Fixing Failing States: The New Security Agenda

by Pauline H. Baker

Weak and failing states rank among the world’s greatest threats to international peace and security today. While major threats to world peace used to come mainly from ideological, military, or economic competition among competing states, in modern times lethal threats are growing within states from communal tensions among rival factions, extremists groups with radical political agendas, and faltering regimes clinging to power and asserting militaristic ambitions. These are the driving forces of a growing world disorder.1

Recent events highlight this paradigm shift in the strategic environment. North Korea is a failing state with an inward-looking regime and a negative view of the world. Its own insecurities, including its fear of a US invasion, are motivating it to pursue nuclear capabilities that have increased its isolation further and exacerbated tensions.2 Lebanon is a weak state that successfully cast off fifteen years of Syrian military occupation, but was unable to assert its sovereignty and fill the vacuum left behind. Hezbollah used that opportunity to assert itself as a “state within a state,” with dual power bases in the government and in the south, where its autonomous security forces launched a devastating war with Israel in July 2006. Then there is Sudan, a country with the highest risk of internal violence that has stonewalled effective international action to stop the continuing humanitarian crisis in Darfur, described by the US State Department as genocide.3 Internal weaknesses within these states have increased the threat of nuclear proliferation, precipitated an interstate war, and worsened an ongoing humanitarian crisis, respectively.

Though the origins of state weakness go back decades, the curtain was raised on the era of failing states—if one can call it that—by the tragedy of September 11, 2001. One year after the biggest terrorist attack on the US in history, the 2002 US National Security Strategy stated that America is threatened more by failing states than it is by conquering states, overturning decades of US national security thinking. Overnight, we went from looking at security through a “big power” lens to seeing it from a “small power” lens. Much of the rest of the world has come to see security challenges from that perspective as well.

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Terrorism brought the message home. However, other threats, such as secession, religious extremism, organized crime, money laundering, drug trafficking, and pandemics, also are linked to failing states. While negative forces can emerge in strong states as well as in weak ones, the frequency of the occurrences, the environment that facilitates their growth and the inability of many governments to respond make such threats more difficult to contain in weak states than in strong ones. The persistent violence in Iraq and in Afghanistan after the Baathist and Taliban regimes were militarily overthrown by US-led coalition forces are also a function of state weakness. Deadly terrorist attacks have taken place in many countries worldwide: Kenya, Tanzania, Indonesia, Egypt, England, Spain, India, Philippines, Lebanon, Israel, Algeria, and others. Restive minorities are pressing for autonomy and resources in protracted armed conflicts, such as Nigeria’s Niger Delta. Elections in transition states have resulted in militant movements, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, coming to power, or hard line leaders being installed. This includes Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who accused US President George Bush of being a devil from a UN podium, and Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who denies the Holocaust took place and calls for the destruction of Israel. Animosity from these two states is significant. They both have large oil reserves and promote revolutionary change. Iran is emerging as the strongest power in the Persian Gulf, expanding its influence in the region, and developing a nuclear program in defiance of the UN.

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Not all weak and failing states are linked to security threats. Some analysts have warned against over-generalizing, calling for further research identifying which states are linked to specific threats. Clearly, tracing the lineage of such threats to their source would be useful, but as a group, fragile states remain vulnerable to exploitation by a wide range of outside groups, predatory elites, and internal warlords, all of which may descend on ungoverned spaces for a variety of purposes and at various times.

To understand the full dimension and scope of the problem, the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy magazine collaborated to create the first annual Failed States Index. The Index revealed that roughly two billion people live in misgoverned or insecure states. Approximately two thirds of the states in the world have a critical (high), in danger (likely) or borderline (moderate) risk of violence. The great majority of them are not currently failed states, but they exhibit serious attributes of risk along a continuum. Even strong and stable states can contain “pockets of failure.” Dysfunctionalities were exposed, for example, in the US by its failure to respond adequately to citizens affected by Hurricane Katrina in 2005, an institutional breakdown that stunned the world. France was rocked by violent riots in isolated and
alienated communities that were cut off from the mainstream of society, exposing a fault line in the polity that had been ignored for years.

Conflict risk is a function of the pressures on a state combined with the institutional preparedness of that state to respond to such challenges. Some states are able to contain and repair internal crises quickly; others are chronically unable to cope with such pressures. Consider the ways countries have addressed election crises, for example. Côte d’Ivoire, once considered among the most prosperous and stable countries in Africa, descended into civil conflict following a rigged election and a coup d’état in 2000. It remains a divided land, cut in half by an unresolved civil war.

In contrast, the 2006 Mexican presidential election prompted street protests and possible violence, but parliament and the courts kept the country from crossing that threshold. India’s 2004 parliamentary election resulted in a victory by the National Congress Party of Sonia Gandhi, the Italian-born widow of assassinated Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Popular protests against her taking power prompted her to step aside for Manmohan Singh, a respected economist, to prevent the unrest that her tenure was likely to spark. The 2000 US presidential election, though highly controversial, never threatened violence and was settled in the courts. The variety of responses to the same kind of high-stakes crises shows the variation in strong versus weak states, with the latter coming much closer to open violence.

**Perceptions of the Problem**

What are the root causes of weak and failing states? They are, in large part, a legacy of unresolved historical inequities, including colonial rule, corrupt elites, and the role of the superpowers, which propped up unpopular leaders during the Cold War in quest of alliances and influence. Containment may have been successful in its goal of keeping communism in check until it collapsed, but it had a negative impact on large swaths of the world population whose needs were neglected throughout the half-century of Cold War competition. Deep-seated grievances based on poverty and neglect accumulated, leading to a profound sense of humiliation, xenophobia, and opposition to Western foreign policy, which frequently reinforced, or was seen to reinforce, local inequities.

Without meaningful change, it is not surprising that alienated populations are embracing leaders who advocate violence, revenge, and moral absolutism to achieve a new political order based on communal pride or religious fundamentalism. With the end of the Cold War, the information revolution and globalization facilitated the movement of extremists, who filled the political void in weak states. In this sense, the struggle to fix failing states will be a “long war” — not in the military sense of the term, but rather in the sense that it will need to address basic societal issues. If we are to resolve the root causes of terrorism, we must also address the historical conditions that gave rise to extremism. This means reviving decaying institutions, meeting basic human needs, understanding the long-standing grievances that give rise to humiliation and anger, and addressing local inequities and social injustice.
Some observers have argued that the problem of weak and failing states is not all that serious. Not long ago, efforts to quell such conflicts, once termed “teacup wars,” were derisively dismissed as “social work” that diverted troops and national resources away from emerging peer competitors and rogue states. The military also initially shunned such missions, calling them “military operations other than war.” One school of thought, paradoxically endorsed by figures from both the far Left and the far Right, argues that small wars are not the central issue and that the real threat to peace comes from the imperial ambitions of both the US and China, each fighting for supremacy. At bottom, this is a simplistic interpretation that trivializes reality. Even if hegemony was the central foreign policy goal of these two nations, they are both constrained by threats from weaker states. The US is bogged down in two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the deployment of hundreds of thousands of troops and the investment of over $400 billion for stabilization and reconstruction. It is leading a Global War on Terrorism and an international effort to contain the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Washington is also facing mounting international opposition to its foreign policy goals, particularly since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

China has mounting vulnerabilities as well, as it pursues economic modernization at a break-neck speed and confronts growing dangers of nuclear proliferation in its own neighborhood. It lives in a volatile region that contains several weak and failing states, including North Korea, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Burma. North Korea, one of the most closed and controlled societies in the world, and Pakistan, which lacks effective control over roughly half its territory, are particularly dangerous and insecure states that have nuclear capabilities and unstable and/or unpredictable leadership.

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China also exhibits internal weaknesses. It is one of the most unequal countries in the world, with an average annual growth of 10 percent and 150 million people living on one dollar a day. This contributes to widespread corruption and eroding state legitimacy, especially in the countryside. In 2005, China experienced 87,000 protests from more than 4 million people complaining about arbitrary fees, taxes, land grabs by local officials and deteriorating social services. Some Chinese scholars have pointed out the short time that China has had to build a modern state, dating from the market-oriented reforms announced by Deng Xiaoping in 1992; one scholar described the country as a “teenager” or “adolescent” in this regard. China is also becoming highly dependent on oil supplies from countries with high political risk, exposing Beijing’s potential vulnerability to supply interruptions should civil unrest break out. China tends to disregard human rights and internal conflict.
conditions in the states it depends upon for oil. Beijing offers large loans and grants to corrupt and unstable governments, a policy that could deepen the host country’s political risk by undermining reforms. Eventually, disregarding local concerns may trigger a backlash from Africans, despite the benefits they are currently receiving.

Europe is also struggling with the problem of weak states, especially in Southeast Europe. The Balkans erupted into civil conflict a decade ago and continues to seethe with ethnic hostilities. In 1995, NATO conducted its first “out of area” military mission in Bosnia, noting at the time that this was not a precedent for such missions in the future. Yet, in 2006, NATO took full responsibility for stabilizing the entire country of Afghanistan to contain the reemergence of the Taliban. Other regional and sub-regional organizations are likewise taking a larger role, though they differ widely on the desirability and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.9

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Significantly, the African Union (AU), whose members have traditionally been staunchly opposed to outside interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, has moved in a new direction. In its charter, the AU authorized humanitarian intervention under certain conditions and it deployed a military mission of 7,000 troops in Darfur, Sudan, the first large-scale mission of this type.10 The African Union force has not succeeded in stopping the violence due to its limited mandate, poor funding, and insufficient equipment, but its presence is deemed preferable to having no international presence at all and efforts have been made to convert it into a UN force.11 At the time of this writing, the African Union is trying to mobilize another peacekeeping force to deploy in Somalia under a UN mandate to replace departing Ethiopian troops, who invaded the country to overthrow the Islamic Courts.

While not as effective as hoped, the deployment of AU forces is a sign of the growing acceptance of the principle of a “responsibility to protect,” which was adopted by the United Nations in 2006.12 Security Council Resolution 1674 states that the international community has a responsibility to protect civilians in armed conflict if their government cannot, or does not, do so itself. In addition to the adoption of this principle, the UN is once again fielding a record number of peacekeepers, from Lebanon to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In August 2006, the Security Council adopted resolutions that are likely to increase UN peacekeeping levels by approximately 50 percent and could increase the overall cost of such operations from the projected 2006—2007 $4.7 billion level to $8 billion.13

Not every humanitarian emergency or failing state needs an international military response. Precipitous military responses without prior peaceful efforts at conflict resolution could make matters much worse. Diplomacy, economic tools, and
cultural exchanges play equally important roles in preventing and mitigating conflict. Policymakers have been understandably cautious about peace enforcement missions and armed humanitarian interventions, in which good intentions can turn bad, as happened in Somalia in 1993. Yet overly cautious responses can be equally devastating, as was illustrated when the international community failed to intervene in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. It went on for four months, killing 800,000 people. Once again, massacres are occurring in Darfur, with timid responses from the international community.

History, thus, has made a U-turn. In the 20th century, the dominant threat to world peace came from powerful states; today they come from weak states. Aggressors of the 20th century conquered territories; today’s aggressors are mostly interested in shaping international attitudes toward their political causes.\(^\text{14}\) Clashes in the past occurred between large state armies, using conventional military equipment, backed up with the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Most wars today are fought within states, with non-state militias playing a primary role. Their weapons of choice are improvised explosive devices, small arms, suicide bombings, and other attacks on civilians using unconventional means, such as converting commercial aircraft into missiles. Groups committed to catastrophic violence have already threatened the nightmare scenario: the use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction. As the *New York Times* opined, “we live in an age in which fighting on the ground to rescue failed states and isolate terrorists has become the Pentagon’s most urgent and vital military mission.”\(^\text{15}\) Increasingly, it is becoming the primary mission of other agencies of government, and a major concern of international organizations and alliances as well.

**WHAT ARE WEAK AND FAILING STATES AND HOW DO WE RECOGNIZE THEM?**

While there is no universal definition of a weak and failing state, most scholars agree that they have common attributes. These include loss of physical control over territory, lack of a monopoly on the use of force, declining legitimacy to make authoritative decisions for the majority of the community, an inability to provide security or social services to its people, and, frequently, a lack of capacity to act as a full member of the international community. The terms “failed,” “failing,” or “collapsed” states are controversial, but they have become the most commonly used terms. Some agencies and think tanks use other terms, such as “fragile states” or “low income countries under stress.” However, these terms might suggest that state weakness is confined to poor countries (it is not) and that all low-income countries are weak, fragile or failing (they are not).

How can the seriousness of those vulnerabilities be determined? The Fund for Peace has developed an approach, called the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) to accomplish this. It conducts a careful assessment of twelve conflict indicators or drivers (pressures on the states) coupled with an evaluation of five key
state institutions necessary to manage those pressures (police, military, civil service, system of justice, and executive/legislative leadership). In this way, the level of “sustainable security”—defined as the ability of a state to resolve its internal problems peacefully without an external military or sustainable presence — is determined. In the Failed States Index, which is based on CAST, all the pressures on states are assessed by the same indicators and institutional criteria to ensure that risk levels, wherever they may appear, are not biased in favor of one class of states over others.

Since 2001, the FFP has been refining a computerized version of CAST that processes over 12,000 international, regional and national media sources in print, electronic and broadcast form. This includes news outlets, government reports, think tank studies, commercial information, statistical sources, polling results and any other relevant public source information. Using Boolean phrases for content analysis, CAST scores the indicators based on data that are scanned, sorted, and indexed according to the indicators and their measures. The final scores are internally checked and reviewed by experts.

This method exposes a popular misperception about weak and failing states. It is often thought that “strong states” are those with large populations, considerable military assets, and an advanced economy, the traditional indices for gauging relative power internationally. However, these factors do not always reveal how strong a state is internally. Observers often confuse “strong states” with “strongman states.” Stability in strongman states rests on one person or group of leaders, such as Kim Jong Il in North Korea or Saddam Hussein in Iraq. In reality, while they can be dangerous, such states are only as stable as their leadership. In 2003, Iraq was said to have the fourth largest army in the world and weapons of mass destruction; in reality, it was already a failing state due to a decade of sanctions, mismanagement, and oppression. The army did not put up a stiff resistance to the 2003 US-led invasion, and other Iraqi institutions also imploded immediately after Saddam was overthrown.

In contrast, strong states have governing institutions that are legitimate, representative, and competent. They enable these states to weather internal political, economic, and social crises without resorting to violence or needing a foreign military or administrative presence.

FINDINGS FROM THE FAILED STATES INDEX (FSI)

What did we find from our recent research on the Failed States Index and other investigations?

• The problem of weak and failing states is far more extensive than previously thought. Roughly two billion people live in insecure states, which have a borderline to moderate or critical risk of civil violence.

• Most organizations and scholars estimate twenty-five to fifty states have moderate to high risk of political violence. The Index identified at least sixty that raise significant concern.
Africa has the largest number of weak and failing states.

Other states with borderline to high risk are located in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. The territorial expanse stretches from Moscow to Mexico City and is not limited to the Muslim world.¹⁹

Large states (with populations of fifty million or more) are increasingly vulnerable, from Indonesia to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This raises the possibility of significant spillover effects from refugees, economic linkages, ethnic affinity, and resource exploitation. In some areas, such as the Horn of Africa, there are clusters of failed states that are spiraling into failed regions.

Large defense budgets do not correlate with the risk of failure. Comparing the Index rankings to state spending on the military, weak states have various magnitudes of defense spending. Nor is the opposite true: military expenditures do not necessarily correlate with stability. Five of the world’s top military spenders (as a percentage of the Gross Domestic Product) are conflict vulnerable states: Eritrea, Angola, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Bahrain.

The risk of failure does not necessarily match comparable media coverage. Events in the most at-risk states, such as Cote d’Ivoire, Somalia, and DRC were barely noted in the international press.

Countries with the greatest risk of failure do not necessarily receive the largest amount of aid. Foreign aid per capita compared to the FSI revealed that high-risk countries get minimum aid, except for those in which there has been military intervention. Among those, Bosnia got the most while Cote d’Ivoire got the least.

The top drivers of violence included demographic pressures (especially a youth bulge and natural disasters), economic inequality (not merely poverty), criminalization and de-legitimization of the state (most often based on corruption, coups, and rigged elections), and a legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance (from religious and ethnic divisions).

Corruption correlates highly with instability. Eight of the ten most stable countries also appeared among the ten least corrupt countries in Transparency International’s perception of corruption scores.²⁰ Chile, one of the most stable countries in Latin America, is recognized as among the least corrupt in the region.

As many as fifty million people in at-risk states voted in elections in 2005, but that did not translate automatically into stability. Results were mixed. The 2004 elections in Indonesia improved that nation’s indicators in 2005, and Liberia reached a milestone with the 2005 election of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, following years of brutal war. In both countries, elections strengthened legitimization of the state. However, a number of states also misused elections to exacerbate ethnic conflict and reinforce authoritarian rule, including Ethiopia, Iran, Tajikistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe, the latter exhibiting a sharp and constant downward spiral.
How can failing states be fixed? This is a central question of our time. Until recently, most “solutions” were based on stopgap measures and short-term responses revolving around inappropriate notions of creating societies that were reflections of those in the West. The problem with this approach is that sustainable security cannot be transplanted easily nor be accomplished as a cookie cutter approach, with uniform activities in all states. It must come from within the society. Unless and until state-building takes root in the indigenous society and with committed local leadership, no amount of external training, reconstruction, constitution-making, or elections will make it stick.

Fixing failing states basically requires a two-track policy: building core state institutions while, at the same time, reducing the conflict drivers. It is a long, costly, and difficult process that requires ample resources, leadership, commitment, patience, and multilateral cooperation. Some states, such as East Timor and Haiti, were once considered successes, only to descend into violence or coups a short time after the premature withdrawal of peacekeeping forces. Backsliding is a constant risk of bad timing, poor funding, and quick exits.

There have been examples of failing states that have successfully pulled themselves back from the brink. The two most notable examples that made the transition to stability are South Africa and India, both taking decades to do it. Most significantly, their transitions were accomplished without external military intervention. Their processes were driven by local forces, not imported from the outside. In the 1970s, India was widely deemed to be heading for a Malthusian catastrophe, with famine, overpopulation, poverty, the caste system, and religious conflict undermining efforts to develop and progress as a unified state. Today, while it contains many unresolved issues, India is thriving. Its problems are real, but they are much less serious than the apocalyptic forecast made years ago. India is the world’s largest multiparty democracy with one of the fastest growing economies in the world.

Similarly, in the 1980s, apartheid South Africa had widespread inequality and spreading violence that was driving the country toward a race war. Yet, while it also retains problems, South Africa accomplished a remarkable transition from white domination to black majority rule, with a philosophy of racial reconciliation promoted by Nelson Mandela, the country’s first president under a universal franchise. Though burdened with a difficult legacy of inequality, it boasts sound economic policies, a respect for constitutional rule, a free press, and a strong civil society. Neither India nor South Africa is in the “stable” or “most stable” categories in the FSI; however, they dodged the bullet of state failure that could have torn their countries apart.

Many western governments are taking steps to devise new policies, bureaucratic structures, and interagency systems to prevent conflict and to stabilize countries emerging from conflict. The US, UK, Canada, Germany, France, the Netherlands,
and Scandinavian countries, as well as multilateral organizations, have issued new directives and set up new agencies to develop better early warning, preventive actions, and interagency management systems for stability and reconstruction activities. The US military is experimenting with new metrics for measuring progress, or lack thereof, in such operations. Scholars, think tanks, and aid agencies are doing the same.

The UN established a Peace Building Commission to coordinate the efforts of donor countries, international financial institutions, and troop contributing countries. Governments and military organizations are investing in better predictive frameworks and systems of post-conflict reconstruction. The US military has made stability and reconstruction operations (SRO) a core mission and the White House issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44 to mandate the US State Department as the lead agency in coordinating, planning, and implementing SRO assistance in states in transition from conflict or civil strife. The directive states that the US “should work with other countries and organizations to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate.”

A Rand Corporation study by James Dobbins offered “a rough hierarchy of nation-building functions” that provides an overall guide to peacemakers. This hierarchy does not need to be sequential and, when resources permit, may be pursued simultaneously. However, higher-priority needs, Dobbins notes, should be adequately funded before lower-priority ones, “in recognition of the fact that if first order objectives are not met, money spent on second order objectives will be wasted.”

His hierarchy of six functions is:

- Security: peacekeeping, law enforcement, rule of law, and security-sector reform
- Humanitarian and relief efforts: refugee return, containment of potential communicable diseases, and large-scale famine, other acute health concerns
- Governance: resuming public services and restoring public administration
- Economic stabilization: stable currency, legal and regulatory framework for resumption of local and international commerce
- Democratization: building political parties, free press, civil society, and a legal and constitutional framework for elections
- Development and infrastructure: fostering economic growth, poverty reduction, and infrastructure improvements

These fundamentals are important. In Iraq, the US pursued this sequence in reverse, starting with infrastructure and democratization. While the sequence does not have to be rigid, the higher order priorities should come first—security and the rule of law, humanitarian needs, governance, and economic stabilization. Nearly every state-building experience has confirmed the wisdom of that hierarchy, and where it has been ignored, the mission has usually failed.

Even under the best of circumstances, and the fullness of resources, state-building is a long, costly, and risky process with no guarantees of success. However
difficult and complex it might be, we have no choice but to meet the challenge. Building secure and competent states is vital to the US national interest. The US and its allies face the possibility of failing states reemerging in Afghanistan and Iraq, with the return of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The possibility of failing states endangering national and global security exists from North Korea to Lebanon.

And the danger does not reside within weak states alone. An additional concern is threat convergence — the linkage between weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and weak and failing states — which could open up new pathways to proliferation. North Korea, for example, presents a dual threat as a country with its own nuclear development that could endanger the US and its allies, and as a potential seller of nuclear technology to a non-state terrorist group committed to catastrophic violence. When one contemplates the number of countries with potential rogue scientists, residual arsenals that are not well secured, and multiple anti-western groups operating in ungoverned or misgoverned territories, the full scope of the danger becomes clear. As many as fifty states have enriched uranium or the capability to make or acquire enriched uranium that could accelerate proliferation. Whether the problem is approached from a humanitarian perspective or a strategic perspective, fixing failing states will be the new national security agenda of the early 21st century.

Notes

1 Communal rivalries refer to conflicts based on competing ethnic, clan, racial, religious, linguistic, geographical, or class differences that create a sense of collective belonging or group identity that defines the social location of group members in competition with “other” competing communities.


3 Sudan refused to allow a UN peacekeeping mission to replace the ill-equipped and undermanned African Union peacekeeping force that also lacks that mandate to stop the killing in Darfur. Khartoum stated that it would consider any country's pledge to participate in a UN force as a “hostile act” and a “prelude to an invasion.” The Sudanese government threatened an al-Qaeda and Sudanese attack on non-African forces if they land. As many as 450,000 people have died and 2 million displaced in what has been described as the worst violence in Africa in more than a decade. See “Sudan Escalates Stand Against UN Mission for Darfur,” Washington Post, October 6, 2006.


7 That term is no longer in vogue, but it shows how stability and reconstruction operations, as they are now called, were viewed in the decade of the 1990s. They can be found at www.fundforpeace.org.

8 Comments made at a Beijing conference hosted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences on trilateral cooperation September 22-24, 2006.


10 The African Union previously deployed a smaller mission in Burundi to protect leaders in the transitional government. This was not considered to be a traditional peacekeeping mission, however, as it was more a bodyguard function for the political elites during the transition period.

11 Susan Rice, Anthony Lake and Congressman Donald Payne called for a more muscular military response
13 Peter Gantz, US Budget Requirements for UN Peacekeeping 2006. Available at:
14 The notable exception is, of course, the Palestinian movement. Other conflicts also raise territorial
concerns, such as the Serbian quest for control of Kosovo or border disputes arising from colonial days. For
the most part, however, the conflicts circle around identity, resource, and religious issues.
16 These concepts are taken from the FFP methodology known as CAST (the Conflict Assessment System
Tool) and the Failed States Index.
17 For more information see Fund for Peace reports on “Iraq as a Failed State.” Available at:
18 Save the Children calculated that, of the 115 million primary-aged children worldwide that are not in
school, at least 43 million—one in three—live in fragile states affected by armed conflict. Available at:
19 The FFP has scores for 148 states published on its interactive website. Available at:
20 Available at:
(Accessed on February 1, 2007).
22 For another framework, see Jock Covey, et al., Eds., The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and
Strategies for Conflict Transformation, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2005). In much of the
literature, the terms “nation-building and “state-building” are used interchangeably.