicle that can deliver the socioeconomic progress demanded by populaces across the continent. Successful nations like Ghana, South Africa, Kenya, and Senegal are well on their way to consolidating democratic rule. Collapsed states like the DRC and Somalia, meanwhile, are searching to develop democratic frameworks that can stitch their countries back together, and even authoritarian states like Togo and Cameroon hold sham elections to claim a veneer of legitimacy with their people. Nigeria, Uganda, and a host of other states in transition between these two poles are also struggling to strengthen the rudiments of democratic governance, and their relative level of success in this endeavor is a strong indicator of their level of overall socioeconomic progress (see Tables).

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Clearly, democratic consolidation is essential, if not a prerequisite, to political stability and socioeconomic development across Africa. Given the massive diversity of cases across the continent, however, can we still discern some common elements to the democratic solution for African political and economic development?

Almost all African countries share one political fact: their state structures were imposed by imperial powers over a century ago. This imposition of the state created a remarkably similar set of dilemmas that Africans have faced across the continent: an *ethnic security dilemma*, in which ethnic groups are caught in a reciprocal struggle for power to secure the interests of their group, and a subsequent *economic dilemma*, in which growing numbers of people must vie for portions of shrinking economic output. A review of how these dilemmas unfolded, and how the successful states have addressed them through democratic development, offers a set of options for strengthening democracy across the continent and for bringing the states of Second Africa back on the path to prosperity with the First.

THE LEGACY OF THE PAST: TWO DILEMMAS

The European imposition of the state system on Africa created a political development process that was different from the European experience in two key respects. First, African states were not each primarily the construct of a single hegemonic ethnic group, as was the case in Western Europe or the United States.² Several African countries contained groups that could assert hegemony on independence, but state institutions did not grow out of any indigenous political process of their making. One notable exception was Ethiopia, which was never colonized.³ In addition, British “indirect rule” policy incorporated indigenous political institutions into the colonial administration to a degree, but only so far as to maintain public order and to reinforce the extraction of primary commodities to the metropole, at the expense of the legitimacy of these institutions with their publics. Second, African states had only a handful of years to prepare for independence as coherent political units, unlike the centuries over which the European states evolved. Thus, African political elites at the time of independence inherited state institutions that were largely alien, and they had little practical experience governing together under single political entities.

Not surprisingly, few Africans felt much connection to these rootless states. Independence leader Obafemi Awolowo’s characterization of Nigeria as “a mere geographical expression,”⁴ and nothing like the seemingly mono-ethnic nations of Europe, captured the mood of the age. Instead, most Africans identified strongly with the precolonial nationalities or ethnicities to which they belonged.⁵ Racist colonial policies of “divide and rule” reinforced these ethnic identifications, and in many cases the colonialists built political units around ethnic groupings, which also encouraged ethnic political identification.

Moreover, the political structures that African political elites did inherit were primarily developed around coercive mechanisms and centralized political and

economic controls, such as the bureaucracy, police, and military. Corruption became endemic, and critical democratic institutions like legislatures and local governments were weak, although some colonies had fairly extensive judiciary systems. Consequently, political cultures were based on ethnic ranking and distinction, authoritarian patterns of governance, and increasingly, state corruption.

With ethnic groups seen as the primary units serving the interests of individuals, promoting ethnic-based interests became paramount, and the increase in power of one ethnic group was perceived as a relative decrease in the power of others and therefore a threat to their security and their interests.

Thus, for most newly independent African countries the most readily identifiable political category both for identification and mobilization was ethnicity, rather than class or territorial nation. Given this relative strength of ethnicity in comparison to the weak institutionalization and legitimacy of African states, political leaders and supporters alike generally perceived themselves in a *security dilemma*⁸ with members of other ethnic groups vying for control of the state. With ethnic groups seen as the primary units serving the interests of individuals, promoting ethnic-based interests became paramount, and the increase in power of one ethnic group was perceived as a relative decrease in the power of others and therefore a threat to their security and their interests. All political matters thus came to be viewed first through the ethnic lens and judged fundamentally in regard to how they influenced the balance of power among ethnic groups. Ethnic groups were never monolithic, but a rise in intra-ethnic divisions came at the cost of losing ground to more unified groups.

This ethnic security dilemma persists in many African countries today, and remains a constant source of instability. So long as the dilemma persists, national politics remain fixed on the question of *who governs*, rather than moving to the question of *how* to govern. Policy in these cases is less a matter of the substance of initiatives, and more a question of how they affect the ethnic calculus.

Because of this dilemma, the early democratic phase of the 1960s in Africa saw intense inter-ethnic competition and increasingly ethnic political parties. Although some groups formed coalitions, more often than not one group rose to dominate the state and lock others out of power. Consequently, groups increasingly saw control of the state as a zero-sum matter, which legitimized any action to win power, even at the expense of the democratic system. Rigged elections, one-party states, and abuses of power became the norm, forcing excluded groups to find other alternatives to protect their interests, such as military coups, secession, and revolution.

As young democracies failed across Africa in the 1960s, the continent moved into a long authoritarian period during which the ethnic security dilemma persisted

in many countries and was exacerbated in others. Authoritarian rule, whether one-party or military rule, accelerated the political centralization of state structures begun under the colonialists and added an additional dimension of economic centralization under variations of socialist policies. The result was the stifling of foreign investment by nationalization and import substitution policies, and the strangling of broad-based agricultural development by colonial-style product boards and regressive tax policies. Foreign debts rose, as did foreign aid dependence.

This economic and political centralization produced a second dilemma for African states: an *economic dilemma*. Who gets the limited economic fruits amid growing poverty? Placing the most productive elements of the economy under state control increased the benefits of power dramatically, and political authoritarianism reduced the circle of individuals with access to that power, thus making its access all the more lucrative. Given the government's growing role in the economy, the search for public office and/or government contracts became the most gainful and thus, dominant economic activity.⁷ Fulfilling the terms of these contracts became of lesser importance than the transaction itself, which typically involved some remuneration for the public official who gave it out. Moreover, under pressure from international financial institutions in the 1980s to implement structural adjustment policies, African political elites gutted what remained of the meager social nets for their publics. Economic growth ground to a halt, constricting tenuous standards of living even further, and making control of the state and its monopoly of economic benefits truly a life-or-death affair.

Leaders across the continent who were able to retain power for a measure of time grew fabulously rich and powerful, which signaled the rise of the so-called Big Men – leaders who used their control of state resources to build vast networks of clients.

Authoritarian rule did little to solve the ethnic security dilemma or the economic dilemma directly. In fact, in most cases it exacerbated these problems, given the massive centralization in political and economic power, which made political losers even more disaffected, while the winners became more adamant about staying put. Through a mix of ethnic balancing and brutal methods, some leaders such as Cote D'Ivoire's Felix Houphouet-Boigny or Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko, grew especially adept at staying in power. Leaders across the continent who were able to retain power for a measure of time grew fabulously rich and powerful, which signaled the rise of the so-called Big Men, leaders who used their control of state resources to build vast networks of clients. This "neopatrimonialism"⁸ put the Big Man at the top of a pyramid of supporters and saw the same pattern replicated at lower levels; provincial and local clients also sat atop their own patron-client networks.

Interestingly, however, although these neopatrimonial networks typically sat atop a solid ethnic base, the more powerful Big Men built alliances across ethnicities through political and financial patronage. To some extent, this undermined ethnic loyalties in some cases, in the sense that personal, cash-based fealty to the Big Man proved more individually rewarding than promoting one's ethnic group. Although these relationships fed corruption, they also ameliorated the ethnic security dilemma to a degree, in the sense that political elites grew to view their political alternatives in a more individualistic fashion. This individualistic approach opened more alternatives to negotiate, typically in cash terms, than the more zero-sum perspectives of ethnic politics. This proved critical in Nigeria, Kenya, Zambia, and elsewhere after the authoritarian period, where political elites were able to forge multi-ethnic political parties, in part on the basis of financial incentives for politicians across the ethnic spectrum.

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AN IMPERFECT DEMOCRATIC WAVE

By 1989, much of Africa was dominated by politically and economically centralized states. The ethnic security dilemma assured that whoever was in power faced the constant threat of removal by rival groups and that states grew only marginally in terms of having the identification and legitimacy of their own people. National political cultures, in turn, were characterized by neopatrimonialism, clientelism, corruption, and authoritarian intolerance for opposition and preference for executive fiat. The economic dilemma, meanwhile, kept states weak and populations increasingly impoverished. Economies remained dependent upon primary products and were deeply indebted to foreign creditors.

With the end of the Cold War, security concerns of Western nations abated in the African region, allowing secondary goals such as economic trade and spreading democracy to dominate Western policy concerns. This led to dramatic cuts in foreign assistance for old "friends" of the West like Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire and Samuel Doe in Liberia, and to a general press across the continent for political liberalization both from internal actors and international ones. The result was a wave of democratization⁹ that swept Africa throughout the 1990s. A number of states, like Togo and Gabon, resisted this trend. Others, like Somalia and Zaire, were so weakened by misrule amid the ethnic and economic dilemmas that they imploded.

Most African states, however, spent the 1990s undertaking a range of political reforms and varying degrees of democratization. The young democracies inherited weak state institutions in many cases, and all faced ethnic security and economic dilemmas. Two general trends in democratization were evident over the past 15 years:

1. *Sudden transitions*: States like Zambia and Burundi, in which new political organizations or opposition groups unseated longstanding authoritarian rulers shortly after political liberalization was allowed.

2. *Gradual transitions*: Countries like Senegal, Ghana, and Kenya, in which ruling parties or authoritarian rulers only partially liberalized or allowed only the trappings of democratic reforms, such that opposition parties spent years mobilizing their support base and civil society groups in order to force credible elections and win control of the government.

Most of the sudden democratic transitions in Africa have proven less stable than their gradual counterparts. Within several years of the sudden transitions, most of the new governing parties quickly displayed many of the authoritarian political cultural patterns of their predecessors in how they governed, seeking to restrict opposition and looking for institutional ways to maintain their hold on power. Burundi, meanwhile, collapsed into civil war within three months after its Tutsi-dominated military assassinated its newly elected Hutu president.

One thread running through the poor records of the sudden transitions is the failure of the new governments to resolve the ethnic security dilemma. The rapid nature of the transition itself in some cases exacerbates the dilemma, such that some ethnic groups see their hold on power evaporate within a context of deep uncertainty as to whether the new groups will ever allow them significant access in the future. In Burundi, fears that the new Hutu-dominated government would integrate the Tutsi-dominated military and scale back other prerogatives had disastrous consequences. Zambia, meanwhile, saw its new president seek to change the constitution to promote his own tenure in power and to restrict the influence of the former ruling party.

Gradual democratic transitions, however, appear to ease the ethnic security dilemma to some degree. Delayed democratization and authoritarian recalcitrance in most of these cases appears to have provided for an extended period of hard bargaining, public engagement on the part of opposition parties, and eventually, some form of elite compromise¹⁰ that directly or indirectly addresses the overarching governance question posed by the ethnic dilemma. This compromise typically provides for some form of powersharing arrangement among the major ethnic groups, as in South Africa and Kenya, and/or it instills sufficient confidence in the election system and other state institutions that losing parties feel they have a reasonable chance at winning in the future, as in Senegal. Moreover, public engagement in these transitions is sufficient enough for supporters to demand higher accountability of the new governments once in power, which can restrict their ability to exclude competitors from the policy process.

Although many of the gradual transitions appear to have made some progress toward arresting the ethnic security dilemma and are moving toward consolidating their democratic frameworks, they still feature political cultures significantly characterized by Big Man neopatrimonialism. These powerful mandarins dominate both ruling and opposition parties, often at the expense of larger public engagement in, and benefit from, the political process, in a fashion that resembles competitive oligarchy more than democratic development. The Big Men generally retain their patronage power bases and continue to view warily some critical elements of democratic development, such as accountability and transparency.

If African countries are to continue down the path to democratic development, the persistence of authoritarian and neopatrimonial patterns of governance must be addressed in a manner that resolves the ethnic security dilemma, which in turn will likely allow states to manage the persistent economic dilemma as well.

The progress made by the gradual transitions toward resolving the economic dilemma, however, is generally promising. The tables show that on average, the consolidating democracies, which were all produced by gradual transitions, have higher rates of economic growth and overall human development than transitional democracies, authoritarian governments, or countries that are backsliding toward authoritarianism. Their lead by these indicators is, however, still moderate, and the transitions for most are still fairly recent, such that their progress in resolving the economic dilemma will require closer study as the decade progresses.

CHALLENGES FOR AFRICAN DEMOCRACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

If African countries are to continue down the path to democratic development, the persistence of authoritarian and neopatrimonial patterns of governance must be addressed in a manner that resolves the ethnic security dilemma, which in turn will likely allow states to manage the persistent economic dilemma as well. Although no single template or model can apply to all of Africa's 54 countries, the states that have been more successful in moving toward democratic consolidation in the past few years offer a number of possible elements to encourage democratic deepening.

First and foremost is a balance of power among critical centers of power in the country. This balance must be struck not only among the formal structures of power—as in checks and balances among the various branches and levels of government—and between the state and actors in society, such as businesses and civil society groups, but among the informal structures of power as well. Most important among the latter is the development of a balance of power among the various networks of the neopatrimonial Big Men, particularly through the vehicles

of political parties. Such a balance can help competitive oligarchy to evolve democratically through the competition among these oligarchs when none of them – alone or in coalition—can impose their wills on the rest. This in turn forces them to compromise. So long as power is generally balanced and this competition operates largely within the contours of the democratic system—through elections, court battles, policy debate, public inquiries, and so on—rather than through organized gangs of thugs, armed militias, and abuses of systemic powers, then it will commit the interests of political elites more closely to the health of the system.

Moreover, balanced political competition among the Big Men will encourage them to engage more of their supporters in the process, which in turn will force them to deliver on their political promises in exchange for that support. Over time, this increased public engagement can bring neopatrimonial practices under greater public scrutiny, introducing increased transparency and accountability into political relationships. Furthermore, as leaders of various ethnic factions negotiate with one another in this manner, it can help to ease the ethnic security dilemma by introducing political compromise and structures that accommodate broader participation through the democratic framework.

As was clear in Ghana and Kenya, if political competition among elites is to foster engagement of broader publics, leading in turn to increased accountability, then an essential element in the democratization process is a credible elections system.

One of the central reasons for the success of the gradual transitions is that they allowed time for this power balance to develop. The balance, in turn, provided the framework for the elite compromise, which drew the architecture for democratic transition. Kenya's National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) developed after divided opposition groups fought Daniel Arap Moi's KANU through two stolen elections in the 1990s. During this period, opposition groups built public and civil society support and forged the NARC, creating sufficient power to ensure that the government held credible elections, which the NARC won. KANU, meanwhile, negotiated the contours of these elections such that they retain some confidence of regaining power, and have set about wooing voters for elections in 2007. Ghana followed a similar path two years earlier, with the main opposition party unseating Jerry Rawlings' NDC after eight years of constituency-building and constant pressure on the NDC over the electoral commission.

As was clear in Ghana and Kenya, if political competition among elites is to foster engagement of broader publics, leading in turn to increased accountability, then an essential element in the democratization process is a credible elections system. Central to the elite compromises that produced successful transitions were

agreements that assured the integrity of the electoral commission. By contrast, some of the marginal cases of democratization have faltered particularly because their election processes are questionable and pose deep problems for further democratic consolidation. Nigeria is emblematic in this regard, as its electoral commission produced deeply questionable results in at least two-thirds of Nigeria's 36 federal units in elections in 1999 and 2003.¹¹ Shockingly, Nigeria's President Obasanjo himself directly admitted in December 2004 that he knew that elections had been rigged in one Nigerian state in 2003, and implied that other states were rigged as well. Nigeria's ruling party clearly had influence over the electoral commission throughout the process. Since 2003, however, the more blatantly rigged Nigerian states have grown increasingly violent as political factions, headed by local Big Men, resort to other means to gain control of the system.

The closer that serious political choices can be brought to the local level, the more comprehensive the balance becomes and the more likely that policies will reflect the interests of a broader scope of citizenry.

Political and economic decentralization are also important factors that both encourage the development of a balance of power and the availability of sufficient political and economic choices for individuals. The closer that serious political choices can be brought to the local level, the more comprehensive the balance becomes and the more likely that policies will reflect the interests of a broader scope of citizenry. In addition, civil society groups typically wield more influence with local governments. Economic decentralization, meanwhile, can shift economic power from the state to the private sector, and can also put some regulatory oversight distance between the state and business. Most of the advanced democracies in Africa have made progress toward scaling back the role of the state in the economy, while several have sought to devolve some political powers from the national level as well. South Africa in particular reorganized its federal structure prior to the 1994 transition, such that regional governments gained greater powers to resolve local issues.

Political cultures must also change if African democracies are to flourish. National political cultures must develop prevalent values of compromise and respect, and national political identities need to increase in relation to subnational or religious identities. The development of a balance of power among the political elite helps to promote political learning of compromise and other values critical for negotiation within a democratic framework, as does open political debate when systems grow more transparent. Mozambique provides one of the most hopeful examples in this regard—after 15 years of civil war, the main combatants transformed into political parties and have peacefully contested three elections since peace negotiations produced a democratic framework in the early 1990s. Deep differences remain, but the

parties continue to value dialogue and negotiation as a nation united rather than the violent methods they chose in the past.

All of these factors together point to what is perhaps the most important need for African democratic development in the early 21st century: the rise of loyal opposition parties capable of winning elections. Successful cases like Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, and Senegal have solid opposition movements that provide voters serious alternatives and that constantly vet government policies and seek to check abuses. Transitional cases like Nigeria and Niger have weak opposition parties currently incapable of unseating ruling parties, while failing or failed states actively seek to crush political opponents. Zimbabwe's rapid decline over the last five years has been a direct result of government efforts to squelch opposition, yet the opposition continues to mobilize, and may, over time, follow the paths of Kenyan and Ghanaian opposition movements to victory.

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An essential element in the development of a loyal opposition is an active and diverse civil society sector. Not only do these groups help to check the power of the state, but they also play critical roles in mobilizing public support both for opposition parties and the government. Moreover, state legitimacy and the social contract between citizens and the state were severely denigrated or broken during the authoritarian phase in Africa; civil society groups can help to reconnect states to their populaces. Labor unions, for instance, have been critical allies of democratic opposition movements throughout Africa, most notably in South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Kenya. The Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) is currently the only serious check on the power of the Nigerian government, far more than Nigeria's weak opposition parties. When the Nigerian government made widely unpopular moves to increase fuel prices over the last three years, NLC strikes have been the only efforts that have forced the government to scale back the burdensome policies.

In addition to the growing role of civil society groups, a very important democratic development has been the rise of multi-ethnic political parties. The early African democracies of the 1960s were plagued by mono-ethnic parties, which assured that the ethnic security dilemma played out in all facets of national policy. Multi-ethnic parties, on the other hand, shift the locus of inter-ethnic competition to the party level, where the incentive for compromise is much stronger, so that one multi-ethnic party may successfully compete with the next one. In this regard, Nigeria's ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), although it is deeply corrupt and is primarily an alliance of convenience among Nigeria's Big Men, has done much to bring ethnic groups across the nation into a common governing process. An important reason

why Nigeria's flawed 2003 elections did not immediately spark widespread unrest was that most of the key ethnic-based concerns had been settled through the tumultuous PDP primary season. Kenya's NARC, in contrast, being a coalition of parties, many of which are ethnic based, remains in constant danger of dissolution over issues driven by the ethnic security dilemma, threatening the promising reform process there.

Each of these elements has done much to ease the ethnic security dilemma in African countries that are more advanced in consolidating their democracies. The economic dilemma, however, remains problematic, although the more consolidated democratic states have made greater strides toward economic development. Nonetheless, a consensus is emerging that the distinction between the growing number of successful African states and the continent's failing states is the degree to which they have democratized. The more consolidated democracies are successful precisely because they are more capable of resolving the ethnic security dilemma, which in turn allows them to undertake sustained efforts to address their economic concerns.

Democratic development in Africa is not the only solution to the continent's many troubles, but the growing list of success stories gives strong credence to the notion that democratic deepening is indeed a necessary condition for addressing Africa's predicaments. Moreover, if the widening gap between the Two Africas is to be closed — and if Second Africa is to be kept from dragging down First Africa through regional insecurity — then the states of the Second must follow the First on the path to democracy.

Table 1. Consolidating Democracies

Country	% GDP Growth			Average % GDP Growth 2001–2003	HDI from 2002
	2001	2002	2003		
Benin	5.0	6.0	5.5	5.50	161
Botswana	5.2	3.9	5.4	4.83	128
Gambia	5.8	-3.2	8.7	3.77	155
Ghana	4.2	4.5	4.7	4.47	131
Kenya	1.2	1.0	1.5	1.23	148
Mali	13.3	4.4	3.2	6.97	174
Mozambique	13.0	7.7	7.0	9.23	171
Namibia	2.3	3.3	3.7	3.10	126
Senegal	5.6	1.1	6.3	4.33	157
South Africa	2.7	3.6	1.9	2.73	119
	<i>Average:</i>			4.62	147

Table 2. Transitional Democracies

Country	% GDP Growth			Average % GDP Growth	HDI from 2002
	2001	2002	2003	2001–2003	
Burkina Faso	5.9	4.4	6.5	5.60	175
Burundi	2.2	4.5	-0.5	2.07	173
Chad	9.5	9.9	10	9.80	167
Madagascar	6.0	-12.7	9.6	0.97	150
Malawi	-4.2	1.8	4.4	0.67	165
Niger	7.1	3.0	4.0	4.70	176
Nigeria	3.0	1.5	10.6	5.03	151
Sierra Leone	5.4	6.3	6.5	6.07	177
Tanzania	6.0	6.3	5.5	5.93	162
Uganda	5.3	6.7	4.9	5.63	146
Zambia	4.9	3.3	4.2	4.13	164
<i>Average:</i>				4.60	164

Table 3. Undemocratic or Reverting toward Authoritarianism

Country	% GDP Growth			Average % GDP Growth	HDI from 2002
	2001	2002	2003	2001–2003	
Angola	3.2	15.3	4.5	7.67	166
Cameroon	5.3	6.5	4.2	5.33	141
Central African Rep.	1.0	-0.8	-5.8	-1.87	169
Congo	3.6	3.5	0.8	2.63	144
Congo, Dem. Rep.	2.1	3.5	0.5	2.03	168
Cote d'Ivoire	0.1	-1.6	-3.8	-1.77	163
Ethiopia	7.7	1.2	-3.8	1.70	170
Gabon	2.0	0	2.8	1.60	122
Guinea	3.8	4.2	2.1	3.37	160
Guinea-Bissau	0.2	-7.2	-1.2	-2.73	172
Lesotho	3.3	3.8	3.9	3.67	145
Mauritania	4.0	3.3	4.2	3.83	152
Rwanda	6.7	9.4	0.9	5.67	159
Swaziland	1.7	3.6	2.2	2.50	137
Togo	-0.2	4.6	3.1	2.50	143
Zimbabwe	-8.8	-12.8	-13.2	-11.60	147
<i>Average:</i>				1.53	154
				(2.41 without Zimbabwe)	

Notes

- ¹ See, for instance: Joseph Siegle, "A Tale of Two Africas," *Los Angeles Times*, July 13, 2003; and Arik Bachar, "A Tale of Two Africas: Ten Years On," *Agence Global*, May 15, 2004.
- ² Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).
- ³ Italy conquered Ethiopia in 1936, but Ethiopia regained its independence after World War II with the previous state structures intact.
- ⁴ Obafemi Awolowo, *Path to Nigerian Freedom*. London: Faber and Faber, 1947.
- ⁵ See, for instance: Peter Ekeh, "Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 17, no. 1 (1976): 91-112.
- ⁶ Compare this perspective to the notion of the security dilemma in Realist thought in international politics. See, among others: Joseph Nye, *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 4th ed. (New York: Longman, 2002).
- ⁷ This development is described as the "rentier state". See: Darren Kew and Peter Lewis, "Nigeria," in Kesselman, Krieger, and Joseph, eds. *Introduction to Comparative Politics: Political Challenges and Changing Agendas* (Houghton Mifflin: New York, 2003 ed.).
- ⁸ Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, "Neopatrimonial regimes and political transitions in Africa," *World Politics* 46(4), 1994.
- ⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave* (Norman: Oklahoma UP, 1991).
- ¹⁰ Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986.
- ¹¹ Darren Kew, "The 2003 Elections in Nigeria: Not Credible, but Acceptable?" In Robert I. Rotberg, ed. *Crafting the New Nigeria: Confronting the Challenges* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004).



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