The recent economic downturn has amplified public debate over immigration. What does the global recession mean for international migration? Do migration flows increase or decrease? Do migrants stay put or return to their countries of origin? What should be the policy response to changes? What happens to remittances and investments? Are non-citizens differentially affected by recession? It is difficult to answer such questions when recovery is by no means sustained, and labor markets are still in the doldrums.

This article considers the relationship between recession and migration and focuses on a particular question that has received considerable attention in the United Kingdom: do migrants take jobs away from British nationals at a time of rising unemployment? Though this particular article focuses on UK policy, practice, and politics, the arguments elaborated have broader applicability, raising issues that go beyond the current economic context. An example of this political salience was all too dramatically revealed in demonstrations at the Lindsey Oil Refinery early in 2009 demanding “British jobs for British workers.” This slogan, coined by British Prime Minister Gordon Brown in 2007, has been taken up by the press, power plant workers, and some elements of the left. But what is a “British job?” The Lindsey Oil Refinery is located in North Lincolnshire and takes its name from the historic kingdom of Lindsey. It is operated by a French multinational energy company, Total SA. The work was for an expansion of the refinery, to be carried out by Jacobs Engineering Group Inc., an American multinational company, but subcontracted to IREM, an Italian company. So who is the British worker in this scenario? According to the photographs of strikers from the 2009 Lindsey Oil Refinery Strike, the British workers waving the national flag are white and male. This gives some alarming clues about the national perception of the “British worker.”

The economic downturn has meant an increase in the supply of unemployed residents in a labor market where migrants have been playing an ever-increasing role. In 2008, 13 percent of the working-age population was foreign-born, as compared

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These statistics heightens the fears that jobs are “taken” by migrants willing to work for lower wages and under worse conditions, leaving British people condemned to unemployment. Academics argue that there is not a fixed amount of work in an economy that is then divided between a given number of workers. This notion of a static amount of work in an economy is known as the so-called “lump of labor fallacy.” However, the fallacy resonates with every day experience. For example, a person sees a job advertisement with multiple rejections and one successful applicant. If that applicant is a Polish person and the rejections are all British nationals, the “lump of labor” does not sound much of a fallacy to the average citizen, particularly if the job is a low-waged one that does not require formalized credentials.

This concern about immigration is principally expressed as a concern about the relationship between the current state of the economy and labor supply; however, consider what happens when the focus shifts to the relationship between immigration and labor demand. Labor supply and demand are mutually constitutive. The relationship between the two gives insight into the kinds of policy challenges faced by government, and into the political, as well as economic, nature of the rhetoric and decisions around immigration and labor markets. This paper will first consider briefly some of the assumptions that underpin debates on these issues. It will then outline what we know about employer demand for migrant labor, then consider the impact of recession, and end by outlining some of the broader policy issues. These indicate the importance of analysing how immigration is part of a dynamic political, social and economic environment and points to the limitations of an analysis that depicts migration impacting on an otherwise stable system with fixed characteristics.

Core Assumptions

A critical assumption of popular, policy, and even some academic contributions to debates on immigration, labor markets and recession, is that the meaning of “migrant” is self evident; however, this is far from the case, and indeed there is a profound confusion about who counts as a migrant. In government documentation and research, a migrant is often defined as “foreign born.” This includes the UK’s Migration Advisory Committee (MAC), a body of economists tasked to advise the government on immigration. The MAC has been very concerned to draw up a rigorous methodology for analyzing migration and the labor market. However, the problem of equating “foreign born” with “migrant” (and ‘UK born’ with British) is that many of those foreign born are British citizens, either British citizens born abroad or long-term residents who have acquired British citizenship. In the year to

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September 2008, 40.9 percent of foreign-born UK residents were of British nationality—and 5.3 percent of UK residents who did not have British nationality were born in the UK—while in the UK, there were 5.3 million working-age foreign-born individuals in 2008, there were only 3.3 million working-age foreign nationals. So, not all foreign-born individuals are subject to immigration controls, which are a key means of controlling migrants’ access to the labor market.

Arguably, a preferable definition for the purposes of labor market analysis would be “non-citizen.” But even this is problematic as a key assumption in debates around migration and labor markets is that migrants are a residual pool of labor. They are useful for temporary shortages, after nationals have had a first bite at the cherry. Thus, it is perfectly reasonable that migrants should not be chosen over nationals at a time of increasing national unemployment. But not all non-citizens are, at least in terms of the law, such a residual pool of labor. For example, EEA nationals or holders of a right to permanent residence effectively enjoy similar rights in the labor market as nationals. Importantly, they are largely free to work where they want and to leave employers with no consequence for their residence status. Indeed, in February 2009, the EHRC, the DWP and the Government Equalities Office initiated a joint program of work to monitor the impact of the recession across specific groups including “ethnic minorities.” But nearly two-thirds of these are foreign-born, and of these with the exception of “Other White,” half have been in the UK for over 10 years and are, therefore, likely to belong to the group for whom preferential access to the labor market is secured. While managing the rhetoric of “British jobs for British workers,” there is nevertheless concern that some of this group are at risk of unfair discrimination. A worker being foreign-born or a non-citizen does not mean that an employer can, on those grounds, discriminate against them. In any consideration of migrants and the labor market in practice, the distinction between citizens and settled migrants on the one hand and more recent arrivals on the other is absolutely critical.

In addition to these (crucial) technicalities, the term “migrant” in popular usage carries particular connotations. Not every “foreigner” is a migrant. American financiers for example are not perceived as migrants, and neither are Australian back packers, nor British expats. Crudely put, the term migrant is heavily raced, classed and gendered. So, from both above and below the term is highly contested. This means that numbers and data are highly problematic, and that public understandings can be confused and malleable. It also means importantly that the policy tools to control immigration—immigration controls and increasingly rigorous citizenship procedures—cannot constrain the labor market behaviour of the majority of those who are constructed in popular, policy and academic discourse as migrants. Migrants from countries such as Poland and Czech Republic for example, are the subject of considerable press concern and public debate, yet as citizens of European Union member states they are entitled to free movement and to work without restriction in the UK. What is often perceived by the public as an immigration problem is not susceptible to an immigration solution.
“Our country needs you?”: Employer Demand for Migrant Labor

For the purpose of argument, the term migrant in this article will be defined as a foreign national entering the UK. A central question in debates about labor immigration policy then becomes how to link the admission of migrant workers to the needs of the national economy and the domestic labor market. When, and with what conditions, should a government allow migrant workers into the labor market? Employers often claim that there is a “need” for migrants to help fill labor and skill shortages even in a recession, suggesting that, even during times of economic downturn, new migrant workers are needed and in some occupations may be critical to economic recovery. Skeptics can respond, particularly during a recession, that in many cases these claims simply reflect employers’ preference for recruiting cheap and exploitable migrant workers over improving wages and employment conditions. In this way, they argue, migrants undermine UK workers’ employment opportunities and conditions.

In assessing both these types of arguments it is important to recognize the highly segmented labor market and differentiated economy, and that migrants are often concentrated in very specific occupations. In the UK, occupations are listed and categorized according to Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) codes. The most detailed large-scale data on the labor market break it down into 353 general occupations. Yet, there are 26,000 official job titles alone, and there are of course degrees of specialisation that go beyond official titles even at this level. This can lead to some misleading generalizations. For example, the 2008 MAC report found that 22 percent of chefs in the UK were not born in the EEA. But what top-down data does not tell us is how many of these are working in Indian, Chinese, and other non-European food based restaurants. Migrants are often clustered in very specific niches and one must be cautious of generalizing across occupations and sectors.

The argument that there is a “need” for migration even during a recession can reflect one or both of two distinct but related approaches. The first is that states rely on a high level of human capital in order to promote long-term economic growth and competitiveness. This line of argument is typically based on endogenous growth models that emphasize the importance of human capital, knowledge, and research and development for economic growth. Human capital models therefore suggest that the immigration of highly skilled workers is to be encouraged with or without a job offer and that the benefits will effectively trickle down and across the broader economy and labor market. The UK’s Tier 1 is an example of such a supply-driven admission policy. It is notable that as yet there has not been a great deal of political pressure on Tier 1 despite the recession because it is imagined as being for elite, high-
skilled people.\textsuperscript{11}

The second approach, which is more commonly adopted by employers in particular, is to understand the need for migrants’ skills as a response to perceived specific staff shortages. During recessions, there is an assumption that migration is acceptable only when staff shortages are considered to be skilled. Implicit in these discussions is that anyone can perform a so-called “low-skilled job,” and an unemployed British worker could and should, do low-skilled work, and such jobs should not be given to migrants while there are unemployed British people to fill them—though here the complications about who counts as British or a migrant should be recalled. In a context where it is often assumed that low-skilled migration should be highly circumscribed, temporary, and limited to certain occupations, such as agricultural work or au pairs, the distinction between a low-skilled labor shortage, and a skills shortage becomes highly relevant and considerably contested.

Although commonly used in academic, public, and policy discourse, the term skills is very vague, both conceptually and empirically. Skills can require years of specialized training or simply a one-day course. Some skills, such as basic literacy and numeracy, are supposed to be produced by national educational systems and require long-term state investment, others may be obtained through further education, while others may be firm or industry specific, such as in the financial service or information technology sector, in which case they may be principally the responsibility of employers. These systems are usually interdependent. For example, an IT worker may have to have demonstrated numerical competency and have a good degree to qualify for further training paid for by an employer. As Wickham and Bruff discuss, skills shortages and employers’ responses to them “are the result of specific relationships between the system of production and employment on the one hand and the system of education and training on the other.”\textsuperscript{12, 13} Skills therefore can refer to a wide range of qualifications and competencies whose meaning in practice is not always clear. Research has long pointed out that the notion of skill is socially constructed and highly gendered and formal qualifications offer at the very best only approximations of actual competencies.\textsuperscript{14}

The limitation of formal qualifications as a measure of skills becomes most apparent when one considers so-called “soft skills” encompassing a broad range of transferable competences, from problem solving to team working. Soft skills are often said to be particularly important in sectors where social relations with customers, clients, or service users are important to the delivery and quality of the work. Certain skills may be necessary to make sure the job is done in a way that contributes to a good service experience, rather than simply to complete the task. There are some low-skilled jobs that cannot be done by just anyone. Not everyone has the experience, the personal qualities, or the interest. They may not even have the right body type for jobs where it is expected that workers will be of a certain age, gender or ethnicity. For example, in some ethnic restaurants customers might expect to be served by a person who has a particular perceived physical appearance (“Indians” in Indian restaurants for instance).\textsuperscript{15} Thus, while a male ex-steelworker
may indeed be perfectly capable of being a paid childminder, he might well not think of doing this kind of work, and should he do so, he may be unlikely to find many employers willing to take him on.\textsuperscript{16}

The skills debate is further complicated because the word skills can also refer to personal attributes and characteristics. For example, in the care sector some service users actively express a preference for personal qualities over formal qualifications. These may in turn be related to employer control over the workforce. Soft skills can blend into personal characteristics, attitudes, and the “fudging of skill with behaviour.”\textsuperscript{17} Employers may find certain qualities and attitudes desirable because they suggest workers will be compliant, easy to discipline, and co-operative:

\begin{quote}
The Poles have a strong work ethic, they are northern Europeans, they are Christians, their whole ethos – not to be racist – it’s a hardworking culture that they come from. It’s also a hard drinking culture.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

In this way, British workers can be very negatively stereotyped:

\begin{quote}
[Foreign nationals] just want to work to earn money… you can actually rely on them to get up in the morning… a British person will wake up in the morning and draw the curtain, and if it looked like it was going to rain they would just pull the curtains and go back to sleep.\textsuperscript{19}
\end{quote}

These sorts of arguments are by no means specific to the UK, nor are they limited to particular sectors. They have also been well documented in other countries, although of course the nature of the stereotypes is highly variable.\textsuperscript{20} These comments should not be taken at face value, but neither should they be seen as reducible to simple prejudices. Rather, they are related to how employers respond to and perpetuate structural imbalances and inequalities in local and global labor markets. It is important to note that these judgements are typically about relatively recent arrivals. Piore (1979) argues that the imagined temporariness of new arrivals’ stay means that at the earlier stages of a migrant’s immigration ‘career’, perhaps when they have lower subjective expectations, less language and more limited understanding of the labour market, they are more likely to view work purely instrumentally. Work which offers no opportunities for career progression may be perceived more opportunistically when the worker, whether or not they are migrant, considers such work as a temporary position rather than a “job for life.” Jobs may be viewed optimistically, not as the only work that is available, but as an opportunity to get a foot on the ladder, while for migrants there may be non-pecuniary returns from work, most importantly the possibility of learning English.

For UK nationals, in contrast, unsocial hours, low wages, temporariness, lack of opportunities for promotion or personal development as well as the low status of work can prevent job seekers from applying for particular positions. People who want a long term engagement with the labor market may be reluctant to consider entry level jobs if they are looking for work that offers prospects of promotion, or that is consistent with their particular skills and experience. Those who have caring
responsibilities may want work close to home and be limited in the hours they can work. Thus a supply of immobile workers looking for a career with development opportunities will not necessarily be responsive to a demand for flexible intensive work with uncertain hours, particularly if potential workers have domestic responsibilities.

In summary, demand for migrant labour is often for quite specific jobs. It is important not to take claims of skills shortages at face value, and there are complex social as well as economic reasons, why migrants may be prepared to work in occupations and under conditions that others might be more reluctant to take on. The calls for “British jobs for British workers” risk oversimplifying labour market processes.

**Recession and Demand for Migrant Labor**

The question remains, how does this change in a recession: When the supply of unemployed nationals increases, do some employers still prefer migrants? The past recessions saw a fall in numbers of new arrivals, and 2008 saw a decline in the inflow of migrants to the UK.\(^2\) The MAC points out that in this period, the UK sent more people abroad to work than accepted new arrivals. There was a significant decline in the National Insurance Numbers allocated to non-UK nationals, particularly for so-called “A8 nationals” (citizens of states who joined the European Union in 2004). Their numbers fell by over 20 percent in the year up to September 2008.\(^2\) Data indicate a significant falling off of A8 national migrants in low-wage sectors (and other sectors) in the first and second quarters of 2009. Importantly, however, this is telling us about flows but not stocks: people do not de-register, and it is estimated that about half of those registered have left the UK.

There are some indications that there is an increase in the numbers of A8 nationals leaving the UK. This, broadly speaking, mirrors previous recessions (i.e. a somewhat reduced inflow and initial rise in outflow). But research has found that this relationship tends to be weak, and it is important to remember that migration decisions are not taken with reference to economic performance alone.\(^2\)

Moreover, data on flows do not tell us much about employer use of migrant labor already in the UK. In terms of ethnic minorities, of whom some are British-born, some foreign-born, and some non-settled migrants, the first monitoring report for the UK Equality and Human Rights Commission found that employment rates had remained stable, but they do not disaggregate between those with preferential rights to the labor market and non-EEA migrant workers. Data from the Office for National Statistics found that in the months from October through December 2008, there had been a rise in the numbers of non-UK born in employment, and a rise in non-UK nationals in employment, but again as reported this does not disaggregate between EEA and non-EEA nationals. In its Summer 2009 Quarterly Survey Report, CIPD found that employers were still looking to recruit migrants, defined as non-British nationals. Again, employers might be referring to initiating new flows, or drawing on current stocks. But what is particularly interesting is that the reasons for
employing migrants are remarkably similar to those expressed above in pre-recession times: 27 percent saying that they have recruitment difficulties, and 79 percent of employers in hotel catering and leisure, and 33 percent of manufacturing saying that they recruit migrants because they are “hard-working and reliable.”24 Quantitative data are not sensitive to key complexities, but it does seem that recession has not changed some employers’ stereotypes of migrant labor.

**THE IMPORTANCE OF AN INTEGRATED APPROACH**

The question, do migrants take jobs away from British nationals during a recession, implies that, if only migrants would go “home” there would be more jobs available and that migration, particularly under straitened economic circumstances, is an aberration. However, labor markets and labor conditions are always changing as a response to all kinds of institutional and structural developments, many of which may be unanticipated. The shifting social and political context also impacts on labor
markets. Take the case of elder care, a sector where jobs are predominantly “low-skilled” and where migrants play a crucial role. Foreign-born workers are an estimated 19 percent of care workers, and 35 percent of nurses involved in care of older people. The workforce expanded by 155,000 from 2003 to 2008, and nearly half of the new workers were foreign-born. Of these, nearly half have been in the UK for under 10 years.25 Elder care is, then, a large employer of migrant labor, both in the long term and among recent arrivals. Is this, then, an example of a sector where jobs are “taken” from British people by “migrants?” Would it not be more appropriate for unemployed British people to do this work, particularly since it is recession-resilient. Older people will continue to need care whatever the economic climate. However, elder care is also very sensitive to public spending, and the results of a BBC poll in April 2009, found that only two percent of people think that social care expenditure should be a priority. So, while older people will continue to need people to care for them, one impact of a recession may well be that government restricts the budget for this care. This situation means that a sector where wages are low, hours are anti-social, and status is low is unlikely to see any significant improvement in working conditions. At the same time, the British government is committed to increasing the provision of care in older people’s own homes as well as promoting care users’ choice of and control over the care they receive.26 In other EU states, moving elder care from an institutional and regulated setting to a private home, where workers are far less protected, has been shown to increase the use of migrant labour in the sector.

Economic policies (elder care cuts) and social policies (the promotion of care in private households) that promote the use of migrant labor, are pulling in a different direction from immigration policies (no entry for care workers as they are considered low skilled). Moreover, while the supply of citizens available to work in the sector may be increased by a combination of Welfare Reform and increasing unemployment, this job cannot be done by just anyone. For decent quality of care, care providers need more than reluctant bodies filling jobs. Thus rather than simply focussing on the increase in labour supply resulting from the recession, one needs to analyse the nature of the demand. In this case, for a worker with particular soft skills who can relate well to older people, able to work antisocial hours in a job with very little career development, with low wages and low status.

Conflicting policy priorities are not only a feature of public sector work. For example, Agriculture Minister Hilary Benn recently called for the UK to increase food production to “produce as much food as we can ourselves,”27 while the DEFRA UK Food Security Assessment, published in August 2009, recognizes the

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FOREIGN-BORN WORKERS ARE THOUGHT TO MAKE UP OVER 80 PERCENT OF THE SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKFORCE IN PEAK MONTHS, 40 PERCENT IN FOOD PROCESSING AND PACKING INDUSTRIES AND 75 PERCENT IN FOOD PRODUCTION AGENCIES.
importance of “adequate physical and human capital”28 and “labour costs, remaining within limits;”29 there is not a single mention of immigration. This is extraordinary given that in the UK migrant labor is key to the contemporary food supply system which, in certain types of horticulture and food processing, relies on temporary, highly intense work.30 When the government limited the numbers of visas available for seasonal agricultural work, a National Farmers Union conducted in 2008 found that 61% of respondents claimed that they had lost income and 58% claimed that they had crops that could not be harvested. This is despite the fact that foreign-born workers (though not visa holders) are thought to make up over 80 percent of the seasonal agricultural workforce in peak months, 40 percent in food processing and packing industries and 75 percent in food production agencies.31

**Conclusions**

The recession has meant a supply of unemployed residents has increased. A proportion of these are foreign born, some of whom may legally have equal access to the labour market to citizens, but may be subject to discrimination, others of home are legally constructed as a residual pool of labour. The “British jobs” that migrant workers, particularly new arrivals, cluster in are often low waged, poor quality and insecure. They are low status and are regarded as low skilled, though in practice they may demand considerable experience and soft skills. Moreover, the employment of migrant workers is often symptomatic of issues that do not essentially derive from immigration policy. Farmers might respond to restrictions on immigration by switching from labor-intensive fruit and vegetable production to capital-intensive wheat farming. The question then becomes, as one farmer put it: “Does the UK government want a fresh fruit and vegetable industry in this country?”

The social, political and legal processes help produce “flexible” workers, which in practice means that foreign-born individuals (including some who are citizens) do not have access to the same kinds of jobs and conditions as the wider population does. Flexible workers may also be characterised as insecure or precarious. An approach that toughens immigration controls and enforcement leads to greater migrant flexibility/insecurity, which is in some circumstances, precisely what makes foreign born labour attractive to employers. Labour protection, enforcement and organising might be a more efficient means of protecting “British jobs,” and indeed make them ore attractive to “British workers.” Concerns about migrants “taking jobs” from British people may risk detracting attention from the key issues of job quality, job security and low pay.
Notes


6 Ibid.


8 Alessio Cangiano, Isabel Shutes, Sarah Spencer and George Leeson, Migrant Care Workers in Ageing Societies: Research Findings in the United Kingdom (Oxford: COMPAS, 2009).

9 Tim Finch, Maria Latorre, Naomi Pollard and Jill Rutter, Shall We Stay or Shall We Go?: Re-migration Trends among Britain’s Immigrants (London, IPPR, 2009).

10 Migration Advisory Committee, Skilled, Shortage, Sensible.


13 According to Howard Gospel, The division of responsibility between state and employer in skills production is critical, but so too are the institutions and regulations within each sector. In construction for example, where, for reasons to do with the deregulation and fragmentation of the sector in the UK, employers pursue ‘production’ strategies, which involve recruiting and training labor only for their own immediate use, rather than “investment strategies,” which would involve training labor for the long-term good of the industry. Howard Gospel, “Comment: Training and Migrant Employment in Construction,” in Martin Ruhs and Bridget Anderson eds., A Need for Migrant Labour? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2010).


19 Ibid.


25 Alessio Cangiano, Isabel Shutes, Sarah Spencer and George Leeson, Migrant Care Workers in Ageing Societies, 60.
26 Ibid.
27 Hilary Benn, interviewed on the Andrew Marr Show, BBC TV, August 9, 2009.