In Defense of a Concert of Liberal Democracies

by Robert S. Singh

Among the many areas of academic disagreement about US foreign policy at the end of the Bush years, one notable source of relative consensus exists—democracy promotion will assume a very modest part of the Obama Administration’s approach to world affairs. Even during the comparatively benign years of the Clinton presidency, opinion surveys consistently demonstrated that democracy promotion was a very low priority among the American public, and only marginally more important to foreign policy elites. Now, amidst grave financial crisis and huge economic instability, liberal democracies are facing the imperatives of securing energy independence and combating climate change. Compounded by shifting changes in the global balance of power and challenges to Washington from both traditional state actors (Russia, Iran, and Venezuela) and continuing threats from militant Islam, institutional liberalism’s least pressing task would seem to be the dogged pursuit of a more democratic world. Tarnished in particular by the mismanaged occupation of Iraq and the victory of Hamas in Gaza, serious doubts now remain over not only Washington’s capacity to build democracies abroad, but also the very desirability of such efforts.

The starting point for many analysts today is instead the reality of a multi-polar world, in which the major players, now including China, India, Brazil and Russia, have divergent views of how they see their own and the rest of the world’s future. The pressing necessity—abstract for academics and public intellectuals, but all too real for the next administration—is how to best recalibrate foreign policy to match the implications of the new constellation of power for the future world order. But while power equations are changing, the international architecture continues to be mired in the power structures of the past, and mid-twentieth century designs are increasingly incapable of responding to the complex challenges of the twenty-first century. This mismatch between power and order at the international level is of particular concern to the US, and requires that Washington explore how global institutions may need to be altered in order to meet the challenges and opportunities of an increasingly interdependent yet multi-polar world. In this regard, traditional US

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support for democracy promotion may appear, especially to many Americans, not only outdated, but counterproductive.

But need this be the case? In the pages that follow I seek to advance a case for maintaining the goal of spreading democracy as a key component for the next administration and Congress. As a strategic objective, tactical instrument, and moral impulse, abandoning democracy promotion would be a grievous error for Washington if it is indeed serious about preserving and enhancing institutional liberalism and, moreover, reviving the centrality of its leadership role within a purportedly “post-American” world. What needs to alter, however, is not so much the substance of the ultimate goal, whose validity remains the subject of broad consensus within the US and throughout the greater developed world. Rather, the role of democracy promotion, within the general contours of US foreign policy, requires revisiting and refinement. As a matter of urgency, a principal feature of this revision should be the development of a Concert of Liberal Democracies (CLD) as a formally organized, well resourced, and institutionalized forum for international collaboration, consultation, and collective action. Such a concert would clarify the choices facing the world and relieve the US of its lonely responsibility of assuring global public goods, while providing the surest route to meaningful democracy promotion in the future.

THE DIMMING OF A DEMOCRATIC DAY

Democracy promotion has had a long and distinguished, if far from settled, place within US foreign policy. Now, however, neither its desirability nor its feasibility appears at all secure. The challenge to democracy promotion both reflects and reinforces the broader pressures to which institutional liberalism has been subjected since 2001.

As a simple matter of raw power, and in stark contrast to the various expressions of triumphalism that accompanied the years between the wars—that is, post-1989 and pre-9/11, it no longer appears that institutional liberalism is on the ascendant, whether in the political or economic spheres. The notion that liberal democracy, economic growth, and prosperity are inextricably linked has been directly challenged by the rise of authoritarian capitalism, most notably (but far from exclusively) in China, Russia and the Gulf. By challenging the economic balance of power in regions throughout the world, emerging markets have stirred a profound scepticism regarding the causal links between pluralist forms of governance and economic performance. As such, the material interests of billions of people across the planet no longer seem to rest on the development of governments that are accountable to their people. While some may bemoan this phenomenon, the reality seems to be that many citizens of quite disparate nations and regions would willingly trade the political liberties and rights associated with liberalism in exchange for material...
security and prosperity. Just as varieties of capitalism have long co-existed, so too may varieties of government, from illiberal democracies to autocratic regimes, that can tailor their particular embrace of the market to the specific conditions—material, ethnic, religious, and cultural—of the host state.

Beyond the apparent de-linking of democratic change and material fortunes, the feasibility of the US exporting democracy is now widely questioned in four important respects. First, the notion that Washington ought to impose its political-economic model on other peoples has been discredited to many by the Iraq experience, perhaps permanently. While the military surge under General Petraeus proved to be a startling success, the Iraqi democracy that George W. Bush leaves in place upon departing Washington is fragile at best, and its prospects are anything but clear. Admittedly, the US went to war for security reasons, not to promote democracy; but to the extent that the latter figured into its post-war justifications, the democratic legacy forms part of the overall audit of the Iraq intervention. Moreover, Iraq has not—thus far, at least—served as an exemplary effect for the greater region. Indeed, assisting pro-democracy movements in the Middle East has proven to be, in many cases, a mixed blessing for both the movements themselves and for Washington. In an era of rampant anti-Americanism, the former are all too easily cast as *American democratic jihad* stooges, rather than genuine patriots, while Washington often finds itself trusting fair-weather friends of dubious reliability and sincerity.

Secondly, the US now finds itself in a powerfully constrained position in terms of a forward leaning posture. American resources are transparently finite and the US public is exhibiting demonstrable signs of an inward turn that are unmistakable. Just as peoples in emerging markets are placing security and prosperity first, so many Americans are understandably skeptical towards expending their tax dollars and young military personnel on conducting ambitious political experiments abroad, rather than on assuring their position at home. As Iraq so brutally demonstrated, even if planted, the seeds of democratic change require many years of careful nurturing to come to fruition. One need not subscribe to the bigoted notion of there being an “Arab exception” to the spread of democracy around the globe in order to accept the fact that the many distinct cultures and traditions of the Middle East have proven tenaciously resistant to the appeal of western forms of liberal democratic governance. Why Americans should therefore expend blood and treasure in substantial quantities to secure a goal that seems not only elusive, but undesirable to many within the region, is far from obvious.

Third, although including democracy promotion as an explicit goal of US foreign policy accords with the finest ideals and values of the US, it deeply complicates America’s international relations. It is close to impossible for the US to be consistent, both over time and in relation to all states, in marrying its sincere ideals to its actual policies. By emphasizing its quest for democratic freedoms in Iraq, while either refusing to pressure other states (Saudi Arabia), reneging on such pressure elsewhere (Egypt, Pakistan), or refusing to accept the outcome of elections (Hamas
in Gaza), Washington appears hypocritical. Similarly, tailoring its democracy promotion rhetoric and pressure solely on the basis of relative power exacerbates the double standards on view (Cuba is pressured to move towards democracy post-Castro, while China is happily ignored).

Fourth and finally, the incentives attached to democratic transformation are no longer clear. It has become evident that achieving the necessary conditions for membership in NATO and the EU, through democratic transformation does not guarantee a decisive US, EU, or NATO intervention in defence of a threatened sovereign, as Georgia so graphically discovered in August 2008. Equally, the absence of democratic change, provided that a closer or more reliable security posture is assured to Washington, represents no stumbling block for improved bilateral relations, as Libya has discovered since its abandonment of its WMD programs in 2003.

In summary, to the limited extent that a democratic wave flowed around the world after 1989, it no longer seems one that is so enticing to surf. A pragmatic US administration would therefore be well advised to mute its rhetoric about the imperative of democratic change and recall the pledge in the Declaration of Independence to evince “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind,” however different the latter may be to American interests and ideals.

AN INDECENT RESPECT TO THE OPINIONS OF MANKIND?

The case for downgrading democracy promotion is serious, informed, and powerful; but it is not, ultimately, compelling. A proper reading of the Declaration should recall that its rationale was that “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.” This is not the conventional contemporary progressive interpretation, which states that America needs to heed the views of the rest of the world, but instead, a reminder that America should give the world reasons for its actions. After all, the war for independence was fought not so the colonies could be more like Great Britain and other European powers, but to forge a decisive break and commence a new beginning in America. Listening to allies and adversaries is invariably wise and prudent; being bound by them is not.

In some respects, of course, a place for democracy promotion remains a part of every administration’s foreign policy because democracy is an ineluctable part of the American DNA. The issue is really what priority this should form, what forms it should assume, and what strategies, tactics, and rhetoric should inform the commitment. At this juncture, a prudent course would be to modify the strategic approach. The best mechanism for effecting such a change would be to elevate the objective of institutionalizing a concert of liberal democracies above—but not to the exclusion of—bilateral efforts at encouraging and supporting regime change.
IN DEFENSE OF A CONCERT OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES

A CONCERT OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES

As Thomas Carothers has rightly noted, big ideas do not surface very often in international politics. The notion of a Concert of Democracies, or a League of Democracies, however, represents just such an idea, one whose time Carothers is adamant has not arrived. Nonetheless, the idea has received support from across the political spectrum. The Princeton Project on National Security, headed by moderate Democrats G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, strongly endorsed the idea in its final report of 2006. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, the former an advisor to Senator Barack Obama’s (D-Ill) presidential campaign, strongly echoed more detailed support for the proposal. On the right, figures such as Robert Kagan and Charles Krauthammer concurred, while Senator John McCain (R-AZ) explicitly advanced the idea in his foreign policy platform. Even the apostate neo-conservative, Francis Fukuyama, expressed enthusiasm. Such broad and influential sources of support at a time of pronounced polarization is rare indeed and itself attests to the potency of this particular proposal.

While the exact form that the entity should take differs among its backers and remains embryonic in conception, in essence, the notion of a Concert implies a free-standing organization that operates separately from the United Nations, which it could conceivably replace. Its purpose would be to provide a reliable mechanism for securing cooperation and support for shared goals, especially in terms of providing legitimacy for military interventions to secure global peace and security, tackling ethnic cleansing, increasing pressure on “rogue” and autocratic regimes, and assisting in the fight against global crises such as HIV/AIDS and global warming. As Daalder and Lindsay suggest, this is not multilateralism for its own sake, but instead, a way to reinvigorate the bargain that the US struck after the Second World War and regain the trust that was shaken among America’s fellow democracies during the Bush years.

Critics of the notion typically venture objections based on three problems that they identify. First, the Concert is deemed to be merely a cover for perpetuating US dominance. Second, proposals for a Concert are seen as a subtle cover for blatant anti-UN agendas. Third, the proposal is seen as conferring a deeply misguided confidence in the like-mindedness of constitutional liberal democracies. Allow me to refute each of these claims.

DUBYA-LITE?

The charge that a CLD would simply be new wine in the old bottle of US imperialism seems misguided. To begin with, the very proposal of new institutional architectures for the current global order is prima facie recognition that a new world is emerging, one for which the rules and institutions of the Cold War and pre-9/11 era are no longer well-suited.
era are no longer well-suited. During the Cold War, the US dominated new institutions such as the GATT, IMF, World Bank, and NATO because of its unmatched power. If, however, this is now eroding, as many critics argue, America’s ability to dominate new institutions will be comparably constrained. In designing the new entity, it would be for the co-founders to determine the necessary criteria for what constitutes a democracy. But whether one adopted a version of Robert Dahl’s polyarchy, or the 2002 National Security Strategy’s “non-negotiable demands of liberty”, this is an eminently feasible task for mature pluralist systems to accomplish. Indeed, any formal system of admission into a CLD could involve a weighted Admissions Commission that was not automatically acceded a US majority, or veto, in designing a Charter of Democratic Rights. Moreover, such a charter would go beyond merely free and fair elections. It would require that fundamental political and civil rights—such as freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and the right to organize, petition, and participate in government—were assured in the applicant member state.

In this regard, nomenclature matters. Part of the continuing appeal of the United Nations remains its misleading title, which belies a more prosaic reality in which its members are typically more disunited than in agreement. While some of the UN’s functional agencies, including the UN High Commission for Refugees, World Health Organization, and World Food Program, generally perform admirably, the UN mostly proves woefully inadequate as a vehicle for addressing serious international problems. This is especially true for issues concerning hard security, such as WMD proliferation, genocide, and inter and intra-state violence. As an expression of the institutionalization of all the deficiencies of a great power concert, the very universality of the UN significantly limits its utility in resolving hard security issues and more specifically, the plethora of threats generated within, rather than between, states.

A Concert of Liberal Democracies addresses this issue by ensuring that only those states whose governments prove accountable to their people would be admitted, as exemplified in constitutional and pluralist regimes. Moreover, the accountability of governments would accord the deliberations, pronouncements, and ultimately, the collective interventions deemed necessary by the Concert. Such an institution would embody the consensual legitimacy that is currently absent from most UN (non-) decisions. In fact, concert, unlike league (itself tainted by the memories of the failed League of Nations prior to WWII), implies a dedicated effort at collective mobilization behind shared goals. Finally, as a concert rather than an alliance, the non-military aspects of the shared interests and values of its members would gain particular emphasis as well.
KILLING THE UN SOFTLY

The backing of neo-conservatives—apparently in and of itself a sufficiently toxic element for some to require automatic opposition—arouses disquiet among some critics. Much as their support for the war on terror and the overthrow of Saddam was depicted in some commentary as a sinister cloak for hidden agendas, so too is their advocacy of a CLD seen as an instrumental mechanism for fatally undermining the UN.

This criticism, however, appears perverse. As previously over Iraq, an enormous amount of power is being attributed to a handful of writers who are themselves divided over the issue. For example, Krauthammer sees virtue in the democratic homicide of the UN, while Kagan denies the motive of replacing it. Ultimately, if the arguments for a CLD attract wide appeal, it will happen; otherwise, it will not. In addition, whether or not the mixed motivations of its supporters are remotely pertinent to the strategic efficacy of the project is a moot matter entirely.

Moving forward, defenders of the existing system need to explain how the widely acknowledged flaws of the UN are to be remedied, as they must surely be if ways forward are to be found on an array of issues where the institution is sadly, but obviously, broken. As Ikenberry and Slaughter put it:

One of the things that all members of a Concert of Democracies—which could include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey, and many other states—would agree on is that the circles of global decision-making need widening. If the concert gained sufficient credibility—or political legitimacy—it could speak with a collective voice on great issues of the day when the United Nations failed to do so, providing an additional incentive for reform.

It is manifestly apparent that the UN Security Council remains unable to reform to widen the circles of decision-making to include powerful states such as Japan, Germany, Brazil, or India. Turkey, a crucial state in a critical region, is highly unlikely to be invited to join the EU, despite making major reforms in order to meet the EU’s requirements. If we are to unfreeze the institutional arrangements of an altogether inappropriate and entirely outdated generation, the burden of elaborating an alternative path forward is on critics of the CLD proposal, whose silence thus far has been deafening.

DEMOCRACIES DIFFER

The third criticism of a CLD is that it cannot guarantee the ends for which it is purportedly established. Democratic governments differ not only with non-democratic ones (though not reliably so even in that regard), but also among themselves. But one is apt to ask, So what? The test for a successful institutional innovation should not be unanimity. If it were, there would be no effective innovations (neither the EU, the UN, NATO, or others always see eye to eye). Nonetheless, the obvious and enduring fact that democracies possess distinct interests should not negate, or outweigh, the common value systems they embody.
The only law of international politics that approaches that of a scientific law is that mature constitutional democracies do not go to war with each other. That remarkable fact still receives insufficient attention and respect. Indeed, as Ikenberry and Slaughter note, when democracies do differ intensely among themselves, as they did over Iraq in 2002 and 2003, the significance of such division would be amplified under a CLD.11 What one would hope and expect, however, is that an institutionalized organization would increasingly socialize its members into viewing their common interests, and threats to these, as matters for collective solidarity and initiative.

A GLOBAL DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS

Establishing a CLD has important virtues in this regard. In terms of geopolitics, formally recognizing the interplay of values and interests that democracies share gives explicit acknowledgment to an existing reality. The internal arrangements of a regime do matter to its external behavior, as has been vividly and tragically attested to in Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, the Congo, Darfur, Burma, and elsewhere. Determining partners not only on the basis of their relative power, but their governing arrangements, is a powerful and dramatic change. However, given the numerous challenges facing liberal democracies today, advancing down a democratic road does not mean that non-democratic regimes can be ignored; nor does it mean that cooperation and negotiation with the latter constitute the necessary parts of a solution to the most critical issues facing the world today. In a world of overlapping networks of formal and informal relations, it would be impossible to avoid working with states that refused to countenance even the legitimacy, let alone the desirability, of constitutional liberalism. That is not going to change, even if a nascent CLD can be forged over coming years.

Nonetheless, armed with a well-staffed, full-time secretariat and a substantial budget, a CLD that holds regular ministerial meetings and frequent summits offers a prospect for collaboration and collective action that would not be hampered by the go-slow and vetoes of Russia and China in the UN Security Council. Moreover, a CLD provides a stark contrast to the twin threats of autocratic regimes and radical Islamism that are likely to persist for decades to come. The banding together of mature constitutional democracies in formal alignment is not a panacea. Interest-based differences will persist, as will genuine disagreements on the priorities attached to particular challenges and the best means to address them. Such is the nature of our noisy democratic realities. Nevertheless, a CLD would still provide—just as institutions such as the EU, NATO, and the WTO—institutionalized opportunities to consult, cajole, and convince like-minded interlocutors of the sincerity of our commitment to common values and the willingness to abide by shared rules and conventions. As a source of collective strength that could potentially prove formidable, regular interaction via a CLD would not only enhance integration among the current set of liberal democratic states, but also speed the support for pro-active interventions that crises from Darfur to Iran presently demand.
Moreover, the incentives to bandwagon with, and ultimately join, such a successful association of innovative, productive, and militarily powerful states, are likely to prove strong. Much of the current bout of despondency about the fate of the West relies on an historical determinism that is subject to powerful counter-arguments. It assumes, for example, that the rise of states such as China and India is linear, when it is not. It assumes, too, that the reassertion of Russian power is a lasting phenomenon, despite the major reasons for questioning its longevity. In short, the momentum towards a CLD can serve as a rejoinder to contemporary Cassandras, and an expression of a justifiable confidence in the utility of democratic forms of governance in the long-term.

One might add that, conceived in the right way, a CLD can act as an effective caucus within the purported parliament of the world, the UN. Opponents might contend that this step threatens to create a new cold war for the twenty-first century, one in which the democratic world—itself divided—is pitted against the non-democratic world. This view, however, overlooks the divisions among the latter, divisions that are arguably more profound and consequential than the occasional conflicts between democratic regimes. Indeed, one could offer physical expression to the changed contours of the twenty-first century by locating a new CLD organization within the current UN building in New York City. It could then be relocated to a new symbolically charged home, perhaps in Delhi, Brasilia, or Berlin. Such a development would have a dual effect. On one hand, it would display a welcoming magnanimity on the part of the US; relinquishing the home of the UN after sixty years at Turtle Bay would be seen as recognition of a newly emergent world order. On the other hand, it would also offer the added attraction of relieving the US political class and public the ignominy and tedium of anti-American zealots, such as Hugo Chavez and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, offering their puffs for Noam Chomsky and anti-US polemics in the heart of one of America’s premier cities.

Finally, a recalibration of dues to the UN, which the formation of a CLD would necessitate, could also accelerate much-needed reform. For example, CLD members would need to prioritize both their strategic goals and the appropriate funding in order to be dedicated to these reforms. Autocratic members of the UN would likewise be required either to put up or shut up in terms of their commitment to fighting pandemics, disease, and other prevailing concerns. The stark reality of the current era—that it is fundamentally the democratic world that bears the principal costs for assistance without conditions through UN programs—might then be made pellucidly clear not only to the recipients, but to democratic publics as well. To the extent that the CLD serves as a mechanism for the serious reform of a dysfunctional UN, such hard financial realities could conceivably induce changes that mere speeches cannot.

**Towards a Matrix of institutional Reform**

Whether or not Zakaria is correct that a post-American world is emerging, there can be no doubt that the geo-political landscape is shifting in a manner unseen since
the late nineteenth century. Thus, a new architecture for the current global system urgently requires building. Ideally, such a system would institutionalize consultation, not only between the world’s democrats, but also between the twentieth and the twenty-first century’s major powers, even if it cannot guarantee cooperation. There is no reason why such a reconfiguration should not complement the formation of a CLD and advance just as rapidly, if the political will exists for renewal. In economic matters, for example, the G-8 should be reconfigured as rapidly as possible to the G-13 or G-12 (depending on whether or not it was deemed prudent to keep a belligerent and weak Russia within the club), adding Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa as full participants. Even a G20 is conceivable. Ultimately, a reallocation of voting rights in the IMF and World Bank could also help accommodate the new evolving realities in the global finance and economic arenas.

As part of this necessary rewriting of global frameworks, the successful expansion of the UN Security Council remains in question. But even if it could, its security benefits are uncertain. In terms of the existing structures, the problem of permanent members vetoing desirable initiatives would be exacerbated, not ameliorated, with an expanded set of members. Even with a larger set of formally recognized stakeholders, the dilemmas confronting the US and its allies in violating traditional notions of state sovereignty would remain as acute as ever. If one identifies legitimacy in terms of the number of UN member states supporting or opposing a given action, then no reformation of the Security Council will assure a positive outcome for Washington, since neither the incentive structures nor the sanctions facing autocratic and failed states would alter.

The ultimate fates of the Concert and the UN are therefore impossible to identify at this embryonic stage. Nonetheless, a formally constituted Concert has merits on its own, but it should also be seen as a force for making transparent the shortcomings of the UN, thereby exposing much needed change. Whether the UN and non-democratic member states have sufficient incentive or will to accomplish that change is entirely a matter for them.

But, as Daalder and Lindsay have argued with compelling force, the question of the legitimacy of international intervention to combat ethnic cleansing or to enforce collective security can no longer be viewed simply on the basis of procedural considerations:

States may be equal in a procedural sense, but they are not equal in fact. Most states in the world today, including a majority of UN members, do not represent the interests or perspectives of the people they rule. So when it comes to determining international legitimacy, why should states with no legitimacy at home have an equal say as states with such legitimacy? Real legitimacy, like real sovereignty, resides in the people rather than in the states—which is why state decisions to confer international legitimacy must rely on the
democratically chosen representatives of the people, not in the personal whims of autocrats and oligarchs.\textsuperscript{14}

The normative foundations of a given action must therefore take precedence. Or, to put it another way, while democracy must begin at home, democracies can creditably intervene abroad if the shared interests, values, and strategic wisdom so demand. It is only by reinvigorating our own self-confidence in the efficacy of democratic governance, and by developing an institutionalized forum that represents our like-minded governments and peoples, that the inertia and legitimacy deficit of the UN can now be superseded, and a world safe for liberal democracies can be secured.

**CONCLUSION**

Institutional reform, in and of itself, represents a necessary but insufficient condition for rebuilding the strengths of institutional liberalism in the coming decades. Absent power, institutions can do little, either to meet the threats and challenges, or to seize the opportunities of a dangerous world, as we move into the 2010s. Moreover, even with preponderant power in the military arena, the US cannot accomplish the totality of its own national security goals alone. But a D-60—comprised of the collective political, economic, and military powers of the sixty liberal democracies—could make a significant impact not only through mutual assistance in confronting security threats, but also through the promotion of economic growth and development and, ultimately, the spread of human rights and other democratic ideals. The responsibility for solving the world’s problems is shared by the US and the rest of the democratic world which, as Robert Kagan notes, “is infinitely stronger than it was when World War II ended. The future international order will be shaped by those who have the power and the collective will to shape it. The question is whether the world’s democracies will again rise to that challenge.”\textsuperscript{15} A Concert of Liberal Democracies represents a necessary step in the shaping of the new global order. Without the collective weight of the democratic world, such a Concert will develop in ways deeply deleterious to our ideals and interests. Therefore, it should not be for the US alone to bear the burdens and pay the price of securing a common future of liberty under law.

**Notes**

8 Daalder and Lindsay, “Democracies of the World, Unite,” 15.
Carothers cites Krauthammer stating that, “What I like about it, it’s got a hidden agenda. It looks as if it’s all about listening and joining with allies, all the kind of stuff you’d hear a John Kerry say, except that the idea here…is essentially kill the UN.” See Carothers, “A League of Their Own,” 48-9. Kagan’s response to Carothers criticism stated that, “As for the complaint that a collection of democracies would not perceive all its interests in common, that is certainly true. However, if that is the test for a successful international organization, I can think of very few that would pass, least of all the United Nations (which, by the way, a League of democracies is not intended to replace).” See Robert Kagan, “Major League Debate,” letters, *Foreign Policy* no. 168 (2008): 8.


Ibid., 8.


