Globalizing the Household in East Asia

by Michael Douglass

Households are seen neither as isolates nor as small units of social organization related to national economies, but instead as basic units of an emerging world-system. 1

A quarter of a century ago, Smith, Wallerstein, and Evers put forth the thesis that the household is not merely a unit of consumption dependent upon a larger economy, but is instead the foundation of society and economy reaching from local to global scales. 2 In being charged with the physical and daily reproduction of society and economy, the household carries out its tasks through pooling of unpaid and paid labor and resources, among its members. It also serves as a base to organize and socialize individuals for the rigors of employment outside of the household. 3 Their thesis goes even further to state that without the household playing its assigned roles, “any economy would collapse.” 4

Given this thesis, the apparent demise of the household in many societies presents the portent of increasingly severe limitations on national economies and, ultimately, the capitalist world system. Currently, more than fifty countries are experiencing below replacement fertility, with some already experiencing absolute population decline. High divorce rates, late marriage without children, the institutional warehousing of the elderly, and the phenomenal increase in single resident housing units (more than 50 percent in major cities in the North) are all indicators of retrenchment of the household.

East Asia is not immune from the stresses on the household that are being documented in the West. 5 Absolute population decline has just begun in Japan; Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, the original “tiger” economies of Asia, are not far behind. These trends present an impending crisis in the respective national economies as the labor force has already begun to dramatically shrink, dependency ratios are rising, and welfare systems are becoming insolvent in rapidly aging societies.

One emerging way of attempting to overcome these disjunctures in forming and sustaining households within a given society is to go global. Referred to in this paper as global householding, the major dimensions of this process are as follows: marriage, child-bearing and adoption, education of children, hiring foreign domestic helpers

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and caregivers, and moving not only from low to high-income economies, but as retirement ages approach, also moving from higher to lower income societies as a way of stretching fixed incomes. None of these elements exist in isolation of the others, but are more accurately part of life cycles for the household through time.

Despite the importance of the household in its many dimensions, it remains a phantom in migration studies. Mainstream research continues to view the global movement of people as part of a transnational labor process composed of individual decision makers or members of ethnic Diaspora who migrate around the world for work and income. Global householding represents a significantly different take on migration and is put forth here to theorize more explicitly about linkages between the household and larger structural issues, such as demographic transitions and shifts in the global economy. Table 1 presents key dimensions of global householding, each of which contrasts with other formulations, including transnational family.

First, the household is used as a way to open the treatment to many possible configurations that go beyond kinship or marriage typically used in conjunction with the term family. Family is defined here as a social unit that reproduces itself not only through the physical bearing of children, but more broadly through mutual nurturing, psychological support, forming identities and social values, income-pooling, and labor-sharing. The household also does not need to be based on biological relationships or on a common residence. It can take many forms, including those with fictive kin, same-sex and unmarried couples, and friends who develop long-term co-residential arrangements. By the definition used here, domestic workers often become household members as well.

Second, an open view is taken of the household with regard to the expected interpersonal relationships within it. This perspective is not intended to dismiss research that shows the many ways in which patriarchy and traditional family structures make the household a “mini-political economy.” Rather, it is to accept that households are also an arena of genuine caring and selfless actions for the good of others and the household as a whole.

Third, a key concern is presented about the role of global householding in social reproduction and the world economy. By the beginning of this century, countries accounting for more than half of the population in the world were already experiencing below replacement fertility. How this will impact local economies and social capacities to care for aging populations is already a question of high importance. In East Asia, the same policy question has also emerged as to how a society can continue to enjoy prosperity and basic levels of social support, in the face of chronic population decline and in spite of the diminishing capacities of its households. Similarly, can global migration and transactions support the household and the societal roles it is expected to play?

Fourth, as suggested above, householding is a longitudinal process; it is not solely about the fate of one member or one generation. Studying this process as moments in continuous cycles of householding can also help to understand and
theorize about the impacts on households of macro elements of globalization, such as the current global shift of labor-intensive manufacturing to China, or the rise of an urban middle class in Asia that is presenting a high demand for foreign domestic workers. Given all that is at stake at both micro- and macro-societal levels, whether global householding will effectively compensate for local householding and broader economic disjunctures is a question worth considering.

Fifth, global householding goes beyond the economist view of cross-border migration solely as a labor process for economic gain. It instead allows for more multi-faceted understandings of the motives for migration. Genuine desires to form households, have progeny, and care for others are incentives as powerful as the lure of higher incomes. Sixth, by using the term global instead of invoking the term transnational, global householding avoids reifying the nation-state as a singularly meaningful scale to distinguish local from global movements of people. As with the world economy as a whole, the use of nation-state and national borders to sequester social, political, and economic phenomena from those beyond the border is increasingly anachronistic. Globalizing households, for example, often have de facto, if not de jure, dual citizenship. Local governments, rather than only national governments, are taking an increasingly larger role in promulgating immigration policies.

Similarly, the difference between a rural person migrating to a big city for a job in a global factory or moving abroad for the same work is not captured by distinguishing domestic from international migration. Both are part of a globalizing local economy. Likewise, householding also has global-local, rather than separate internal versus transnational linkages. Porio, for example, shows how extended families combine remittances and unpaid labor to move members from the countryside to Metro Manila and abroad in constantly shifting patterns of rural-urban migration, migration abroad, and return migration to various parts of the Philippines.

Currently, more than 200 million people live outside of their country of birth. Multiplying this number by 4 or 5 to account for non-migrating household members increases the number of people engaged in global householding to a range of 800 million to 1 billion people. One-quarter of global migrants originate in Asia, suggesting that more than 200 million people in Asia are involved in one or more dimensions of global householding. These shares can only be expected to increase in the coming decades.
GLOBAL HOUSEHOLDING IN EAST ASIA

With the beginning of the twenty first century, household formation in Taiwan unfolded as a picture full of the imprint of globalization. In 2003 one in every 3.5 newly wedded couples was a cross border marriage...Nearly 120,000 foreign healthcare givers are tending the elderly in Taiwanese families, and new destinations to retire overseas, including China and Vietnam, have become part of the householding agenda.14

As the region with the most rapidly advancing economy in the world over the past several decades, East Asia is now beginning to experience the gamut of global householding. There are many sources of this global turn. Most are due to difficulties in forming and sustaining households within a nationally constituted territory. Among the most crucial indicators of these strains on householding is the demographic transition toward below replacement fertility, which is resulting from extreme difficulties in finding candidate spouses, implicit choices made by women and men to develop careers instead of marrying or having children, education systems that parents do not want for their children, climbing rates of divorce, and the high costs of living in home countries after retirement.

These trends are already creating burdensome impacts. East Asia already has a number of societies that are, or will soon be experiencing absolute population decline, including Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and China. Japan, for example, will see its population decrease by 20 million people by 2050. But the impact is even greater on the labor force, which already began shrinking in the 1980s and, according to some estimates, will decrease by 70 percent by 2050; very few children are being born and more than 40 percent of the population will be over the age of 65.15 The labor forces in Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan are already shrinking as well, resulting in similarly rising ratios of non–working to working populations among their citizenry.

At the same time, although largely unanticipated only two decades ago, global migration has now become a major dimension of local life in East Asia.16 In 1993, approximately three million people were documented as having moved across national boundaries to other destinations in East Asia for work, study, marriage, family reunion, retirement, or as political or environmental refugees. A decade later in 2003, the estimated number jumped to 10 million.17 Due to immigration laws declaring much of this migration to be illegal, both the 1993 and 2003 figures significantly underestimate actual numbers.

As noted above, the cross-border movement of people is increasingly related to global householding, which is revealed in its key dimensions: marriage/partnering, bearing/adopting children, raising and educating children (and adults), maintaining/reproducing the household daily, dividing labor and pooling income from livelihood activities, caring for elders and other non-working household members.

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Marriage

The marriage market in Asia is becoming rapidly globalized, and just in time for tens of thousands of single-but-looking South Korean men, most of them in the countryside where marriageable women are in scant supply. With little hope of finding wives of their own nationality and producing children to take over the farm, the men are pooling their family’s resources to raise up to $20,000 to find a spouse abroad. 18

Marriages with spouses from foreign countries are increasing in several East Asian societies. One of the factors behind this trend is the continuing urban transition. This transition has already depleted rural populations in higher income societies and left men, who are obligated to carry on with family farms and the family line, unable to find brides due to an observed preference by women for urban work, urban householding, and urban lifestyles.

In Korea, local governments have joined with farmers to sponsor searches for potential spouses from other Asian countries. For example, Haenam—a district in the southwest of Korea—has provided unmarried men with 5 million won (US$5,500) for expenses spent on finding and marrying foreign spouses. In 2005, 14 percent of all new marriages in Korea were between a Korean and foreign spouse. More prominently, nearly 40 percent of all rural marriages were with a foreign spouse.19 As summarized by a newspaper reporter in Korea, “As the number of international marriages increases in the rural areas, rural villages are experiencing their own kind of ‘globalization.’”20

In Taiwan, one-third of all marriages involve a non–Taiwanese spouse. In addition to Mainland China, Vietnam has become a principal source of spouses for Taiwan men. Over the past three years approximately 80,000 women have moved from Vietnam to Taiwan for marriage. In recent years, 1,000 Vietnamese women and Taiwanese men have been marrying every month. Between 1993 and 2002, approximately 148,000 brides moved to Taiwan from Mainland China for marriage.21

The number of marriages in Japan between Japanese men and foreign women reached about 30,000 per year by 2000. While only about 1.4 percent of the population in Japan is from abroad, in 2002, these marriages accounted for about 5 percent of the national total.

Bearing/adopting children

By 2020 nearly 50 percent of the population below age 19 in South Korea’s rural regions will be biracial due to the quickly growing number of interracial marriages.22

‘There are only old people around here,’ said Le Pho, a 22-year-old Vietnamese woman who married a South Korean a year ago and is now pregnant. Her child will be the first born in the village, Seogok-ri, in more than 20 years.23

Among the principal motives for marriage to a foreign spouse is to have children and carry on the family line. In 2005, South Korea and Taiwan tied for the lowest birthrates in the world at 1.1 children per woman, with Japan close behind.24 For
men, particularly those in heavily depopulating rural regions of high-income
countries, namely Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, marrying a foreign woman is their only
chance of having a family and children. While at current levels this is not yet
sufficient to reverse trends toward below replacement fertility in these countries, data
on rates of birth clearly show that these marriages result in more children than do
local marriages.

When having their own children becomes impossible, couples can turn to
international adoption. Sending Asian babies to the West for adoption has long
been practiced, and continues today. The preference for male children in many Asian
countries not only results in highly imbalanced sex ratios favoring males, but
paradoxically, also a very large number of female children made available for
adoption abroad. China, which now has 120 boys for every 100 girls under the age
of four, is experiencing significant levels of orphaned or abandoned female children,
and is now a principal source of female babies for adoption in the West. Vietnam has
also become a source of children for adoption over the past two decades. From 1951
to 2001, children from abroad adopted in the United States totalled 265,677. Of that
number, 156,491 came from Asia; the annual number more than doubled between

Openly adopting children from abroad is as yet uncommon in most East Asian
countries; however, unreported adoptions are said to be numerous in many
countries. In the case of Singapore, adoption is becoming a more open option; in
2005, applications for adoption processed by the Singapore Government totalled
556, of which 56 percent were foreign children. Smuggling babies from Indonesia—
some are stolen from parents—is reported to be a significant part of adoption in
Singapore.26

In 2003 the Government of Japan banned surrogate motherhood. As a result, women
from Japan are now going to Korea and paying other women to bear their children.27 Just as
the marriage of rural men to foreign women seemed improbable just a few years ago yet is
now becoming routine, so might the adoption of foreign children or finding surrogate
mothers abroad.28

Child rearing and education

…[Korean] Fathers were not passive or reluctant participants…to the contrary, they were
often the initiators of this family splitting [sending wife with children abroad for education]
for the sake of children and, despite the great difficulties they have to endure, they seem to
have no regret about their decisions.29
One of the most striking trends in householding in East Asia is sending children abroad for education. In Korea and Taiwan, it is common for husbands to remain at home while wives and children move abroad for many years. Since the beginning of its reforms in the late 1970s, China has sent the largest number of people to study abroad. From 1976 to 2006, 10.6 million people traveled abroad to study. This number increased from 860 in 1978 to 1.3 million students abroad in 2006. By 2008, the annual increase reached 180,000, with 60 percent claiming to be financed by their families in China.

Parallel with these trends, such countries as the US and Australia have been positioning themselves as a center for schooling and higher education for people from Asia. In the US—which had 572,000 foreign students in its educational system in 2003—such prestigious universities as Massachusetts Institute of Technology have classes with as many as 70 percent of their graduate students from abroad. Three-quarters of all long-term visitors from Asia in Australia are in educational programs. Global householding is providing a critical economic boon to Western schools and universities. Again, this is not about migrants using either labor or income as their motive for migration. Contrary to migration data on worker remittances, this is a reverse flow of money from the middle class, going from lower to higher-income economies.

Daily household maintenance and family care

In the eyes of the state, the FDW (foreign domestic worker) is not so much a worker within a key industry in the national economy but an appendage of the Singaporean household, brought in by private contract, and made necessary only because the “family” (and within it, women in particular) are no longer able to absorb what was traditionally unpaid work.

‘Maid agencies’ in Singapore estimate that 30% of the 150,000 foreign domestic workers are hired specifically to care for the elderly.

Global householding in Asia is most observable in the millions of domestic helpers, and caretakers for children and the elderly circulating among higher income countries. For the first time in history, middle class families, not just elites, can avail themselves of full time domestic workers due to the ease and much lower cost of recruiting them from such countries as the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, China and, more recently, Vietnam. In 2003, 750,000 legal foreign workers, almost all women, were working in these occupations in just Hong Kong (240,000), Taiwan (120,000), Singapore (150,000), and Malaysia (240,000).

In Singapore, one in seven households now has a domestic worker from abroad, and two-thirds of households say that they cannot take care of domestic chores, including taking care of children and the elderly, without a domestic helper. As a result of their limited stay of up to a few years in any one country by host governments and with the dense networks that the workers have created among themselves at home and abroad, foreign domestic workers use Asia as just one source of employment as they further deploy themselves around the world.
Domestic workers typically find themselves involved in two or more households in their home countries and in the countries in which they work. Filipina domestic workers in Taiwan, for example, are simultaneously breadwinners for their households in the Philippines and surrogate mothers for children of Taiwanese families.38

Foreign workers are increasingly involved in caring for the elderly. In Taiwan, where adult family members are likely to be occupied with their individual careers, foreign workers have become the backbone of a system of filial piety that makes putting elders in long-term care facilities unthinkable. On call twenty four hours a day, seven days a week, these foreign caregivers provide the semblance of a caring Taiwanese family. Japan, facing a similar situation, is now opening its doors for very limited number of nurses for elderly care in hospitals. Whether these workers are considered to be members of the families that employ them is perhaps debatable.39 Nonetheless, they are clearly indispensable to the reproduction of hundreds of thousands of households in many countries in East Asia.

Labor migration and household remittances

An estimated 2.2 million contract workers and immigrants, largely women, remitted some US$3.3 billion from Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia “on monthly averages ranging from US$300 to US$500,” said the ADB study, Southeast Asian Workers’ Remittances.40

Human Rights Watch criticized Singapore for collecting S$530 ($314) million a year in levies from the employers of 150,000 foreign maids, but does not protect the maids under its regular labor laws. Employers pay S$200 to S$295 a month for the privilege of importing a foreign maid. There are about 600,000 foreign workers in Singapore.41

The number of people moving abroad for work is escalating. Filipinos deployed abroad increased from less than 40,000 per year in 1975 to nearly 1 million per year in 2004. One-third of those in 2004 went to other countries in East and Southeast Asia. Approximately 20 percent of the entire Philippine labor force is now working abroad. In Vietnam, about 31,400 workers were sent abroad in 1999, a fifty percent increase over 1998. In 2001, about 50,000 workers were sent overseas for work. In 2000, Indonesia—also a major source of global labor—had more than 1.5 million workers in Malaysia alone, and another 90,000 in Taiwan, 70,000 in Singapore, 40,000 in Hong Kong, 12,000 in Korea, and 3,000 in Japan.43 In all cases, the numbers continue to increase and are extending through expanding migrant networks to even more countries.

Worldwide remittances from these global workers are now more than double the amount of global aid by governments and international institutions combined, and are now equal to annual amounts of foreign direct investment in developing countries. In 2003, East Asia accounted for 14 percent of these remittances. In 2008, worker remittances to the Philippines alone were sent at a pace of US$1 billion per month, or more than 10 percent of the country’s GDP.44 Remittances to Indonesia
from its 1.2 million legal workers abroad were almost $3 billion in 2003. The Vietnamese government earned $1.25 billion in remittances from overseas workers, making labor one of the country’s key exports.45

The shares of incomes sent home can be extremely high. Indonesian domestic workers in Singapore, for example, are found to be remitting about two-thirds of their average US$150 a month wages to their families in Indonesia.46 Their lives in Singapore are exceptionally frugal, often without even a room of their own in the houses in which they work. When considering in-kind support from families at home, remittances do not go just one way from migrants to households in their country of origin. In a great number of instances, household members at home take care of the children of the migrants and provide sanctuary for migrants between migration episodes. They also give meaning to the sacrifices that especially low-wage migrant workers endure in harsh, highly exploitative employment overseas. Household support is very frequently cited as the main reason for migrating and is the principal source of emotional well being for people working abroad.

Retirement migration

I do not want to burden my children...I have three sons and have established good relationships with my daughters-in-law and I want to maintain this pleasant relationship until I die...I want to maintain my pride as a respected father-in-law. That is why I decided to come to Chiang Mai. I can afford to hire a live-in maid or nurse to look after me here. This arrangement gives me better peace of mind towards ageing.47

—interview with Japanese retiree living in Thailand

For seniors facing fixed incomes and a diminishing ability to rely on children, an alternative is appearing: less expensive residences in Southeast Asia or China where retirement villas are being built complete with health care and assistance in daily household tasks.48 By 2002, one-quarter of the population in Japan was already over the age of 65. This share is projected to reach 42 percent by 2050. In 2050, Korea will also have more than 40 percent of its population over the age of 65 and will have surpassed Japan as having the oldest population in the world.49 Taiwan’s population has a similar trajectory. Governments and developers in Southeast Asia are already putting forth programs and retirement communities for Japanese and Korean retirees.50

Retirement migration is appearing from other parts of East Asia as well. Old soldiers of the Chinese Nationalist Party who came to Taiwan in the late 1940s are...
returning to China. Others too are also moving from Taiwan to China not only to take advantage of lower costs, but also to participate in China’s booming economy.51

Conclusions

What is surprising in discourses on global migration is the neglect of the household as a vital institution not only in social reproduction, but also as a locus of decision-making and motives for migration. It remains a phantom that is only vaguely or incidentally revealed as a background for assessing migrants as labor, spouses, or diasporas, yet global house-holding, not labor migration per se, represents the singularly most important transformative process in East Asia. Migrants recruited only for their labor typically have visas limited to short–term stays, and are never afforded the chance to become either permanent residents or citizens. Families cannot accompany them, and they are also often forbidden to marry or have children in the host country.

Global householding through marriage and having children, for example, has a quite different outcome that includes permanent stays and possibilities of citizenship, and, according to said citizenship, rights to all privileges. In bearing children, global households contribute to inter-generational multicultural linkages within and among societies in the region and beyond. Globalization of householding is much more likely than people recruited as labor alone to produce the layers of cultural sedimentation in the host country that, in the longer-term, will transform ethnically homogeneous societies in Asia into genuinely multicultural ones. Few other challenges to the identities and cultures of East Asia are as profound as global householding.

Once it is seen as a key social institution in local and global socioeconomic systems, and once available data and cases are brought together to reveal its importance in contemporary globalization processes, the question that arises is whether or not global householding can be a phoenix that renews energies of householding that otherwise seem to be declining. The answer to this question is unclear for at least three reasons: (1) policy regimes are not, in general, hospitable to global householding; (2) social acceptance is also needed for it to flourish; and (3) the trends are not yet documented sufficiently to be able to make trajectories.

First, policy regimes throughout Asia tend to be inimical to the needs of global householding. Marriage across national boundaries is fraught with difficulties, including, on one end of the spectrum, trafficking and fraudulent representation; on the other end, immigration policies often disallow citizenship rights until several years after marriage and residence, with many countries disallowing non–citizen spouses the right to work outside of the household in the local economy.52

Second, social attitudes and discriminatory practices against various elements of global householding are pronounced in many countries. Discrimination in access to private housing, community services, and public spaces are common and usually without legal recourse. Negative attitudes about the traits of people from other Asian countries, such as sensationalized criminal behavior, are allied with this
discrimination. Societies in receiving countries are known to systematically channel migrants through unregulated discrimination into certain neighborhoods, which are tantamount to ghettos. Governments also participate in private sector and community regulation through law making and police powers. In addition, popular and academic writing on the various dimensions of global householding often take a pejorative view of its nature and impacts. Among the more commonly expressed views are that it is exploitative, morally improper, undermines local culture, and brings in migrants to steal jobs from locals. The many experiences that counter or caution these views remain in the shadow of the more negative treatments.

Third, with tracking of the many dimensions of global householding not yet routine, trends are difficult to assess. In some areas, such as marriage, available statistics show stunning growth patterns. Nonetheless, even this data is not easy to retrieve, and other aspects of global householding, such as adoptions, schooling abroad, remittances, and retirement migration, are typically found in case studies, rather than national data level. Placing householding in the center of migration analysis is necessary to assess its future prospects.

When householding goes global, a myriad of agents, governments, and local social reactions present formidable challenges to its success, yet those engaged in global migration and householding are beginning to find allies in civil society and government alike. While much attention has been given to the nation-state represented by the central government, what is apparent from numerous studies is the heightening role of the local state—prefectural, district, and municipal governments—in global householding. Local governments, for example, have been a vanguard in recruiting foreign brides for men in rural areas. Local governments have also developed programs to assist in the education and welfare of foreign household members and were the vanguard in ending discriminatory fingerprinting of Korean residents in Japan. Where local governments have significant autonomy from the center, the differences between the national and local state seem to be widening across a number of areas of work and residential issues faced by foreigners and globalizing households. Yet the local state, like global householding, remains relatively unexplored in the governance of migration; it merits much more attention in order to assess the future of global householding.

Despite the manifold barriers confronting global householding, current trends and their underlying drivers indicate that it will continue to expand in East Asia, especially in terms of marriage and childbearing, education of children, and recruitment of domestic workers. Other forms, such as international adoption, might very well increase over the longer term, as will retirement migration. Though it cannot be predicted how or if difficulties appearing in domestic householding in East Asia will somehow be compensated by global householding, it can be concluded that global householding has become a permanent and expanding feature of this world region, the future of which will, in part, depend on its successes.
## Table 1

*Key Dimensions of a Global Householding Research Framework*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Global Householding</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Basic Unit</td>
<td>Household as an income pooling/(paid and unpaid) labor division and sharing social institution; not only kinship or marriage-based.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Relations in the</td>
<td>Cooperative as well as contested; “economy of affection” as well as “mini-political economy.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>household</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(3) Household-society</td>
<td>Social reproduction—reliance on the household in the physical and daily reproduction of society.</td>
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<tr>
<td>relationship</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(4) Time</td>
<td>Longitudinal through life cycles and generations; marriage/forming household partnerships; child-bearing/adoption; children rearing, including education; daily household maintenance; care of others in the household, including the elderly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Migration motive and</td>
<td>Sustaining households with individual betterment; non-economic as well as economic motives.</td>
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<td>driver</td>
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<tr>
<td>(6) Special Scale(s)</td>
<td>Multiple local-global scales within and beyond the nation-state; not simply “transborder” or “transnational.”</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
GlobAlIzIng the HousehoId

Notes


2 Ibid.

3 Labor does not simply “magically appear that the factory gates” where it is organized by labor market principals. Its power and availability is instead daily reproduced in the household; Ibid, 65.


5 East Asia is used here to include East and Southeast Asia, or Pacific Asia, extending from Japan to Indonesia.


8 Lea Jellinek, The Wheel of Fortune: the History of a Poor Community in Jakarta (NY: Allen & Urwin, 1991). In the United States, what is now termed “non-family households”—residential units with only one person or those headed by an unmarried person—now comprise approximately one-third of all households (U.S. Census Bureau 2000).


16 Until the late 1980s, migration to Japan from other East Asia countries almost wholly consisted of women

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17 With more than 300,000 emigrants leaving per year, China became the largest source of international migrants in the world by the beginning of this century. See United Nations, International Migration 2002, (NY: UN Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2002).


20 “More Bi-racial Kids Being Born in Korea,” Jong-Ang Daily, April 7, 2006.

21 In 2003 one-third of international marriages registered in Ho Chi Minh City were between Vietnamese women and Taiwanese men. See Tsai Ting-I, “Foreign Spouses Need to Wait for Residency: MOI,” Taipei Times, March 26, 2003.


24 Ibid.

25 Up to the late 1980s as many as 9,000 Korean children were being sent abroad for adoption every year. See M. Freundlich, and J.K. Lieberthal, The Gathering of the First Generation of Adult Adoptees: Adoptee’s Perceptions of International Adoption (Washington, DC, Even B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, 2000).


28 Late marriage and other factors such as rising divorce rates are leading to physical and social barriers to bearing children. Yet the desire to have children remains strong. As of 2004 some 640,000 couples in Korea were unable to conceive and were spending about 8.6 billion won a year on fertility treatment. See Yean-Ju

29 Ibid, 551-552.


34 Vivien Wee, and Amy Sim, “Transnational Labor Networks in Female labor Migration: Mediating between Southeast Asian Women Workers and International Labor Markets,” SEAARC Working Papers Series, City University of Hong Kong, 49 (2003).


42 Note: Numbers from various government documents compiled by the author.


44 M. John Glionna, “Philippine Workers Abroad: The Boon Has a Price,” Los Angeles Times, August 26,
2009.


48 Ibid.


53 Mike, Douglass, “Global Householding in Pacific Asia,” (2006), as exemplified by such statements by a foreign bride support group that “Multinational marriage matching is mainly operated by marriage brokers and the process is quite the same with a business transaction” and thus “the value of marriage is distorted.” See Cecilia Liao, “An Observation of the Multinational Marriages in Taiwan,” *Garden of Hope Foundation, E-News*, 014 (July 27, 2003).

